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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis examines the structure and flow of public funding between the public and private 
sectors in the South African health system and the consequences thereof for the achievement 
of equity.  The conceptual framework used to undertake the analysis derives from Richard 
Titmuss’ core theoretical framework, the Social Division of Welfare.  The application of the 
Social Division of Welfare applied to the South African health care context demonstrates 
how state resources end up benefitting the non-poor and, as a result, reproduce inequality.   
Those who access public institutions such as public health care are assumed to be ‘dependent’ 
on the state, whilst those who access private health facilities claim to be ‘independent’ of the 
state.  However, this thesis shows that these assumptions are flawed.  Access to the formal 
labour market, and subsequently the paying of taxes, authorises one to access state subsidies 
not available to those who do not.  The application of the Social Division of Welfare shows 
that tax-paying private health care patients benefit considerably from state resources.   
This thesis argues that due to cost escalation in the private health sector, a consequence of the 
commodification of health care, these private health care ‘consumers’ as well as the private 
health industry in general are dependent upon state resources.  This thesis analyses the role 
played by the profit motive present in the private health industry and the consequences for 
equity, quality, access and efficiency in health care provision.   
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SUMMARY 
  
This thesis examines the structure and flow of public funding between the public and private 
sectors in the South African health system and its consequences for the achievement of 
equity.  The conceptual framework used to undertake the analysis derives from Richard 
Titmuss’ core theoretical framework, the Social Division of Welfare, first presented in 1955 
and published in Essays on ‘The Welfare State’ (1958).  The Social Division of Welfare is 
applied to the South African context to demonstrate how state resources intended to alleviate 
poverty can be re-distributed to benefit the non-poor.  Situating the Social Division of 
Welfare in the South African context is necessary, as it subjects to critical scrutiny the largely 
pejorative claims about which social groups and classes are the primary beneficiaries of 
government income maintenance programmes. In order to understand the theoretical 
framework of Titmuss (1958) and explain its significance for analysing how fiscal resources 
are distributed between the public and private sectors, it is necessary to understand Titmuss’ 
general approach to the function and aim of social policy. 
Chapter 1 introduces the thesis whilst Chapter 2 traces Richard Titmuss’ theoretical and 
conceptual insights with a brief biographical outline in order to situate him in the context of 
his era.  It draws parallels between the significance of his theoretical work in mid-20th 
century United Kingdom and its relevance to democratic South Africa.  The approach is 
informed by the view that the work of Titmuss is that of a social theorist writing in the 
academic field of social policy. 
Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical and conceptual framework which is used in this thesis.  It 
traces the origins of Titmuss’ approach to the concept of solidarity and his interest in the 
perpetuation of class-based stereotypes through social policy.  It then interrogates his ideas on 
‘value systems’ embedded within institutions and apply this to contemporary South African 
academic discourse on social policy, poverty and “the poor”.  Finally it sets out the 
methodological mechanisms of the Social Division of Welfare which is fully explained, 
applied and analysed in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 4 provides some historical examples of social policy measures developed in South 
Africa which show how particular interest groups shaped the discourse and agenda which 
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influence social policy.  This chapter demonstrates, with reference to Richard Titmuss’ 
conceptual framework, how powerful class interests and the discourse of racism have shaped 
these policy measures.  The changing economic and social patterns in South Africa have 
brought with it what Titmuss terms a state of ‘diswelfare’ (Titmuss, 1968).  Social policy 
measures, aimed at ameliorating diswelfare, are shaped by discourses of dominant groups 
contoured around illness, poverty, class, race and gender.  An historical understanding of how 
the egalitarian intentions of social policy can be undermined by dominant discourses can help 
to explain how interventions in social policy in the democratic era can be appropriated to 
serve narrow interests. 
Chapter 5 outlines the concept of the Social Division of Welfare in detail and its criticisms.  
The Social Division of Welfare is then applied to the South African health system, in 
particular, fiscal resources in and between the public and private health systems.  The 
analysis focuses on the structure and operation of public resource flows towards the private 
health system. 
Chapter 6 examines how the structure of the current health system, in particular the private 
health system, undermines the principles of equity and accessibility and the goals of 
efficiency and affordability.  It does this by tracing the resource flows in and between 
government and the two-tier health system from the evidence provided in Chapter 5.  It 
integrates the conceptual insights of the Social Division of Welfare into the larger context of 
the South African health system and look at the different means by which state resources 
flow towards the private health system.  The chapter then analyses how the interactions 
between the public and private health systems lead to inequalities in resource flows; away 
from those who most need them.    
Chapter 7 outlines and discusses the argument that the private health system is the source of 
many of the inequities in health provision in South Africa.  This chapter argues that primary 
health care is neglected in the private health sector which has a detrimental effect on health 
outcomes in the country.  The “hidden” flow of public resources towards the private sector is 
discussed as well as the concomitant quality of care which is able to be provided in the 
private sector because of such flows.  The migration of doctors and nurses trained through 
public funds and the unequal geographic distribution of private health care facilities are 
analysed and the reasons and effects of this is explained.  Lastly, the effectiveness of private 
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health provision with regards to the most pressing health concern in South Africa, HIV/Aids, 
is interrogated. 
Chapter 8 provides a conclusion which discusses the findings of the preceding empirical 
chapters and relate these to the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 3 in order to 
provide an explanation for the tenacity of current problems which beset the health care 
industry in South Africa despite government commitment to public health care and what may 
be required to address this. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
1. L 
During a recent interview following the publishing of the 2011 census results, the ex-finance 
minister and current head of the National Planning Commission, Minister Trevor Manuel, in 
responding to the question of why inequality has increased despite considerable redistributive 
policies, said that South Africa’s current developmental trajectory and focus on growth 
means it is inevitable that in the short term inequality is going to increase (SABC 3 NEWS 
Interview, 30 October 2012).  The relationship between growth and inequality that Minister 
Manual posits is arguably not self-evident, nor is it universal.  Economic growth does not 
necessarily lead to an increase in inequality, and policies that benefit the well-off do not 
necessarily contribute to economic growth.  Inequalities, and increases in inequalities take 
different forms and have structural origins in the organisation of capitalist society.  Our task 
is to understand these origins and how the mechanisms which perpetuate inequality work.  
This thesis shows that in the realm of social policy, particularly health policy, a considerable 
amount of financial and other resources flow from the state to the private health system and 
from the public health system to the private health system.  Overall, this is having negative 
quantifiable and unquantifiable consequences for the public health sector and goes some way 
to explain the crisis in the public health system.  This thesis identifies and quantifies the flow 
of resources from the state to the private sector and analyse the consequences of this distorted 
flow of resources. 
This empirical evidence is situated within a larger conceptual framework which explains why 
and how resource flows can be appropriated and re-distributed in favour of the well-off and 
why they are not visible enough to be exposed to constant public scrutiny.  When systems of 
redistribution from rich to poor are proposed they are always accompanied by much criticism, 
research and theorisation.  Studies are done on the often poor recipients of state benefits, 
outcomes are speculated upon and unintended consequences are fretted over. It is particularly 
the latter which shapes criticisms of policies of redistribution.  Welfare - it is often argued in 
the public media, policy documents, by public officials and think tanks - creates dependency; 
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child support grants encourage teenagers to have children; and if the unemployment grant is 
set too high – their recipients will refuse to look for work.1  This discourse resembles to a 
large extent that of Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’ in the United Kingdom (Meth 2004: 12-13).   
As is often thought to be the basis of a ‘developmental state’, individuals and institutions who 
hold this view often argue that grants must be linked to incentives to work.  See for instance 
the 2007 ANC National Conference Resolutions document:  
We are building a developmental state and not a welfare state given that in welfare 
state, dependency is profound. (ANC, 2007) 
This is contrasted against the seemingly rational decisions likely to be made by those already 
rich – if you tax the rich less they are likely to invest in productive activities.   
These are class-based value judgments that treat the poor as children in need of guidance and 
have important consequences for policy formation, implementation and outcomes.  This 
thesis argues that notions such as these legitimate the enrichment of the better off and justify 
the withdrawal of redistributive measures.  These class-based value judgments pass over 
many of the causes of poverty and inequality in society and assume itself as rational logic.  
As we shall see, social policy discourses go further than simple justification of the status quo. 
The argument of this thesis is that class-based stereotypes which emerge from the lack of a 
critical interrogation of the causes of poverty in South Africa play an important role in 
legitimating the inequalities in resource flows in, among other spheres, the health sector.  
                                                                
1 For example see some of the following:  Newspaper reports:  ‘SA becoming a welfare state – SAIRR’, 
News24, January 31, 2011; ‘Route to growth lies in tax cuts’, Business Day, December 23, 2012; ‘Begroting: 
Werk moet geskep word’, Die Burger, February 23, 2011;  Free Market Foundation, Vivian Atud, Business 
Day, Friday February 1, 2013; SAIRR, Nachi Majoe, quoted in Media Release:  ‘Construction of a Welfare 
State in Progress’, January 31, 2011;  Government and party officials:  Minister of Agriculture and Land 
Affairs, Thoko Didiza in Business Day, Wednesday August 14, 2002:2; Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan in 
2011 Budget Speech, 23 Feb 2011;  Policy documents:  The notion of dependency was particularly popular 
during the Mbeki administration, see for instance the 51st ANC National Conference Resolutions, December 
2002; 52nd ANC National Conference Resolutions, December 2007.  Democratic Alliance:  Helen Zille, 
‘Address by the Leader of the Democratic Alliance, on social cohesion, at the National Social Cohesion Summit 
in Kliptown, Soweto’, March, 4, 2012;  Speech delivered at Liberal International Congress by Lindiwe 
Mazibuko, Parliamentary Leader of the Democratic Alliance, 22 October 2012 
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As Saleem Badat (unpublished paper) so aptly explains, the structure of society and its 
institutions are deeply informed by the ideas of its members:  
Two kinds of injustice prevail in South Africa. One kind is rooted in beliefs, 
prejudice, stereotypes, chauvinism, intolerance and fear of the ‘other’ – whether 
the ‘other’ are people of different ‘races’, social classes, sex, gender, sexual 
orientation, cultures, religions, languages, or nationalities, or live in specific 
geographical areas. Its effects are patterns of unjust social inclusion and exclusion, 
and domination and subordination of particular social groups. The other kind of 
injustice is deeply woven into the social and economic structures and relations of 
South African society, which have ossified so as to be thought of as natural and 
preordained, even though they are, of course, reproduced through human action 
and agency. These social and economic structures and relations ensure that great 
privileges and unbounded economic and social opportunities for a small minority 
coexist with harsh deprivation and an absence of opportunities for the majority; 
that the country remains one of the most unequal societies in the world in terms of 
disparities of wealth and income, living conditions and access to education, health 
and various social services; and that severe race, class, gender, geographical and 
other inequalities continue to be reproduced. 
The theoretical and conceptual framework explores the different value systems which 
underpin the policy process and traces and outlines the work of Richard Titmuss as he sought 
to debunk the myths of welfare dependency based on stigmatising class-based stereotypes 
perpetuated in the British welfare state between 1950 and 1970.  For this reason, the work of 
Richard Titmuss is particularly relevant in analysing the ways in which these taken for 
granted stereotypes influence social policy discourses and processes as well as their 
outcomes.  Utilising the conceptual framework of the Social Division of Welfare and 
meticulous empirical research Titmuss demonstrated how institutional and fiscal mechanisms 
were concealed from analysis by the system of classification of public expenditure. These 
hidden mechanisms and institutions perpetuated inequality in the welfare state.  In other 
words “inequality… persisted beneath the façade of the welfare state” (Schlesinger, 1966). 
The historical work of Andries du Toit (2011a) on traditions of poverty study in South Africa 
is utilised in order to extend Titmuss’ concepts to the South African situation.  Du Toit 
divides the poverty studies discourse in South Africa into three traditions.  The 
17 
 
technical/managerial tradition has given rise to a discourse of ‘service delivery’.  The 
moralist tradition associated with appealing to the conscience of the middle and upper classes 
depoliticises the poverty discourse, and, in the process either ignores the systemic causes of 
poverty or misplaces them.  The radical tradition which, in a similar vein to Titmuss’ 
argument around the creation of ‘diswelfare’, argues that the focus of poverty studies in 
South Africa should be returned to a focus on the systemic causes of poverty, and as a result, 
the mechanisms which contribute to increasing inequality. 
It is undeniable that the legacy of racist policies formulated and implemented in the colonial, 
segregation and apartheid era continue to have pervasive structural, socio-economic and 
political effects with negative psychological and emotional consequences on the everyday 
lives of working class and poor South Africans. The emergence of poverty and racism and the 
role of powerful interests in the shaping of South African social provision can be traced to 
dominant interest groups who shaped discourses on poverty and disease in order to influence 
policy in their favour.  These resulted in intended and unintended, quantifiable and 
unquantifiable consequences for the working class and marginal social groups.   
Just as a particular conception of the hierarchy of races legitimated racist policies, so are 
particular ideas around poverty and poor people legitimating the continuation of regressive 
social policies.  Policies are analysed to demonstrate how particular ideological reasonings 
are appropriated by groups to shape discourses which create an image of the poor. This thesis 
analyses these popular representations and point out how they are based upon a particular 
understanding of the causes of poverty and disease and how they allow for the process of 
regressive distribution of resources to occur.  Equally important is to investigate the ways in 
which resources flow away from those who need it; ways which are, as is shown in this 
thesis, hidden and justified by layers of ideology.  Ideologies which were historically fuelled 
by ideas about race, have more recently made an incomplete shift to ideas about class which 
continue to haunt South African society. 
The ANC government have always placed an emphasis on the notion of solidarity, and they 
have, in practice, formulated and implemented several policies more or less in line with 
solidaristic principles.  These would include the continuation of the social pension, the 
National Health Insurance proposals aimed at providing universal health care, as well as a 
variety of tax-funded grants.  Solidaristic social policies are based upon principles of risk-
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sharing usually in the form of a social insurance where members of society are equally 
protected.   
As Baldwin (1990: 1) puts it 
Insurance translates the effects of fate, luck and iniquitous social circumstance 
into the common denominators of cash, kind and services, then reallocates them 
so that the stricken bear no more than an average burden and those spared assume 
responsibility for events not directly affecting them. 
However, in most of these cases there are institutional divisions between what the poor have 
access to and what the rich have access to.  In South Africa the private health system serves a 
minority of people capable of affording high cost care.  South Africa therefore has a mixed 
system of health provision where the risk sharing is undermined by institutions of inequality.  
The decision to implement risk-sharing policies is usually accompanied by some controversy 
as classes struggle for the preservation of their own interests.  It is widely held that cross-
class solidarity arises when all classes stand to benefit mutually from a particular policy (see 
Baldwin, 1990).  The gains of equality-producing policies however are often hidden behind 
layers of ideology, notions of desert, and ideas about the causes of poverty and fears about 
‘dependency’.  And, as Titmuss pointed out, the gains often manifest in the form of 
externalities which are not easily quantified and are often overlooked (Titmuss, 1970: 243-
246).  
The psychological and emotional legacy of apartheid coupled with persisting socio-economic 
differentiation based still almost completely on race is thwarting the emergence of a true 
cross-race, cross-class solidarity.  The consequences of inequality (such as high crime rates, 
violence and unemployment) are perpetuated in class and race stereotypes in dominant 
discourses which, in turn, negate the probability for cross-class buy-in to policies based on 
the principle of social solidarity. Titmuss’ work derives from his observations of citizens in 
the United Kingdom’s collective organisational response to the threat of Nazism during the 
“war years” of the 1940’s. From these observations he developed the argument that cross-
class social solidarity is an achievable goal and can take an institutional form (such as the 
British National Health Service) that is supported across classes.  Social policy, depending on 
the principles and values which underpin it, can either contribute to or discourage such cross-
class solidarity.   
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In a country which is still addressing the divisive legacy of apartheid Titmuss’ theories on the 
cohesive or corrosive effects of social policies can provide a unique lens through which to 
scrutinise contemporary South African social policy. An ethic of solidarity stands in contrast 
to an each-to-its-own logic which prevails in the South African system of health provision.  It 
leads us to an analysis that focuses on poverty as an independent ‘problem’, or narrowly 
focusing on the needs of ‘the poorest of the poor’. Social policies based on an ethic of social 
solidarity however, engage the “problem” of the middle and upper classes and their role in 
the creation of a society suffused by poverty and inequality.  A solidaristic ethic argues that 
stability in a capitalist society is created by a comprehensive system of risk-sharing and high 
levels of redistribution in the social sectors.  The middle and upper classes therefore have an 
important role to play in producing the social stability and political conditions which would 
allow for the legitimation of institutions of mutual risk sharing (such as a universal health 
service and comprehensive public education) which would positively impact on the quality of 
life of all citizens across classes. 
The argument therefore is that in order to tackle poverty and inequality, the roots of its 
emergence and perpetuation should be analysed and social policies should be formulated 
which will reverse or remove these structures.  This stands in contrast to the currently 
pervasive idea that the ‘problem’ of poverty can be ‘addressed’ through ‘service delivery’.  
‘Poverty’ is often separated from or even displaces inequality.  In the process of ‘addressing’ 
poverty, the idea of ‘pro-poor’ policies vindicates those who do not fall in the category of 
‘poor’ and encourages popular stereotypes that contribute to the lack of questioning by the 
middle and upper classes as to their own role in the production of poverty.  The racial origins 
of class inequalities in South Africa provide a foundation for such stereotypes and render 
class relations opaque. They will continue to flourish unless these stereotypes are critically 
engaged with and challenged. 
As Richard Tawney argues, and as Titmuss demonstrates in The Gift Relationship (1970), the 
“amenity and dignity and mutual appreciation” between classes (and social groups) is not 
only an important element in “individual happiness and social well-being”, but a fundamental 
necessity for economic prosperity (Tawney, 1931: 20).  So far however a call for solidarity 
has only ever been employed when convenient and then only as an attempt to dissipate ill-
feeling among the working class and unemployed, or to promote philanthropic intentions 
among the rich and business class.  The lack of institutionalised cross-class solidarity means 
there is no real substance in terms of solidarity to fall back on when times of crises arise.   
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As Tawney so fittingly observes: 
A nation, like an individual, reaps in the wet what it sows in the fine.  It enters a 
crisis with its habits framed and temper fixed by the normal and permanent set of 
its policy and institutions.  If it reserves its enthusiasm for co-operation to 
moments when co-operation offers obvious economic advantages, it is likely to 
discover that the object of its invocations, if not sleeping off dinners at his club, is 
hunting the shires or on a journey to the Riviera. (Tawney, 1931: 21) 
If a more solidaristic society is to be developed, risk-sharing will need to be institutionalised 
across classes.  The argument Tawney makes and Titmuss spent his career exploring was that 
solidaristic principles are not only socially desirable but when employed in the social services 
are more efficient than for-profit services such as private health care.   
In 1989 public health specialist Max Price predicted that the trend of privatisation in the 
South African health sector, which was implemented in an attempt to decrease state 
expenditure, will have the opposite effect.  He argued that continued privatisation will have 
dire consequences for equality of access and primary care; it will create resource problems 
for the public health system and invert the processes of rational resource allocation (Price, 
1989: 128).  Chapters 4 and 5, on the Social Division of Welfare applied to state health 
spending in South Africa, shows that the situation Price predicted has indeed come to pass.  
The South African health system as a whole is becoming less efficient and more 
unaffordable.  Titmuss’ conceptual framework can shed light on why this has happened. 
The ‘Social Division of Welfare’, a conceptual framework devised by Titmuss to show just 
how well-off Britons benefit from the welfare state and in effect countering the then-
emerging argument that the British welfare state was impoverishing the middle classes, is 
then applied to state resources in the health sector in the South African context.  The South 
African private health system and its patients – often viewed as independent of the state – are 
showed not only to depend considerably on state subsidisation, but also that private patients 
receive more state resources than their public counterparts.  With the help of Titmuss’ 
framework not only is this shown to be the case, but even more importantly, how and why 
this occurs in a country which has embraced the ethos of redistribution through the social 
services. 
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The thesis then goes on to analyse how the interactions between the public and private health 
systems lead to a distortion of resource flows.  Drawing from the theorem of Kenneth Arrow 
(1963) on the presence of uncertainty in the medical care industry and the detrimental 
consequences it has for efficiency if subjected to market principles, Chapter 5 shows how the 
mere presence of a private health sector is creating dysfunctions in the public health sector as 
well as producing unsustainable cost increases which undermine the long term viability of the 
private sector itself.  Thus, privatised health care is not only problematic due to the socially 
exclusionary manner in which it operates, but also the way in which the overall private 
system creates a systemic flow of health resources towards the better off.  In this way there is 
arguably a corollary between the deteriorating public health system and the presence of a 
private health system, however regulated.    
Using the theoretical framework of Titmuss coupled with the concepts drawn from 
throughout the thesis it is interesting to conclude that inequality is not only produced through 
the chosen economic system operating in industry and the workplace, nor is it, as Trevor 
Manuel noted, just an unintended and unavoidable consequence of development and 
economic growth; it can be observed in those state functions whose aims, at the outset, are of 
equity and redistribution.  Their presence therefore persists due to combinations of special 
interests in the system of ‘private’ medical provision, institutional continuities and habits, 
persisting class-based stereotypes due to a lack of their critical interrogation, and an 
international and persisting trend of focusing on growth and development whilst deferring 
blame for poverty on poor people.  
The Social Division of Welfare points to inequitable spending trends in the health system of 
South Africa.  Spending trends alone do not however explain the reasons for the continuing 
negative outcomes in health or for the dire state of the public health system.  Resource flows 
follow the particular market mechanisms embodied by the system and if encouraged, can be 
distorted to enforce inequity.  Thus the trajectory of resource flows in South Africa is a 
derivative of a commodified health system.  There are many challenges facing the public and 
private health systems today and this thesis uncovers how the resource flows in the public 
and private health systems contributes to the current crisis in health care.  An analysis and 
investigation of these trends, along with the historical context of its emergence sheds light on 
the structural challenges that face health reformers today.   
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CHAPTER 2 
RICHARD TITMUSS AND SOCIAL POLICY 
 1. L 
2.1. Introduction 
This first section of this chapter provides a historical context to the theoretical framework 
used in this thesis which is applied through a biographical and historical outline of Richard 
Titmuss, his work and his conceptual insights in the area of social policy.  This is done in 
order to identify Titmuss’ theoretical work and the development of his ideas on social policy 
as that traditionally associated with a social theorist. It is also to draw parallels between the 
significance of his theories as applied to mid-20th century Britain and its relevance and 
application to the problems of health, poverty and inequality in democratic South Africa.  The 
second section traces the origins of his concept of solidarity and its relationship to class 
stereotypes.  It then interrogates the ideas of Titmuss on ‘value systems’ as they are 
embedded within institutions.  Through this a need for the re-examination of South African 
social policy discourse is argued.  Finally the chapter discusses the methodological 
mechanisms of the Social Division of Welfare and how it fits into Titmuss’ conception of 
social policy and social institutions.  The Social Division of Welfare is fully explained and 
analysed in Chapter 4. 
2.2. Biographical Framework 
2.2.1. Early work 
Richard Titmuss was a scholar who never received a graduate education.  The impact this had 
on his thinking is often quite apparent. His experience in an insurance office, the 
consequences of non-transferable pensions, the stigmatisation of the unemployed, and the 
effect that poverty has on the process of growing up all contributed to his general theory of 
compensation for what he termed the “diswelfare” of industrialisation (Titmuss, 1968).  The 
lack of a rigid education in a singular discipline arguably contributed to Titmuss’ nuanced 
interdisciplinary approach.  Bryan S. Turner argues, in the preface to From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology (Turner, 1991, in Gerth and Mills (eds.), 1948: xxiv) that for Marx, 
capitalism “pushed humanity along the road of modernisation, but at an enormous cost in 
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terms of individual and collective suffering” whilst for Weber it destroyed the systems of 
belief which governed ‘pre-modern’ society.  In a similar vein Titmuss explores ‘collective 
suffering’ whilst devising new ways, in the form of the social services, which can replace the 
systems of belief or in his view, the norms, values and principles which bind societies 
together. 
Within the discipline of social policy, Titmuss used the insights of theorists who concerned 
themselves with the origins or development of capitalism (such as Marx, Weber, and 
Tawney) as a basis to investigate its effects in terms of structure, responsibility and blame. 
Similar to Weber (Gerth and Mills (eds), 1948: 34), Titmuss used statistics extensively to 
point out the underlying economic and social consequences of capitalism2 .  His view then, 
that poverty in society was a consequence of the processes of social change had a significant 
impact on the way ‘poverty’ was framed and policy was formulated in Britain.  These two 
issues, ideology and process, were, for Titmuss, intertwined and he argued that the separation 
of the two would lead to unintended consequences (Titmuss, 1958; 1968). 
As the Chairman of the British Sociological Association from 1959 to 1962, Titmuss was a 
sociologist, yet as T.H. Marshall points out, what Titmuss was so ‘supremely’ good at was  
to show how our understanding of social conditions, problems and processes can 
be immeasurably increased by studies which owe little to theoretical formulae, but 
a great deal to the purposeful selection of a precisely defined subject and to the 
meticulous handling of factual data (Marshall, 1973).    
Whilst working at Bedfordshire County Fire Insurance Office, he used his spare time to write 
a series of monographs.  His first four books were published during this period, the first being 
Poverty and Population (1938), which argued that the alarming decline of the British 
population was due to policies which did not protect British citizens effectively.  Blaming 
premature death and the offshoots of unemployment, Titmuss argues that liberal economic 
theories were failing the country and creating dangerous social consequences for future 
                                                                
2 In the early 1890s Weber embarked on an extensive survey on the depopulation of rural workers in the East-Elbian region 
of Germany.  He showed how “the real-estate and property interests of Junker capitalism were responsible for the 
depopulation of the German east” (Gerth and Mills 1948: 34).  His extensive use of statistics allowed for the ‘economic and 
social reasons’ for the German peasant depopulation of the East-Elbian area and their replacement with cheap foreign 
labourers to emerge. 
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generations and that intervention in the increasing poverty and inequality in Britain was 
imperative.   
Titmuss’ second book titled Our Food Problem (1939) written with F. Le Gros Clark, was 
about the effects of malnutrition in Britain.  He increasingly began to draw from the work and 
ideas of R.H. Tawney.  Our Food Problem investigates and reiterates Tawney’s argument 
that ‘bad wages produce bad work’ (Tawney, 1914, in Reisman, 2004: 774). The possibility 
of a “lively and vigorous population” (Titmuss and Clark, 1939: 91-92 in Reisman, 2004: 
774) was being undermined by malnutrition and vitamin deficiencies which were the result of 
inequality caused by low wages. 
In 1942 he published another co-authored book with his wife, Kathleen Titmuss, titled 
Parents Revolt (1942), which explained the declining birth-rate.  Titmuss shared a view that 
Britain was going through a crisis where the population was not effectively reproducing itself 
to be able to maintain the current economy as well as sustain the country after the impending 
war.  There were just too few people in Britain and this was due, Titmuss and Titmuss (1942) 
argue, to the fact that people could not afford the cost of children in Britain, and that British 
couples were effectively in “revolt” against the system, opting rather for the little security 
they could manage as married individuals without casting themselves into poverty due to the 
costs of bringing up children.  Absolute deprivation was, in other words, acting as a form of 
birth control at a time when Britain was in dire need of active citizens (Reisman, 2004: 775).   
Birth, Poverty and Wealth (1943) followed soon after and continues with the theme of   
Parents Revolt in that it grapples with the problem of population growth in Britain.  During 
the 1940s in Britain the problem of population growth was a public concern.  As the 
Manchester Guardian stated in 1943, “The future of the race” was being faced with a 
“menace” of “a low fertility rate among the well-to-do and a declining fertility rate with a 
high infant mortality among the less favoured classes”.  Where Parents Revolt grappled with 
the low fertility rate through the lens of obligation, which was viewed as decreasing altruism 
due to inequality and poverty; using statistics, Birth, Poverty and Wealth argued that the 
population problem could be solved by lowering the infant mortality rate. This is the now 
familiar Titmussian argument that the increasing gradient of inequality in Britain was having 
a profound negative effect on the life chances of, not only the survival and productivity of 
individuals, but that of Britain as a whole.  As Maurice Newfield argues, by this time Titmuss 
had established himself as an expert in statistical analysis (Foreword in Titmuss, 1943).   
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2.2.2. The war years 
Problems of Social Policy (1950), a major study of the social policy reactions of the British 
government to war time, was a study commissioned by the British Government who wanted a 
history of the consequences for social policy of World War II recorded.  War, Titmuss 
realised, especially a civilian war on the home front, had the ability to unite people.  Seeing 
the growth of the emergency services and the buy-in from the whole range of classes in 
Britain, Titmuss concludes that “a shared contingency evokes a collective response” 
(Reisman, 2004: 776).  The notion of solidarity and its subsequent effect on the operation and 
conscience of societies, which was a common theme in Titmuss’ work, now found itself at 
the centre of his analytic framework.  An “inarticulate need… to be a wanted member of 
society” (Titmuss 1950: 347) became a central theme of Titmuss’ work perhaps exactly 
because he saw first-hand the cohesive effect and effectiveness of its presence during war.  
Drawing from Tawney, Titmuss saw how the civilian war was able to promote the cohesion 
among classes that allowed for the relatively smooth adoption of the Beveridge proposals, 
which exemplified a comprehensive social security system that allowed all British citizens to 
live above a certain minimum standard. 
2.2.3. The emergence of the welfare state in Britain. 
Titmuss took the newly instituted Chair of Social Administration, a new discipline 
established at the London School of Economics in 1950.  Titmuss had a profound effect on 
the shape of the academic discipline of social policy in the mid-1950s, one writer states that 
his influence was so far reaching that “to say social policy in Britain was to say Richard 
Titmuss” (Reisman, 2004: 779).  The establishment of the British welfare state by the post-
war Labour government (1945-1951) attracted criticisms from the right, and anti-welfarist 
views were becoming increasingly widespread in the ruling Conservative Party. Although the 
Conservative government did not overturn the institutions of the welfare state such as the 
National Health Service (NHS), when they came to power in 1951 they subjected it to 
sustained criticism. In 1956 Titmuss and Brian Abel-Smith, a colleague at the LSE, produced 
a book in defence of the NHS.  Conservative critics mostly argued that the NHS was 
becoming too expensive and inefficient and Titmuss and Abel-Smith, in The Cost of the 
National Health Service (1956) provided arguments accompanied by empirical data proving 
that this claim was not valid.  Titmuss produced several commissioned case studies (Social 
Policies and Population Growth in Mauritius, 1961 and The Health Services of Tanganyika, 
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1964a), in 1958 several of his lectures and articles were published in Essays on ‘The Welfare 
State’ (1958) and later, Commitment to Welfare (1968).  In 1962, in an influential empirical 
study, Income Distribution and Social Change (1962), he demonstrated how, despite the  
intentions of welfare state redistribution, the middle and upper classes still managed to find 
fiscal loopholes in the system of welfare provision which enabled them to hold on to their 
wealth.   
2.2.4. Titmuss and the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) 
The year 1963 was, as Fontaine (2002: 402) writes, the commencement of a period of 
hostility between Titmuss and a new conservative think tank, the Institute of Economic 
Affairs (IEA) based in London which would profoundly shape the direction of Titmuss’ 
research.  By then several media articles had appeared arguing for the privatisation of health 
care, mainly written by conservative MP’s3.  But it was the economist D.S. Lees’ pamphlet, 
Health through Choice, (1961) that prompted Titmuss to write Ethics and Economics of 
Medical Care (1963)4.  In Ethics Titmuss sought to expose the selective amnesia of the 
British Medical Association (BMA) which had previously been hostile towards private 
provision; even calling the competitiveness between private medical practitioners ‘evil’ 
(Titmuss, 1963: 17, quoting BMA Report, 1905: 28).  By the mid-1960s the BMA had 
changed their loyalties and was increasingly in favour of the reprivatisation of health care.   
Titmuss went on to debunk Lees’ claims that somewhere in history a healthy private health 
care market flourished without third party intervention.  He continues that the provision of 
medical care is not an ordinary commodity that produces, as do other commodities, an 
environment of expanding choice.  Titmuss used extensive empirical data to make the point 
that the privatised American health system was not working as efficiently as its proponents 
argued.  He then argued that the formula being applied to the American health care system, 
which was assumed to work efficiently and “produce acceptable allocations of resources” 
                                                                
3 ‘‘The Social Services – needs and means’: analysis by two Conservative MP’s’, Iain McLeod and Enoch Powell’s, The 
Social Services – needs and means’. (The Times, 17 January 1952) (They were two Conservative MP’s at the Conservative 
Political Centre), the editorial in the same edition, and John Jewkes and Sylvia Jewkes, The Genesis of the National Health 
Service launched some of the main attacks on the NHS in Britain in the 1950s. 
4 Dr Lees was widely referenced by the American Medical Association (see for instance New York State Journal of 
Medicine, February 15, 1962).  He argued that there was “a strange neglect of general economic principles” being applied to 
health care.  His pamphlet, Health through Choice (1961), released by the Institute of Economic Affairs in London, is not 
available thus all references thereof are taken from Ethics (Titmuss, 1963), and from Fontaine (2002) who provides 
extensive information on the relationship between Titmuss and the IEA.  
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was “singularly inoperative” (Titmuss, 1963: 19).  Not long after Ethics was published, the 
economist Kenneth Arrow (1963) wrote a powerful theorem on the role of uncertainty in 
medical care and the subsequent role that ethics plays in its provision.  Although Titmuss had 
alluded to some of the ethical dimensions of Arrow’s argument in previous lectures5, such an 
article by a noted economist (he was later to win the Nobel Prize) provided Titmuss with 
concrete ammunition against the IEA’s attacks (Fontaine, 2002: 407). 
Arrow’s argument is that the particular characteristics of health care provision distort market 
principles.  Arrow argues that the distortions in the medical-care market are due to “the 
existence of uncertainty in the incidence of disease and in the efficacy of treatment” (Arrow, 
1963: 941).  Market principles cannot be strictly applied to health care because the 
characteristics found in health care (such as the general uncertainty of the consumer about 
their condition) distort the efficiency usually expected in a competitive environment.  
Titmuss added that the application of market principles to health care produces the kind of 
physician that cares little for “the welfare of human beings… [and] is generally not inclined 
to participate in community activities unless these contribute to his income” (Kelly, 1957: 
195-6, as quoted in Titmuss, 1963: 17).   
At this point, Titmuss touches on a notion of morality and values implied in the specifics of 
‘care’ in ‘health care provision’.  In Ethics Titmuss argues that if doctors come to be seen as 
‘small businessmen’, and they embrace the market system, they would have to “relinquish 
their role (as Durkheim put it) as ‘centers of moral life’” (Titmuss, 1963: 17, quoting 
Durkheim, 1957: 26).  This Titmuss goes on to argue, would have a profound effect on ‘trust’ 
in society.  His idea that medical care cannot simply be a commodity is argued with empirical 
evidence that draws attention to the values embedded in social policies.  He argues not only 
for a regard for human life which could diminish with the commodification of medical care, 
but he also calls for a reconsideration of the importance of what it is exactly that makes us 
human – the social bond - and whether or not the ‘money thinking’ which permeates society 
delegitimises its necessity; equating human beings with mink coats and medical care with 
washing machine repair have destructive effects on society beyond efficiency and choice.   
Titmuss was an unrelenting critic of the emerging right-wing think tanks, notably the IEA 
which, in essence, was a Tory response to the ‘socialist’ Fabian Society, founded in 1884. 
                                                                
5 See Titmuss, ‘Sociological and Ethic Aspects of Therapeutics” paper given at Johns Hopkins University in November 1963 
(Fontaine 2002: 407) as well as in Ethics and Economics of Medical Care  (1963)  
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Titmuss used rigorous empirical evidence to refute their sloppy use of statistics and facts and 
their disregard for what he considered the damaging unquantifiable consequences of the 
actions they proposed. In a similar vein to Weber’s ‘debunking technique’, Titmuss revealed 
how “ideological assertions” are really “false cloaks for less respectable interests”; the so-
called “incongruities between verbal assertions and actual intent” (Gerth and Mills (eds.), 
1948: 48).   
In Ethics, Titmuss points out the selectivity in Lees’ choice of historical periods in support of 
his arguments on private health care (Lees, 1961, as cited in Titmuss, 1963: 16-17): “It would 
seem, therefore, that Dr. Lees’ assumption of free market conditions operating without the 
intervention of third parties has only limited validity in respect of the period before organised 
Health Insurance in 1911”.  He goes on to point out Lees’ failure to recognise the 
fundamental differences between objects and service, life-threatening needs and ordinary 
wants, and the measure of control over costs in the product services and health care (Titmuss, 
1963: 18).  Titmuss then shows Lees’ gross generalisation of the state of health care in the 
United States of America and therefore his distorted analyses based upon these 
generalisations (Titmuss, 1963: 18-19).  His conclusion is once again that “the American 
experience does not, therefore, support Dr. Lees’ advocacy of transferring hospitals to private 
ownership on the grounds that such ownership would keep down costs, expose poor 
performance, redress imbalances and be more sensitive to consumer demands.” (Titmuss, 
1963: 19)   
He then argues that the increasing specialisation in the medical sciences has the effect of 
increasing self-diagnosis and self-selection on the part of the medical ‘consumer’.  This has 
profound effects on quality and cost in terms of time and opportunity (Titmuss, 1963: 20).  
Moreover, the growing scientific complexity increases ‘consumer’ ignorance; increasing the 
need for trust in the doctor-patient relationship – something that is not flourishing within the 
American free market health system considering the number of malpractice suits compared to 
Britain.  His most forceful argument is against Lees (1961) and the Jewkes’ claim (in The 
Genesis of the British National Health Service, 1961) that free market practice in health care 
will increase choice:  “The imbalances and distortions created by private hospital insurance 
systems often contradict the principles of good medical care and consumer choice” (Titmuss, 
1963: 20). 
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Countering the attack on the newly established welfare state in Britain in the mid-1950s, 
Titmuss gives two reasons why the British welfare state, which had been established in 1948, 
came under fire from the right, and increasingly from the middle and upper classes:  the 
promotion in the media and popular discourse of “a decaying, overworked and anxious 
middle class”6 and the “image of an all-pervasive Welfare State for the working classes” 
(Titmuss, 1958: 36).  Two popular books, The English Middle Classes (1949) and 
Professional People (1952) by Roy Lewis and Angus Maude argued that since the 
establishment of the welfare state in Britain, the leisure time enjoyed by the middle classes 
had decreased whilst that of the working classes had increased.  Despite its ideological 
content many British middle and upper class citizens internalised these ideas.  Titmuss argues 
that even if Lewis and Maude’s arguments were defensible (which, with the help of the 
Social Division of Welfare, he pointed out, were not), it would, as a “political frame of 
reference” manifest in class-based stereotypes, resulting in widening class relationships and 
legitimating the withdrawal of redistributive policies (Titmuss, 1958: 36-38).  
Public health care meant more to Titmuss than merely its ends as equality.  With a desire to 
prove that institutions, and perhaps wider society, operate more efficiently when embedded 
with a value system of altruism and a common shared citizenship, he embarked on a project 
that would result in his final and most significant work, The Gift Relationship (1970).  
Titmuss’ normative arguments on social solidarity and the universalisation of social policy, 
apart from being meticulously researched and based on empirical evidence, was constructed 
with “a sense of purpose” (Reisman, 2004: 781).  What made his theories insightful was his 
unrelenting belief in the transformation of society based on the solidaristic virtues inherent in 
human nature, in contrast to ‘liberal’ economists’ argument that the vice of self-interest could 
act as an ‘invisible hand’ to regulate society towards a common/utilitarian good. State 
intervention was a means to an end; Titmuss wanted to institutionalise a particular form of 
human relations which would manifest in, or exemplify, a caring society.   
In this sense he was a reformist, interested, not in Marx’s revolution of the proletariat; or in 
social reform from above, but rather in investing and “engineering camaraderie” amongst 
classes that would, in engaging and debunking stereotypes and misconceptions about the 
effects of industrial change, lead to equality (Reisman, 2004: 782).  His work can be seen 
then as a project to build between-class bridges of solidarity that would allow for what he saw 
                                                                
6 A similar attitude is conveyed in Denney and Riesman’s Creating an Industrial Civilization (1952).  As with Lewis and 
Maude’s book the increase of leisure time for the working class is viewed as undesirable. 
30 
 
as the essential human need to be altruistic and caring towards strangers to emerge - a 
practical application of Tawney’s notion of co-operation7.  This value system would then 
effectively and efficiently govern society.  In this sense it is quite obvious that Titmuss drew 
extensively from writers such as Durkheim, Weber, Marx and Rawls but in a very selective 
manner.  Their ideas are not systematically applied but rather used as insights by Titmuss in 
developing his theories which would make a significant contribution to social policy as an 
area of academic study. 
In 1966 Titmuss contacted a colleague at the Ministry of Health to obtain data on blood 
transfusion with the goal of developing further the argument he made in Ethics “by applying 
economic theory to the problems of blood transfusion and the supply of blood for medical 
care” (Fontaine, 2002; Titmuss, 1966).  In The Gift Relationship (1970), he argued that the 
commercialisation of blood donation puts society at risk.  The basic argument is that being 
allowed to sell your blood would lead people with blood related sicknesses such as Hepatitis 
to lie about their medical history in order to access payment for their blood.  He relates the 
continued wastage and shortage of blood in the commercialised system to very much the 
same problem:  the free donation of blood connected to the ‘altruism’ principle upon which 
the health services to a large extent depends is completely lost once the ‘money principle’ is 
applied.  The Gift Relationship, taking its evidence from the blood donation system, is a 
warning of what happens when the negative unquantifiable consequences (economists calls 
them ‘externalities’) of increasing commercialism are underestimated not only in the blood 
transfusion service but also in the social services and perhaps even society as a whole.  
2.3. Critics of Titmuss and the Social Division of Welfare 
It is necessary in reviewing Titmuss’ theories to examine academic criticisms of his approach 
and ideas. Of his earlier work, critical reviews are mainly positive, indeed, even applauding.  
Essays on ‘The Welfare State’ (1958) was argued to carry “the mark of genius” by Barbara 
Wootton, a British sociologist and president of the British Sociological Association at the 
time (Wootton, 1959).  She was particularly impressed with the way Titmuss refuted myths 
built upon general fears as well as the manipulative use of statistics, in particular the ‘gloom’ 
emitted by the Beveridge Report on the age structure of Britain.  In a revisit of the key issues 
                                                                
7 In opposition to the Marxist notion of class struggle, Tawney argues that a fellow-feeling between classes, based on notions 
of a common humanity can be institutionalized.  
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brought up by Income Distribution and Social Change (1962), A.B. Atkinson calls this “one-
man effort… a singular achievement in the field of social inquiry” (Atkinson, 1975: 68). 
The demographer Eugene Grebenik makes a point in his review of Birth, Poverty and Wealth 
(1943) which emerges as a theme in reviews of Titmuss’ work among those critical of his 
interdisciplinary approach, particularly among specialists who did not appreciate his 
seemingly effortless, yet sometimes simplistic crossing of disciplinary boundaries.  Grebenik 
points to weaknesses in Titmuss’ argument, particularly where it pertains to unconventional 
use of statistics or the drawing of morally saturated conclusions.  He took a slightly sceptical 
view of the statistical methods Titmuss employed, arguing that errors derived from this 
method conveniently worked in favour of the arguments Titmuss presented.  Despite this 
criticism he nonetheless recommends the book “to the expert and layman alike” due to both 
its “simplicity” as well as the “importance of the results obtained” (Grebenik, 1943: 172).  He 
more or less follows the same argument in his review of Income Distribution and Social 
Change (1962) (Grebenik, 1963).  This theme, of pointed criticism followed by an epitaphic 
description of its importance and the insights it held, came to resemble most criticism of 
Titmuss’ work.  
Most of the criticism, reviews, applauds and appraisals were directed at Titmuss’ last work, 
The Gift Relationship (1970) (apart from the ones discussed below, see also Pinker 1979; 
Collard 1978).  As Iain McLean and Jo Poulton said, The Gift Relationship “is a fierce and 
emotional book which prompted fierce and emotional reactions on both sides” (McLean and 
Poulton, 1986: 431).  
An interdisciplinary work, drawing from the writings of anthropologists, sociologists and 
economists, the book evoked far-reaching responses in which this love-hate theme is 
particularly evident.  In The Gift Relationship Titmuss cites economists to the likes of Jan de 
v. Graaf, E.J. Mishan, and S.K. Nath in order to bolster his critique on the inability of 
economists to measure certain externalities.  In other words the Pareto criterion which argues 
that “any change is better as long as nobody is worse off and at least one person is better off” 
(as quoted in Fontaine, 2002: 422-423) was impossible to foresee since most effects are 
unquantifiable, or at least, easy to ignore.  One such externality was the loss of altruism, a 
product, Titmuss argued, of institutionalised gift-giving to strangers in the form of a 
voluntary blood donation service. 
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In 1972 Arthur Seldon, a member of the IEA who was in the process of putting together a 
book of counterarguments to The Gift Relationship, mentioned to his co-editor that Titmuss’ 
book was “taken seriously even by economists of the stature of Arrow” (Fontaine, 2002: 
427).  Among others were Paul A. Samuelson (1971), Alvin W. Gouldner (1971), Nathan 
Glazer (1971), and it seems the book had even impressed Milton Friedman (Fontaine, 2002: 
427).  The Gift Relationship therefore received quite a bit of attention as most of these 
economists, and also significant names in other fields, wrote reviews on the book.  Kenneth 
Arrow, perhaps Titmuss’ most renowned reviewer found “many faults with it yet ends up 
with a blessing” (Fontaine, 2002: 427).  In his review Arrow sees The Gift Relationship to be  
…intended as something of a searchlight to illuminate a much broader landscape:  
the limits of economic analysis, the rival uses of exchange and gift as modes of 
allocation, the collective or communitarian possibilities in society as against the 
tendencies towards individualism. (Arrow, 1972: 343) 
When Arrow was asked to write the review he did not know about the effect his own writing 
had had on Titmuss’ ideas about the medical industry (Fontaine, 2002: 434).  Nonetheless he 
recognises the argument made through the use of the blood system as similar to the one he 
made in 1963 - that particular characteristics of certain ‘commodities’ may actually thwart 
the efficiency of the economic market and that “Formal philanthropy has always been a 
prominent element of all economic systems and has shown no signs of diminution” (Arrow, 
1972: 345). 
In Arrow’s twenty page review he lauds Titmuss for having  
… not rested content with the moral satisfaction of advocating the good but has 
immersed himself in the detailed factual analysis and speculative thinking needed 
if good intentions are to become good deeds. (Arrow, 1972: 343) 
He also argues that Titmuss book has made it obvious “that the allocation of goods and 
services is not accomplished entirely by exchange, as standard economic models would hold” 
(Arrow, 1972: 344).  The way government expenditures are organised, as Arrow notes, 
represent in a way a form of altruism, albeit not a pure one due to the coercion involved in 
paying taxes.  He agrees with Titmuss that a moral justification exists for public social 
service provision, which also translates into palpable policy prescriptions.  The repression of 
this form of altruism erodes a sense of community, or rather, solidarity.  Arrow argues that 
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this “role of free giving in producing a more humanitarian social order is worth considering” 
(Arrow, 1972: 346).   
Arrow does not however feel that Titmuss provided adequate evidence when he makes the 
argument that the gains from a purely voluntary system would be ‘completely lost’ in the 
presence of a mixed system where individuals can choose to either donate or sell their blood.  
He argues that Titmuss came to the conclusion that the United States has a less altruistic 
society when it comes to blood donation because it has a system of paying for blood, but that 
the argument could as well be that the United States have a system of paying for blood 
because it is a less altruistic society.   
Arrow goes on to ask “why should it be that the creation of a market in blood would decrease 
the altruism embodied in giving blood?  I do not find any clear answer in Titmuss” (Arrow, 
1972: 351).  Singer came to Titmuss’ defence, arguing that this is one of the areas in which 
“Arrow did not read Titmuss with sufficient care” (Singer, 1973: 312).  Singer argues that 
Arrow’s conception of ‘freedom’ is too narrow for him to understand what Titmuss is 
arguing.  Indeed Titmuss’ choice of using the words ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’ is likely to allow 
the reader to fall into the trap of established liberal definitions and ways of thinking.  Arrow 
does see that the incompatibility of the two systems cannot mean more freedom even if they 
have more choice. 
While a voluntary system, Titmuss argues, fosters these attitudes and creates opportunities for 
their expression, a commercial system would have the opposite effect.  The laws of the 
marketplace discourage altruism.  Even if the opportunity to give still existed, the attitude 
toward giving would no longer be the same. (Singer, 1973: 314) 
In other cases where Arrow demands more evidence from Titmuss Singer argues that  
The extent to which it is reasonable to demand conclusive or very strong evidence 
before a proposition is taken seriously must vary with the nature of the 
proposition that is being considered.  In a case like the comparison of blood 
supply systems in different countries, where controlled experiments are 
impossible and the factor under examination can never be isolated from other 
differences between the systems, it is unreasonable to demand conclusive proof or 
anything near it.  (Singer, 1973: 314) 
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He goes on to repeat the evidence provided in The Gift Relationship, which Arrow argued to 
be absent, and comes to the conclusion that “once there is some evidence, the onus is on 
whoever denies this to produce counterevidence” (Singer, 1973: 314).  Where Arrow 
demands a theoretical explanation between the link Titmuss makes between blood wastage 
and the commercial blood system (Arrow, 1972: 356), Singer counteracts by saying that the 
strong research outcomes of the extensive interviews Titmuss did in Britain were adequate.  
These interviews asked questions around why people donate blood8 and provides clear 
evidence that free services such as the British NHS “ may strengthen feelings of community 
and mutual interdependence” (Singer, 1973: 317).  
As for biases and under-theorised assumptions lacking in evidence, Singer points out that 
Arrow’s principled stand for self-interest as the driver of supply and demand is motivated by 
his vague assumption and fear that altruism is a scarce resource, one, he argues, “We do not 
wish to use up recklessly” (Arrow, 1972: 354).   
Not long after, Ernie Lightman attempted to address the question asked by Arrow about 
Titmuss’ conclusions.  Lightman asks whether  
the observed differences in outcomes – the quantity and quality of blood supplied 
and its availability to those who are in need – [are] attributable to the national 
approaches to blood procurement or to a host of other cultural, economic and 
political factors which distinguish different societies? (Lightman, 1981: 54-55)   
Noting the element which underlies most of this work, the question of human nature, he 
observes that it does not lend itself to empirical testing.  In the process of testing motivations 
of blood donators, Lightman comes to the conclusion that “Social behaviours can apparently 
be initiated through a favourable context [such as easy access to clinics] but cannot be 
maintained” (Lightman, 1981: 74).  He finds that the reliable blood donors are those who cite 
their obligation to the community as their fundamental reason for donating blood (Lightman, 
1981: 74-75). 
Considering the theme which has characterised Titmuss’ reviews and critiques it is no 
surprise that contemporary reviews either of new editions of Titmuss’ work or on his general 
                                                                
8 Singer quotes some of these interviewees which expressed a motive of extreme gratitude as well as altruism.  Most of the 
interviewees spoke about being grateful about what the NHS has done for them, from small things such as surgical shoes to 
saving their life.  In this case they view the donation of blood as a form of ‘giving back’.  Others pointed to the 
interdependence of society and that, just as they depend on others, others also depend on them. 
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contribution to social policy appreciates his vision with the helpful company of hindsight and 
theoretical and philosophical advances.   Robert Pinker, both a lifelong critic and admirer of 
Titmuss whose ideological loyalties lie at the opposite spectrum than his former Professor, 
said that Titmuss, in the writing of The Gift Relationship “added a new dimension of 
ideological conflict to the debate about the values, ends and means of social policy” (Pinker, 
2006: 10).  Alan Deacon has the following to say: 
The enormous influence which he had exercised over the study of social policy in 
Britain has been almost universally acknowledged.  Writing in this Journal in 
1981, for example, Hilary Rose outlined what she termed the Titmuss Paradigm, 
and claimed that ‘at its height the Titmuss school reigned unchallenged over the 
construction of social policy’ (1981: 484).  (Deacon, 1993: 235) 
David Donnison argued that Titmuss ‘should be reappraised not rejected’ (Donnison, 1979: 
145).  Even in the area of historical studies Kevin Jefferys argues that not only was Titmuss 
the first to raise the “issue of government policy towards reform”, the claims he made about 
the reasons for the emergence of welfare reforms “have never been entirely displaced” and is 
rather being affirmed by new writers (Jefferys, 1987: 123). 
Ramesh Mishra writes that “The questions and concerns he pursued so passionately are also 
our questions and concerns today.  And the Titmussian legacy remains important” (Mishra, 
2002: 787).  Mishra does however point to Titmuss’ weaknesses and limitations, arguing that 
“Titmuss did not see the capitalist economy and corporate power in systemic terms” but 
rather as ‘irresponsible’ agents (see ‘The Irresponsible Society’ in Philosophy of Welfare 
(1987) reprinted in Alcock et al (2001)). What we have become aware of between the writing 
of ‘The Irresponsible Society’ and now, Mishra argues, is “vast” (Mishra, 2001: 749).  
Furthermore, Titmuss was a self-described democratic socialist (more accurately, a social 
democrat), and Mishra asks the question whether, in the post-Cold War world we live in, his 
solutions are ever implementable?  
There are little written critiques on the framework which this thesis employs, the Social 
Division of Welfare. Pinker (2006: 17) criticises the framework for giving too little attention 
to the voluntary sector of welfare provision.  Moreover, Pinker argues that both occupational 
and fiscal welfare are “conceptualised largely in negative terms – as institutional obstacles to 
the creation of a more unified and egalitarian welfare state” (Pinker, 2006: 17).  This was 
arguably however an explicit intention of Titmuss.  Pinker also does not indicate what he 
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deems to be the positive aspects of fiscal and occupational welfare provision. Those who 
argue that Titmuss does not take into consideration the positive aspects of these forms of 
welfare provision fail to realise that Titmuss measures the effectiveness of these forms of 
welfare provision against an image of an already smooth-functioning unitary and universal 
welfare system, and not that of an unequal status quo.   
Titmuss’ paper on the Social Division of Welfare was presented in 1955 and published in 
1956.  Despite “probably” being “the most cited paper in the British literature of social policy 
and planning” (Sinfield, 1978: 129) and “possibly the most influential piece of work in social 
administration” (Mann, 2009), a review of the written evidence suggests its analytic potential 
has not been tapped in social policy to a degree commensurate with its influence as a concept.  
However, the theory has been applied in a variety of academic contexts.  Hilary Rose applied 
the framework to the gendered division of paid and unpaid labour, presenting a theorisation 
of a Sexual Division of Welfare (Rose, 1981).  More recently Paul Henman and Greg 
Marston applied the Social Division of Welfare to surveillance practices in Britain which 
“point to the way in which surveillance, compliance burdens and risk management unevenly 
operate within society” (Henman and Marston, 2008: 187).  Closer to the area of welfare 
provision Traute Meyer and Paul Bridgen analysed the pension system in Britain with a 
particular emphasis on class and gender.  They come to the conclusion that this form of 
systemic analysis is very useful in providing the evidence that “class and gender are 
important predictors of who receives occupational pensions” (Meyer and Bridgen, 2008: 
353).    
Kirk Mann reappraised Titmuss’ essay in 2009, giving examples of how the Social Division 
of Welfare illuminates inequitable resource flows in countries such as Australia, Britain and 
the USA. Challenging the same stereotypes scrutinised by Titmuss, he argues such stereo-
types “appear to be more entrenched and more frequently asserted by journalists, politicians 
and academics, than they were fifty years ago” (Mann, 2009).  The impact of the Social 
Division of Welfare can be measured by quantifying the studies which point to just how the 
rich is able to save through tax subsidies.  Fiscal welfare was then a critically new idea which 
was subsequently termed Tax Expenditure (Alcock et al., 2001: 4).  
Sinfield suggested in 1978 that the concept of the Social Division of Welfare become some 
form of benchmark in the discipline of Social Policy in order to understand the underlying 
rationale of the different forms of welfare which exist in a country.  Furthermore, since the 
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Social Division of Welfare is linked to the division of labour, each country’s divisions will 
vary.  Its application can therefore shed light on the development, form and rationale of social 
policies in each country.  As Sinfield suggests, 
Even within any one society, however, a careful analysis of the distribution of 
resources, security, status and power through the social division of welfare would 
help us to understand much more thoroughly the operation of those mechanisms 
and systems of distribution and redistribution that generate and maintain social, 
political and economic inequality. (Sinfield, 1978: 132) 
This is what this thesis aims to do:  to explain how the division of labour constrains access to 
health provision which is of particular concern in a country such as South Africa with such a 
high unemployment rate.  The Social Division of Welfare might have brought previously 
“hidden” forms of publicly funded but privately utilised welfare provision to light, but critics 
have pointed out that it still has left out other invaluable forms of welfare provision.  Rose 
(1981) and Lewis (1997) called for ‘informal welfare’ which is perhaps even harder to 
quantify because it embodies unpaid and often taken for granted care given by family 
members, friends or even strangers.   
Since care is recognised as public welfare when a nurse cares for a sick child in 
hospital it is clearly a form of welfare when a mother cares for a sick child at 
home. (Mann, 2009) 
This form of welfare provision has a particular impact on women who, due to their traditional 
carer role, lose out on occupational pension provision due either to low or part time 
employment during their lifetimes (see Turner et al., 2005).  Hilary Rose pointed out that 
every aspect of the Social Division of Welfare is gendered (Rose, 1981).  Another of 
Titmuss’ critics, Anthony Giddens argued that he downplayed politics, power and the state in 
his analysis (Giddens, 1977). 
Titmuss was a Fabian Socialist and for this he was frequently criticised as well, particularly 
during the Cold War and the battles which raged around these ideologies.  Fabians occupied 
the middle ground between social democracy and Marxism, moving freely between the 
boundaries of both.  Two particularities, however, were constant:  “total commitment to the 
democratic process and unequivocal support for social welfare services” (George and 
Wilding 1985: 69).  Whereas Fabian Socialists believed that freedom is derived from 
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equality, which can be attained through redistribution.  For ‘anti-collectivists’, as George and 
Wilding (1985) calls them, freedom, or liberty is thwarted by coercion, of which 
redistribution is a form.  They therefore criticise any policy which takes from some to give to 
others as a form of arbitrary suppression which would prevent those at the bottom to choose 
to rise up and ‘help themselves’.   
Whilst the Fabians believe in “purposeful government action ... to modify the injustices of the 
private market” the ‘reluctant collectivists’ are not bent on change, but insist on the 
regulation of the free market (George and Wilding 1985: 81).  Supporters of Keynesianism, 
Fabians ‘foresee’ the potential misery that unemployment can create and insist on economic 
intervention (George and Wilding 1985: 44).  On the other end of the scale Marxists have in 
common with the anti-collectivists a hostility towards the welfare state albeit from a 
completely different ideological position.  Although Marxism consists of a variety of forms 
and ideas, they all “reject the view that the welfare state is a mechanism for changing 
capitalism” (George and Wilding 1985: 126).  Whilst some Fabians see the welfare state as a 
marker of the end of capitalism, Ian Gough writing from a Marxist perspective (1979) argued 
that the welfare state is merely an adaptation of capitalism, albeit one which has produced a 
set of contradictions.  For Marx himself, the welfare state would never be able to “secure 
‘genuine’ individual and social welfare” (Pierson 1991: 9; see also Claus Offe, Contradiction 
of the Welfare State, 1984). 
Titmuss and his contemporaries’ almost complete focus on structural issues presents a 
particular stand on agency.  As Welshman (2004: 225) argues, Titmuss’ thinking was 
“characterised by a ‘denial’ of agency”.  Others have made similar arguments about the 
discipline of social administration during the 1960s and 1970s (Williams et al., 1999).  Due to 
its inordinate focus on empiricism and application, the work of the period is argued to be 
“extremely weak in theory” (Bulmer, 1991: 163) and research and policy-making is only ever 
top-down (Le Grand, 1997).  Whilst warning that Titmussian scholars need to be cautious 
when interpreting Titmuss, Welshman (2004: 243-244) points out that “Titmuss was clearly 
interested in behaviour over and above his belief in altruism” and where he did not address 
issues of agency and behaviour he clearly did wrestle with them.  Ultimately he was 
constrained by the paradigm in which he worked since he endeavoured to refute ideologically 
and pathologically motivated assumptions about welfare recipients which represented a threat 
to universal welfare provision and cross-class solidarity, whilst attempting to conceptualise 
the loss or gains in behaviour which followed solidaristic policies. 
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2.4. Conclusion 
Robert Pinker argues that Titmuss’ “reputation as one of the great innovators in the social 
sciences will survive and grow. His achievement will be the subject of continuous review and 
reappraisal” (Robert Pinker on Reisman, 2001).  Titmuss was an interdisciplinary social 
scientist, policy advisor, prolific author and one of the major shapers of post-WWII British 
social policy who drew from Fabian socialism in order to create an expedient, responsible 
and effective Social Service that would effect greater solidarity and dignity in society.  With a 
consistent focus on the theme of altruism which culminated in The Gift Relationship (1970) 
which is, according to David Reisman, “a remarkable attempt to combine factual evidence 
with moral philosophy” (Reisman 2004: 780) proving, at least in terms of blood donation, 
that altruism trumps self-seeking behaviour in efficiency and quality.  On 6 April 1973 
Titmuss died of lung cancer.  Perhaps he would have woven all the threads of his thinking 
into a single web if he had lived longer; nonetheless, his “legacy to social thought” (Reisman 
2004: 779) in the dozens of books, publication and lecture notes written by him provides us 
with a very helpful lens through which to analyse the inner workings of power, values and 
resource flows in social institutions.     
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3. L 
3.1. Introduction 
The following chapter builds on Chapter 2 by providing an in-depth analysis of the 
theoretical framework which informs the thesis, based on the ideas and concepts of Titmuss. 
Titmuss’ work on institutions can be seen as twofold.  The first is an attempt to argue for the 
inculcation of values into institutions or perhaps more precisely, to show how value systems 
are reproduced by institutions within the imagination of the society that utilises them and the 
resultant consequences for the achievement of equality.  The second is aimed at revealing and 
understanding the methods by which the welfare state can be appropriated by dominant 
classes or work towards the marginalisation of weak individuals or groups.  In both senses, 
Titmuss’ theories are particularly relevant to present-day South Africa.  In 1994, at a time 
when there were expectations that inequality, wealth and redistribution would take a central 
place in policy discourse it was to a large extent captured by dominant ‘neo-liberal’ thinking 
(Vale and Jacklin, 2009: 2).  Considered currently to be one of the most unequal countries in 
the world, the government has very little choice but to review the mechanisms of distribution 
and redistribution in the country.   
Titmuss was not only the biggest supporter of the welfare state but also its greatest critic 
(Alcock et al. (eds.), 2001).  He believed in the transformative power of the social services 
and yet knew that these important institutions can have the opposite effect of their stated 
aims.  Analysing the policy framework and institutions in South Africa using Titmuss’ 
theoretical and conceptual framework can provide valuable insights into whether South 
African social institutions work towards or against the ends of equality.   
As is discussed in detail, one of the aims to which Richard Titmuss’ devoted his time was to 
point out, with the use of empirical evidence, that the commodification of the social services 
had far reaching negative implications, many of which manifested visibly but were 
unquantifiable.  In a period when the question of private social provision is being debated in 
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the policy arena, revisiting his arguments could be particularly useful in gaining insight on 
the reproduction of inequalities in the South African social system.  
3.2. Social solidarity 
Titmuss argued for the creation of social institutions that embody an ethic of solidarity. This 
he did, not because solidarity, as an end in itself, is desirable but for far more complex 
reasons which the influence of R.H. Tawney on his work can reveal.  Titmuss drew regularly 
from the work of Tawney, writing a foreword for the third print of Tawney’s seminal work, 
Equality (1931).  A reading of Equality provides insight into Titmuss’ possible aims with 
regard to his focus on solidarity and the potential role of altruism within institutions. 
Tawney argues that in the wake of the abandonment of “the old formula of free competition” 
and the fervent uptake of “the new formula of combination” (Tawney, 1931: 16-17), the 
concern with technical accomplishments had led to a pre-occupation with finding solutions to 
social problems through modifying institutions of economic organisation.  Reason, however, 
even if employed in the service of their own ends, will ultimately lead to the realisation that 
the problem lies not so much in the deficiency of economic technique, but among the ruins of 
habits left over from previous dispensations within the sphere of social relations. 
Put simply, a new system required new social habits if it is to achieve the institutional goals it 
aims toward.  Indeed, the application of a new formula presupposed a change in their old 
habits (Tawney, 1931: 17): 
It is worth while to inquire whether economic efficiency may not be clogged by 
the presence of conditions which make for social inertia, and whether the path to 
its attainment may not lie to a less degree than is commonly supposed in the 
region of machinery and organisation, and to a greater degree in the attempt to 
create a more humane and flexible social system. (Tawney, 1931: 18) 
The most fundamental habit ‘clogging’ the path to economic change, Tawney argues, is the 
aristocratic remnants of the belief in inequality (or hierarchy) as the centre that holds society 
together and, as a result, the irreconcilability of liberty and equality.  This appreciation for 
inequality which permeated during the era of free competition and gained prominence in the 
era of Tawney’s writing (the 1930’s), and appeared to be dying as a creed was nonetheless 
surviving as habit within the structure of institutions and, as a result, in the minds of people 
(Tawney, 1931: 25).  Unless these habits die, Tawney argues, the economic structure cannot 
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be changed and any new economic formulas would battle to produce the results of their 
intentions.   
A ‘rationalisation’ of the social structure could manifest in a social equilibrium in society but 
Tawney warns that co-operation was not an ornament that adorns rhetoric or an occasional 
call for social composure.  It  
is not a piece of ceremonial furniture which can be offered a ritual tribute of 
formal piety and frigid commendation when the skies are clear, and then be 
produced to work wonders in allaying pestilence or averting famine… [it lives] in 
the daily practice[s] of common affairs, or [it] is not alive. (Tawney, 1931: 21) 
If a nation decides to throw off the “repulsive” habit of inequality it first and foremost has to 
develop new habits in order to liberate and strengthen “the ability to make a collective attack 
upon economic deficiencies” (Tawney, 1931: 22). Co-operation (or solidarity for Titmuss) 
should be embedded within institutions so that the habits could be unlearned and replaced by 
new ideas of a common humanity.  Thus Tawney’s “co-operative effort” becomes Titmuss’ 
solidarity, a fundamental element in the transformation of the new economic system.  A 
success of a system based upon risk-sharing and redistribution will only ‘work the miracles’ 
(Tawney, 1931: 17) its proponents say it can if the system of ideas from which it draws is 
infused within the institutions and attains ‘hegemony’. 
Infusing institutions with a set of values means the process of ‘reasoning out’ the ‘old 
values’, which in Tawney and Titmuss’ case meant the notion of ‘Economic Man’ and its 
remnants.  Titmuss did this through meticulous empirical research.  One of the unconscious 
consequences of these old ‘free competition’ ideas causes society “to apply different 
standards to different sections of the community, as if it were uncertain whether all of them 
are human in the same sense as ourselves” (Tawney, 1931: 32).  Here one can clearly see the 
impetus of Titmuss’ focus on the effects of stereotypes on social policy formation.  He saw 
the ideas of the old system as remnants which form barriers for the emergence of a new 
economic order.   
3.3. Stereotypes and stigma 
Britain in the 1940s and 1950s saw a steady stream of writers on social and economic topics 
“condemning the egalitarian effects of full employment, the reduction of differences in 
earnings and rewards for work, high progressive taxation, and the ‘Welfare State’ (Titmuss, 
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1962: 16). Titmuss distinguished between the welfare state and ‘The Welfare State’ as he 
argues that, in Britain as elsewhere, the welfare state (which simply denotes the state’s role in 
promoting the wellbeing of its citizens) had become stereotyped as “an all-pervasive Welfare 
State for the Working Classes” (Titmuss, 1958: 37). Countering these stereotypes were 
important since he knew that “what a great many people believed” (Titmuss, 1962: 15) 
manifested in barriers to the transformation of institutions and profoundly affected the scope 
of decision-making available to politicians and policy makers.  In his application of the 
Social Division of Welfare, Titmuss reveals that it is not only the poor that benefit from 
welfare.  If social policies are not, as Titmuss believed, formulated around principles of 
universality, not only will they stigmatise the poor, but they also could benefit the rich.  
Stigmatisation, alongside an unsystematic reading of poverty, stereotypes of the welfare state 
and welfare recipients, all contribute towards a breakdown in social solidarity.   
Titmuss argued that much of the criticism launched against welfare provision were 
unfounded in light of the deeper interrogation of common misconceptions and unfounded 
criticisms launched at the welfare state.  Misunderstandings of the “underlying causal 
processes and political dynamics that underpin structural poverty and entrench inequality” 
(Du Toit, 2011a: 128) can lead to “irresponsible” policy decisions and have the consequence 
of legitimising such policy decisions (Titmuss, 1987).  They raise the question as to whether 
the poor ‘deserve’ welfare benefits or not and whether it is detrimental to the health of the 
nation to give ‘hand-outs’ to the poor.   
It is, what Tawney (1931: 32) so aptly calls “slipping into the mood of tranquil inhumanity” 
where it is unquestionable and natural to argue that poor teenage girls would become 
pregnant to access the child support grant but that middle class girls would not be that 
irrational or that, if you give money to the rich they will use it productively, whilst doing the 
same to the poor makes them lazy.  Stigma, sometimes attached to welfare programmes, is a 
consequence of such views.  Stigma disqualifies an individual or a group from being fully 
part of a society (Goffman, 1963).  It is built upon notions of difference, either of physical 
traits, character or actions.  Where welfare programmes treat different people differently it is 
more likely to perpetuate stigma.  Stigma, in this way, creates divisions between groups and 
classes which have negative implications for solidarity. 
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3.4. The ‘Welfare State’ and ‘diswelfare’ 
Titmuss’ concept of ‘diswelfare’ is underpinned by the argument that social policy as a 
discipline and practice needs to take into consideration the structural causes of poverty.  If 
this is not done, social policies are likely to be formulated and implemented based upon 
prejudiced moral, religious, or causal assumptions, and are most likely to fail or make little 
difference.  Titmuss argued that economic change causes ‘diswelfare’ (Titmuss, 1958: 108; 
1968: 63).  The poor and the unemployed are thus casualties in society based upon 
competitive accumulation.  If social policy makers take into consideration these structural 
causes of poverty and inequality it is more likely that policies aimed at compensation of those 
who experience ‘diswelfare’ will be formulated. 
Assumptions about the role and function of social policy and welfare in South Africa operate 
within a ‘field of meaning’.  These fields of meaning can most easily be identified through 
the use of typologies.  Within the discipline of social policy, typologies are applied to 
measure, analyse and compare the effects of different social policies between states.  Esping-
Andersen (1990) acknowledges that the typologies in his seminal Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism are derived from the work of Titmuss, who formulated such typologies in order to 
demonstrate a lack of homogeneity among welfare states, and thus the inapplicability of a 
stereotype of the “Welfare State’ for the working classes’, as such states varied significantly.  
Dominating South African social policy is the residualist tradition that associates social 
policies with safety nets for those who do not have the economic means to act independently 
in the labour market.   
Titmuss’ residual model, which corresponds with Wilensky and Lebeaux’s (1958) model, 
exemplifies the liberal individualist argument that welfare should be a last resort for those 
who cannot survive in the market and in its ideal type uses strict means testing principles.  
The ‘field of meaning’ in which social policies are constructed influences their shape and 
outcome.  Andries du Toit (2011a; 2012) deals with the different ‘fields of meaning’ and their 
roots in conceptions of poverty; he argues that the ‘radical tradition’ of poverty studies in 
South Africa should be revived.  His radical tradition is consistent with Titmuss’ notion of 
diswelfare, seeing poverty as a “symptom of deeper, underlying tensions and contradictions 
in society” (Du Toit, 2011a: 129).  Du Toit shows how other, narrow traditions conveniently 
misdiagnose, and in effect ignore the structural elements of poverty and inequality.   
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In Underclass: A History of the Excluded, 1880-2000 (2007), John Welshman argues that 
“one of the distinctive features of social policy in the post-war period was an almost total 
focus on structural rather than behavioural factors in the causation of poverty and deprivation.  
This derived in part from the approach of its dominant figure - Richard Titmuss” (Welshman, 
2007: 22). Titmuss argued, as Tawney (1913) and Peter Townsend (1979), that poverty is not 
a mark of waywardness in individual character.  Instead it is an ill-effect of economic and 
industrial progress and changes affecting certain individuals, families or communities 
(Titmuss, 1958: 18-24, 108; 1968: 63).  Social policies are thus mediums of compensation for 
these ‘disservices’ or ‘diswelfare’ (Titmuss, 1958: 108; 1968: 63).  Industrialisation is desired 
since it brings about economic growth and raises living standards, yet the effects that often 
accompany these processes can profoundly affect social life.  These processes contribute 
towards the growth of inequality and the most malign manifestation of inequality takes the 
form of poverty.  The presence of poverty in a society has negative consequences for both 
social and economic growth.  
Social change is outpacing the capacity of institutions to change and families, communities 
and cultures find themselves in a state of crisis.  Diswelfare caused by industrialisation, or 
what Titmuss calls the ‘disutilities of progress’ are a consequence of the economic 
development of industrial society but at the expense of a proportion of the population.  
Welfare is therefore not merely a safety net for the worst-off; it is compensation for the 
disutilities created by a chosen economic system.  A portion of the population should not 
have to bear, for society as a whole and without compensation, all the ill-effects 
accompanying capitalist industrialisation, Titmuss argues (1958: 29).  And it is the discipline 
of Social Policy that needs to investigate and form policies of compensation to ameliorate 
these rapid social changes.  The provision of publically provided services such as health and 
education need to be as flexible as its accompanying economic institutions (Titmuss, 1958: 
29).  As Tawney pointed out, a focus on individual or cultural qualities will merely obscure 
these underlying ‘systemic’ causes (Tawney, 1913).  
3.5. Effects of different ‘fields of meaning’ applied 
If economic progress creates diswelfare and welfare provision is there to ameliorate its 
negative effects, the withdrawal of welfare provision in the name of socially constructed and 
pejorative stereotypes of what causes poverty, has the effect of legitimating the accumulation 
of capital and de-legitimating redistribution of wealth to those who bear the brunt of capitalist 
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industrialisation.  If poverty has systemic roots and welfare is compensation for the “illfare” 
of capitalism, then social policy makers should not start from the misleading distinction of 
whether or not any individual poor person is ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’. 
Initially in Britain there was a post-war consensus that poverty has structural causes, however 
this did not last.  The notion of deservedness soon found its way into policy discourse, 
services were selectivised and anti-poverty measures began to be aimed directly at the poor, 
in the process bypassing the structural elements and established power structures that fed into 
increasing poverty.  Titmuss explains why the American “War on Poverty”, which was 
urgently launched in 1964, failed and provided little prolonged benefit to the poor (Titmuss, 
1968: 128).  Despite its complex and extensive structure and its proclamation to target the 
‘causes’ of poverty, these ‘causes’ were misunderstood and in effect the solutions were 
misguided: the poor were to be ‘targeted’ and resources were to be focused on them.   
Not only did the poor have to define themselves as ‘poor’ in order to benefit from this 
extensive War on Poverty program, but the focus was squarely on giving the ‘poor’ a ‘hand 
up’, teaching them a work ethic, initiative and entrepreneurship.  It was believed that the 
individual lack of these characteristics were the reason why people were poor.  Titmuss 
draws parallels between the Poor Law Act of 1834 and the American War on Poverty of 
1964.  Whereas the New Poor Law was a deliberate “assault on personal dignity and self-
respect” (Titmuss, 1987: 128) and its anticipated success based upon the mechanism of 
shame, they “both endorsed and legitimated prevailing social values, both believed in 
redemption through work regardless of whether work was available and both were rooted in 
pathological explanations of poverty” (Titmuss, 1987: 128).  Despite the fact that the War on 
Poverty rejected the mechanism of shame (the Civil Rights Movement condemned the 
‘midnight searches’ and public humiliation), the selectivity of the program could not bypass 
the effects of stigma.   
3.6. The ideology of means-testing 
The aims and rationality of means-testing serve ideological purposes according to Titmuss, 
who contrasted universal socialist social policies which were “different in their purposes, 
philosophy and attitudes” (Titmuss, 1987: 132).  If social policy is to become more than 
merely a safety net from complete destitution, it would have to understand and base its 
formulation and implementation on the structural causes of poverty.  Diswelfare, caused by 
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economic progress, cannot be tackled in a piecemeal way, nor can it tackled by economic 
policy alone.   
3.7. ‘Service-delivery’ rhetoric 
The route by which social institutions become administrative machines follows Weber’s 
notion of rationalisation.  The adoption of capitalist logic creates institutions based upon 
‘rationality’; it promotes rational efficiency, operation, speed, precision and calculation of 
results (Gerth and Mills, 1948: 49).  Weber’s process of rationalisation in political structures 
corresponds with Marx’s ‘alienation’ in economic structures which creates a bureaucratic 
efficiency based upon specialisation (Gerth and Mills, 1948: 47).  The result, for Weber, is 
depersonalisation and dehumanisation which, he argued, presented barriers to individual 
freedoms.  Rationalisation turns social institutions into rigid administrations focused on 
‘managing populations’.  The discourse within which policy discussions takes place shapes 
problems and their possible solutions in a language that marginalise critical thought, avoid 
issues of power and almost completely excludes popular input.  Under such circumstances 
social policy becomes merely a palliative for managing the social consequences of regressive 
macroeconomic policies.   
Vale and Jacklin (2009: 7) argue that “the technicist market discourses that pervade the 
public sphere and the academy in South Africa express post-apartheid South Africa’s 
incorporation into the logic and exigencies of global neo-liberal capitalism”.  If we are to 
‘recover’ critical thought or ‘generate’ a critical vocabulary then, they argue, “we must read 
them against the dominant discourses that they aim to uncover, subvert and displace”.  
Titmuss attempted to retain within the discipline of Social Policy this form of ‘reading 
against’ the discourse that threatened to turn social policy into a narrow administrative task in 
the service of economic policy.  His particular view of the role of social policy and the larger 
ideological framework within which it operates provides a unique lens for bringing critical 
social science and social policy together.   
3.8. Definitions of poverty 
There is a need to revive other, more critical ways of looking at poverty.  General poverty 
discourse in South Africa, heavily influenced by international development discourse has 
what Andries du Toit calls an ‘ambiguous nature’.  There is an opportunity to “engag[e] 
critically with orthodox theories of economic growth and development… but [it] is happening 
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patchily” (Du Toit, 2011a: 125).  An understanding of the structural nature and source of 
poverty plays an important part in policy formation and a critical engagement of this kind 
has, with rare exception, been largely absent among South African policy makers.   
Although there is a significant national consensus on the need to address poverty in South 
Africa and the discourse around it “carries a significant moral charge” (Du Toit, 2011a: 127), 
the policy proposal and implementation process happens mainly within a sphere of technicist 
and value-free discourse devoid of ideological and political positions which largely conforms 
to orthodox international practice.  Thus general policy frames the issue of poverty in 
depoliticised, managerial and modernist terms and participation mainly by experts and 
‘stakeholders’.   
As Du Toit points out, the concept of poverty functions, not so much on its own, but within 
“a field of meaning” (2011a: 129).  It is highly contested and contradictory and dependent on 
“underlying ideological stories about the nature of society, the relationship between suffering, 
humanity and material lack, and the obligations of citizenship, community membership and 
solidarity” (Du Toit, 2011a: 129).  Noble et al. (2008: 118) points out: 
The concept and definition of poverty in a society is like a mirror-image of the 
ideals of that society: in conceptualising and defining what is unacceptable in a 
society we are also saying a great deal about the way we would like things to be. 
According to Du Toit there are “three dominant underlying traditions of poverty study in 
South Africa:  firstly, a moral tradition focusing on deservedness and obligation; a technical 
and managerial discourse of poverty measurement, and lastly a radical tradition that is not so 
much concerned with understanding the depth of poverty itself, but rather sees it essentially 
as the symptom of deeper, underlying structural tensions and contradictions in society” 
(2011a: 125). 
A moral as well as a technicist approach toward poverty obscures the ‘messy’ and contested 
nature of the notion of poverty itself.  Poverty measurement, Du Toit argues, “is not merely a 
neutral lens for seeing what is out there” (Du Toit, 2011b: 4).  The immediate outcome of 
measuring poverty provides us with knowledge about what poverty itself is and who poor 
people are, but not what it is that creates poverty.  Figuring out the social processes and 
relationships that creates poverty is much more complicated and “poverty measurement”, Du 
Toit points out, “is very bad at this” (Du Toit, 2011b: 6).  Poverty measurement is useful in 
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its own right, but it “needs to be linked to forms of knowledge that can reveal the state of 
poverty as a product and aspect of social power relations, that can engage more clearly with 
its causes, and that can grasp it directly in the context of social processes of impoverishment, 
distribution, differentiation and enrichment” (Du Toit, 2011b: 6).   
One of the reasons why poverty measurement so easily divorces facts of poverty from the 
reality of its causes is due to its expert nature and the inevitability of human beings being 
tabled and becoming no more than numbers.  This, in effect, renders poverty “value-free, 
neutral, objective or scientific” (Du Toit, 2011a: 131).  In the process the human connection 
is lost and biased assumptions are made based upon preconceived notions of class and race.  
Poverty measurement is informed by definitions of poverty, and the definitional process, as 
Barnes and Wright argue, is beset with ‘issues’ (Barnes and Wright 2012: 135).  Defining 
poverty inevitably means the “systematic distinction between ‘the poor’ and ‘the non-poor’” 
(Du Toit, 2011a: 134).  Several new approaches in the area of quantitative measurement have 
allowed for a much more balanced view of poverty to emerge.  The “socially perceived 
necessities approach” argues for a considerable amount of participation in the formulation of 
a poverty line (Noble et al., 2008, Noble and Wright, 2012a; Noble and Wright, 2012b).  
Quantitative data on poverty can have far-reaching effects if it addresses the question of 
‘process’, that is “the particular causal pathways and interactions by which access (or 
deprivation) of particular resources or goods interact with one another and with complex 
social processes to systematically produce social and economic disempowerment and 
marginalisation” (Du Toit, 2011a: 136). Wright, Noble and Magasela (2010: 143) provide an 
exception to the otherwise sterile statistical data when they aim to “contribute to the 
theoretical debate on the conceptualisation and definition of poverty in South Africa”, in the 
process of formulating living standard levels. 
If poverty measurement remains delinked from the social processes that create it, the 
immediate causes for poverty will be sought in the individual; and any policy formulated to 
tackle these causes - like the American War on Poverty of 1964, and the subsequent War on 
Poverty fought in South Africa in the democratic era – is open to failure.  And when they do, 
these measures and policies “play a very useful role in the rather more conservative project of 
managing poverty: constituting both poverty as an issue, and restive poor populations 
themselves, as objects of knowledge and regulation” (Du Toit, 2011b: 7).  This form of 
managing poverty is now commonly known as ‘managerialism’.  Managerialism is a focus on 
public sector ‘service delivery’ that, in essence, depoliticises poverty and presents it as 
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something that can be overcome through a process of ‘addressing’ the legacy of Apartheid 
through “modernisation and rational global economic integration” (Du Toit, 2011b: 7). 
Managerialism operates within the logic of “New Public Management”.  New Public 
Management is “a global phenomenon that… represents an attempt to correct the 
shortcomings of traditional public organisation in efficiency and service-delivery to citizens” 
(Hood, 2000: 1).  The principles upon which this new form of managerialism is based, Hood 
argues, are now universally acknowledged ‘truths’ derived from the need to be internationally 
competitive and an uncritical adoption of “received ideas about institutional design and 
managerial best practice” (Hood, 2000: 3).  The term ‘managerialism’ points to the adoption 
of market-orientated practices within the public sector which emphasises “cutting costs and 
increasing labour productivity and efficiency; … delegation of management responsibilities; 
and … the development of neo-Taylorian practices such as setting standards and targets, 
performance measurement and performance related pay designed to create incentives for 
better performance” (Ruiters, 2006: 119).  The first step is usually to adopt customer charters 
such as the Batho Pele Guidelines recently adopted by South African municipalities.  Such a 
practice has consequences on the discourse of poverty in the way that it depoliticises the 
provision of resources by presenting it in managerial and technicist terms, “deflect[ing] 
conflict away from political channels into conflicts between customers and service providers” 
(Ruiters, 2006: 123) and in presenting the people it serves no longer as citizens but as 
customers and the services they offer as commodities.   
This form of consumerist approach, according to Gamble, is a way of “discrediting the social 
democratic concept of universal citizenship rights” (1988, as quoted in Ruiters 2006: 121).  
Ruiters points to the fact that Customer Charters have the potential to be progressive if it is 
formulated and used by the public as tools for participation but that Charters tend to be 
formulated top-down and “used as managerial tools… against workers and consumers” 
(Ruiters, 2006: 121-122).  The shift from citizen to the customer may also be seen as a 
hegemonic state project, as a way of hailing people in ways consonant with exchange 
rationality – all of which transforms to undermine public service ethics.  Public service ethics 
refer to a set of values which include accountability to the political process, acceptance of 
bureaucratic norms of honesty, professional integrity and a stress on altruistic rather than pure 
financial motivations from public officials.  The ethic in practice becomes an institution that 
ensures commitment to service and vocation and a willingness to serve beyond contractual 
obligations. 
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Managerialism thus argues to have at its core ‘value-neutrality’ - like consumerism - of 
treating all people as equals.  However, its function in the process of creating consumers out 
of citizens incorporates a notion of consumerism that not only rewrites the definition of 
citizenship, but bases its rationale on business ethics that side lines those who are, at the 
outset, not part of the market-driven process:  the poor.  It also destroys the ethics inherent in 
a public service, as Ruiters (2006) mentions, that ensures that a process of provision, not 
based upon financial input or output is met.  Providing public services within a value system 
such as that employed by the private sector destroys the altruistic motive that is inherent in an 
egalitarian project and, due to its subordination to technicism, does not address the issue of 
the causes of poverty. 
The moral tradition embodies to a large extent a performative plea for philanthropic action by 
appealing to the conscience of the middle and upper classes.  Without the moral plea 
however, one could expect little support for the extensive welfare policies in South Africa 
and the narrow, but deep tax base that funds it.  The moral tradition, as much as its focus is 
on obligation from the rich, so it also expects a certain ‘deservingness’ from the poor.  This is 
precisely because this tradition does not draw from “any real sociological and analytical 
understanding of the factors that actually cause and perpetuate poverty” (Du Toit, 2011a: 
132).  The dark side of this moralist tradition in South Africa is its preoccupation with 
deservedness, work ethic, the misspending of grants and arguments such as teenage women 
falling pregnant in order to access the Child Support Grant, which has been completely 
refuted by extensive evidence (Makiwane, 2010; Neves et al., 2009; Samson et al., 2004; 
Steele, 2006). 
An overt focus on the moral aspects of poverty has the unintended consequence of opening a 
Pandora’s Box of deservedness and obligation which cannot solve the problems of poverty 
because it does not take into consideration the structural causes of poverty.  On the other 
hand, the technicist tradition of measuring poverty becomes an end in itself rather than a tool 
for revealing the meta-causes of poverty, the discourse within which it operates can become 
oppressive and useless.  Instead Du Toit provides another framework, which he terms the 
‘radical tradition’ (2011a: 129).   
The radical tradition is very similar to what was outlined in the beginning of the section; it is 
a reorientation of thinking about poverty, a new focus on the flows of resources in society 
and the economy and the different elements that restrict and control those flows.  This form 
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of poverty thinking cannot ignore the social and psychological aspects of inequality or the 
dynamics of class.  Its focus is on how the relations of power in society and the economy 
impact upon the people who live in the society. 
3.9. The Social Division of Welfare 
The Social Division of Welfare provides an analytic framework which goes “beyond a 
narrow conception of ‘welfare’ and [makes] visible the relational aspects of welfare and 
wellbeing” (Henman and Marston, 2008: 190).  The different forms of the ‘production of 
wellbeing’ are divided into three categories: social, fiscal and occupational welfare.  Through 
his formulation and analysis, not only did Titmuss reveal the complexity of the system of 
‘welfare production’ in society (which he argued followed the same logic as the division of 
labour); he also revealed how different conceptions of ‘need’ influenced the methods and 
divisions among the various forms of provision within this complex system.   
The three categories differed only in the administrative method applied in its distribution or 
the type of institution in which it is found.  The category of social welfare (or “public 
welfare” as Sinfield (1978) suggests it should be called), includes all state provided social 
services and benefits from the social security system (grants) to public services such as 
housing, health care and education.  Fiscal welfare encompasses all benefits received through 
the tax system, from credits, allowances to subsidies.  Occupational welfare includes all 
benefits received by the population through their participation in the labour market.  This 
category includes sick pay, maternal leave benefits, occupational pension and medical aid 
scheme subsidisation or provision, work-based training and meals.  
Each category of welfare provision operates within its own field of meaning and which has 
often been allowed to operate on its own logic i.e. not systemically connected.  The 
subsidisation of medical aid contributions through the means of tax subsidies have the same 
function as public health provision – it is, in essence, a cash transfer to the individual to 
support their well-being.  However, it is not part of the annual government budgeting process, 
it is not viewed as part of health expenditure and rarely is it scrutinised – at least not as much 
as public provision is.  The next chapter provides an extensive outline and application of the 
Social Division of Welfare to the South African health system.  For the purposes of this thesis 
the Social Division of Welfare is adapted to afford the greatest insight into the resource flows 
in the health sector and limit the analysis to public expenditure.  Chapter 5 analyses and 
extends the insights provided by the framework, incorporating contextual information and 
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making consequential inferences, to provide us with a clearer picture on the role of resource 
flows in the current health crisis. 
3.10. Conclusion 
The Social Division of Welfare casts a critical light on those ‘less visible benefits’ received 
by the more ‘advantaged members of society’, (Henman and Marston, 2008).  Titmuss’ 
conceptual understanding of the workings of a complex system of security provision provides 
us with an insightful analytic framework through which to scrutinise the resource flows in the 
system of health care.  Titmuss formulated the Social Division of Welfare to reinforce his 
wider theoretical claims about the structure of social security systems and the ideas that 
inform it.  Thus in order to understand his theoretical framework fully and the significance of 
the conclusions derived from its findings, it is important to understand Titmuss’ general 
outlook on the function and aim of the social services in society which derived from a 
lifetime of work within the academic field of social policy, direct interaction with the policy 
making system in Britain after the advent of the welfare state, and his insights on the 
functioning of society based on the interaction between the social services and the population 
and the effect these services have on the people that utilise it.   
Within this understanding of society and the social services there lies a range of possible 
interpretations which can contribute to our understanding of the durability of poverty and 
inequality in South Africa despite government interventions.  Even more so it could give us a 
deeper insight into other prevailing social ills that are often unquantifiable and poorly 
understood.  Tawney’s idea that social institutions should be organised in accordance with the 
type of social and economic structure we wish to engender had a great influence on Titmuss’ 
work.  In his analyses of social structures, resource flows, policy discourse and 
implementation, Titmuss was aware of the significant effect that ideas and values that inform 
the policy making and implementation process has on its outcome.  The Social Division of 
Welfare ultimately shows that the application of market logic, such as ‘reward principles’ to 
welfare provision, has the effect of re-distributing public resource flows towards the middle-
class and rich. 
Titmuss talks about “the inherent illogicalities and contradictions in the managerial capitalist 
system as it is developing within the social structure” (Titmuss, 1987: 60); the economic 
logic behind it might itself seem rational, sober and responsible yet, “in the aggregate”, is 
followed by an uneven distribution of resources and incomes” (Titmuss, 1987: 61).  The 
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“Social Division of Welfare” is utilised to ‘aggregate’ these resource flows and the next 
Chapter does so in the area of health care in South Africa.  It aims to demonstrate how, in 
democratic South Africa, the application of market principles in the social services, and 
particularly in the health sector, reproduces inequality.   
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CHAPTER 4 
THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF POVERTY AND RACISM  
IN SHAPING SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL POLICY 
 
4. L 
4.1. Introduction 
Many of the systemic problems in South Africa’s modern health and welfare structures can 
be traced back to its institutional origins in colonialism.  Norms, attitudes and structural 
processes become ingrained in institutions and in the absence of specific catalysts they 
become hard to modify or reverse.  Furthermore, the interests that shape social policies and 
institutions impact on public attitudes towards redistribution.  In the prevailing context of a 
racist society, these are among the most significant factors that have shaped the systems of 
redistribution that democratic South Africa inherited. A key aim is thus to establish a parallel 
in this chapter between differentiated social policies based on racist stereotypes that emerged 
out of dominant economic interests in the colonial, segregation and apartheid era and social 
policies in the democratic era that aim to redress the “diswelfare” of the preceding eras but 
which continue to perpetuate class based stereotypes of the “deserving and undeserving 
poor”.  
The first section of this chapter starts by setting out very briefly the history of inequality and 
poverty in South Africa since the discovery of diamonds and gold, the forms it took, and the 
government policies which were implemented as a reaction. An analysis suggests that many 
of the policies of the time were shaped by the needs of the emerging gold and diamond 
industry, mediated and maintained by racist ideology, and was a reaction to the changing 
character of colonialism, imperialism, segregation and apartheid.  The racially differentiated 
reaction of the state towards poverty in black and white communities will be examined, as 
well as the popular and normative approaches to the phenomenon of poverty that prevailed at 
the time.  The next section then provides an analysis of arguments on the causes of ill-health 
and poverty, and demonstrates how these were adapted to the economic needs of dominant 
interests and how evidence has been manipulated in order to justify certain economic, 
industrial, health and welfare policies.  
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4.2. Emerging inequality in South Africa 
4.2.1. Early inequality and poverty 
Colonial rule ended in 1910 with the formation of the Union government ruling over the four 
separate British colonies.  However, by then, the system of racial domination and exclusion, 
founded on slavery, conquest, expropriation of land, and the recruitment and control of Black 
labour had been firmly established and continued, along a similar trajectory firstly under the 
overarching policy which was known as ‘segregation’, and later, with the coming into power 
of the National Party in 1948, an even more aggressively repressive, institutionalised version 
known as ‘apartheid’. 
A dominant theme which shaped policy during the colonial, segregation and apartheid era 
was the supply of labour.  The first slaves arrived in early 1653 and slavery was abolished in 
1833 at a time when there were already hundreds of slaves in the Cape Colony.  The problem 
with the supply of labour increased exponentially with the discovery and production of 
diamonds in Kimberley in the 1860s and gold on the Witwatersrand in the 1880s (Davenport, 
1987).  The discovery of diamonds and gold provided the context for the entrenching of 
racialised inequality.  Since the abolition of slavery, wage labour grew rapidly, particularly 
after the discovery of diamonds.  However, even before that pockets of wage labourers 
worked on wine and wheat farms as well as in towns.  Manual labourers on the Kimberley 
mines consisted mostly of Africans.  Several control measures were implemented during this 
time in order to control labour, one of which was the pass system first instituted in 1872. 
The control of labour was important for the accumulation of capital in the mining industry.  
Along with the creation of a racial hierarchy through the implementation of the ‘colour bar’, 
inequality rapidly increased.  This hierarchy was legislated in a number of government 
reports.  A ‘unified native policy’ was set out in the Report of the South African Native 
Affairs Commission (Lagden, 1903) which provided the basis for the reconciliation of mining 
and farming interests which received a considerable amount of legislative attention after the 
creation of the Union.  Most of the subsequent policies had their origins in the legislation of 
the pre-war Colonies and Republics bolstered by the exclusion of the African, Indian and 
Coloured franchise by the 1910 Constitution, the 1914 Natives Land Act and the Native 
Urban Areas Act of 1923.  Several amendments to these Acts followed in the proceeding 
decades each of which, in the main, solidified the basis of capital accumulation and racialised 
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labour exploitation whilst attempting to divide the cheap labour force between the dominant 
economic interests (mining, farming and later manufacturing). 
Whilst commercial farming expanded, a large part of the white population was gradually 
impoverished due to the inter-war agricultural depression, landlessness, and the movement to 
cities with little employment. Afrikaner women were incorporated into industries such as 
garment making, leading to a perceived threat in the popular white imagination to their 
“virtue” and the “health of the race” (Teppo, 2004: 13).  Similarly, due to the decline of the 
reserve economy and the war-time expansion of urban employment, as well as the chronic 
lack of housing in the cities, Africans settled in multiracial slums.  Fears over the 
uncontrolled movement of Africans to the urban areas and accompanying racist images of 
miscegenation between the white and black poor, were exploited by the National Party who 
won key urban seats in the 1948 elections. The National Party rapidly promulgated racially 
exclusionary legislation, such as the 1950 Amendment to the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 
which lead to the systematic removals of Africans, and Coloureds and Indians from slum 
areas to urban townships (Teppo, 2004: 14).  
As international ideas of poverty and structural social problems infiltrated South Africa, these 
ideas were extended to poor whites, but not poor blacks.  Towards the end of the 19th century 
poor whites were no longer being regarded as “victims of their vices” (Iliffe, 1987: 116) and 
the Dutch Reformed Church especially took keen interest in solving white poverty.  In 1929 
the Carnegie Commission (1932) was tasked with an investigation into the ‘Poor White 
Problem’.   
One of the defining consequences of the emergence of poverty in the white South African 
population was that it ushered in an era of welfare provision at a very generous rate, although 
on a racialised basis.  The desire of the state to ‘uplift’ (ophef) ‘poor whites’, and as a 
conscious corollary, the hierarchical separation of races, provided a foundation of social 
provision that laid the foundations for a racially differentiated welfare state (ie a welfare state 
for whites) that was unmatched in other middle-income countries towards the end of 
apartheid.  What became known as the “Poor White Problem” started grabbing the attention 
of South Africa in the last decade of the 19th century.  The Carnegie Commission on the Poor 
White Problem in South Africa defined it as such: 
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This term is used to denote principally the economic and social retrogression of a 
considerable part of the white rural (or originally rural) population of our country. 
(Carnegie, 1932: v) 
And “poor whites” were defined: 
As regards their origin, they are persons of European descent who gained (or are 
still gaining) their livelihood chiefly by farming. (Carnegie, 1932: v) 
As regards their economic condition, they constitute a class consisting principally 
of poor “bywoners,” hired men on farms, owners of dwarf holdings or of small 
undivided shares of land, poor settlers, and the growing group of unskilled or 
poorly trained labourers and workers outside of farming.” (Carnegie, 1932: v) 
The main driver of white poverty was landlessness, as in the case of black poverty since the 
colonial era. The effects of the 2nd Anglo-Boer War, poor education, the economic depression 
of the 1920s, rapid urbanisation and the rise of commercial farming contributed towards 
increasing poverty everywhere – economic and social change seems to have been the great 
leveller.  Statistics vary, but according to the Carnegie Commission published in 1932 (even 
before the full effects of the economic depression) poor whites numbered around 300 000 
(Carnegie, 1932).  Almost a third of Afrikaners lived under the subsistence level by the 
1930s.  
The solutions to the Poor White Problem were highly successful (for whites) – by the 1950s 
poor whiteism had almost disappeared. The social engineering functions (discussed in the 
next section) attached to social, economic and segregationist policies were highly oppressive 
for both black and white, but economically more so for blacks as it were implemented with a 
clear focus of differentiation between races.  Some external reasons why white poverty was 
eliminated in South Africa included the post WWII economic boom which provided most of 
the jobs for poor whites.   
The decade before the electoral victory of the National Party in 1948 however signals a few 
disjunctures.  Van Niekerk (2007) explores the context which allowed for inclusive social 
policies to develop during the ‘war years’ as well as why these attempts at inclusivity were 
unsuccessful.  Entering the war meant, for the government, a new vulnerability in the form of 
a “reliance on black economic and political allegiance” (Van Niekerk, 2007: 290), whilst the 
post-war vision which culminated in the 1941 Atlantic Charter contributed to the context 
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within which inclusive de-racialised policies were conceived in the segregationist era. Van 
Niekerk argues that the lack of political rights of the black population meant that such a 
‘controversial’ issue as a cross-race risk-sharing system of universal health care as proposed 
by the 1944 Gluckman Commission was vulnerable to the political divisions among the white 
electorate and therefore failed to be implemented.  The United Party therefore reneged on 
pushing such far-reaching social policy reforms through Parliament in the fear that they 
might alienate their Afrikaans voters (Van Niekerk, 2007: 292).  Similarly Baines (2003) 
argues that United Party Prime Minister Jan Smuts was more likely a pragmatist rather than 
an ideologue, playing his cards as he needed to in order to remain in power.   
4.2.2. Inequality during Apartheid 
There is significant continuity between the racially exclusionary policies of the segregationist 
era and the apartheid era as some writers have pointed out (Baines, 2003; Legassick, 1975; 
Walshe, 1963; Bunting, 1964).  Apartheid is thus seen as a modernisation of the 
segregationist project through the institution of an elaborate system of domination and 
control. Legassick provides a detailed outline: 
…apartheid has meant an extension to the manufacturing economy of the 
structure of the gold-mining industry.  In the towns, all remnants of African land 
and property ownership have been removed, and a massive building programme 
of so-called ‘locations’ or ‘townships’ means that the African work force is 
housed in carefully segregated and police controlled areas that resemble mining 
compounds on a large scale.  All the terms on which Africans could have the right 
to reside permanently in the towns have been whittled away… (Legassick, 1975: 
47) 
Others have argued that there is a more complicated relationship between ideology, the mode 
of production and political practice (Wolpe 1972: 427).  Wolpe argues that “The problems of 
control… are not, however, simply or primarily a function of the demand for labour-power 
which is cheap, but crucially a function of the conditions of the production and reproduction 
of that labour-power” (Wolpe: 1972: 428).  Wolpe finds it problematic that writers on the 
apartheid system have treated racial beliefs “as a force external to, but productive of, 
distortions in the otherwise rational economic system” (Wolpe 1972: 429).  Instead “(R)acial 
ideology in South Africa must be seen as an ideology which sustains and reproduces 
capitalist relations of production” (Wolpe 1972: 454).  A response to changing social 
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conditions is responded to by the ‘dominant classes’ through the lens of particular ideologies 
which, in turn, produced the policies of both segregation and apartheid (Wolpe 1972: 454). 
The coming to power in 1948 of the National Party government saw the implementation of 
several repressive legislative measures aimed at segregating social groups even further.  In 
1949 marriage between social groups were prohibited and in 1950 sexual relations between 
social groups were made illegal.  The Group Areas Act of 1950 specified areas as belonging 
to particular races and controlled movement within it and the Population Registration Act of 
1950 introduced racial classification. “The implications for social policy of this battery of 
exclusionary legislation”, Van Niekerk writes, “was that it organised access to social 
provision such as housing, health and welfare differentially according to race group” (Van 
Niekerk, 2007: 160).  Service provision in townships was poor and social infrastructure was 
often non-existent - in contrast to white suburbs.  Whereas the provision of services in the 
townships was previously left to local municipal structures, the central state started taking it 
under its own authority between 1948 and 1974. The police system was increasingly being 
used to manage influx control and the pass laws were tightened.  
Most of the provisions of the 1940s were either cut back or completely abolished.  
Unemployment insurance to the black population was cut back in 1949.  Seasonal or casual 
African labourers as well as those earning below £182 p.a. were no longer eligible for 
unemployment insurance (Legassick, 1974: 18).  Although the Nationalist government did 
replace a considerable amount of shacks with houses, it was done in order to facilitate the 
policing of townships and to remove freehold rights where possible. Apartheid social policies 
served the capitalist economy by guaranteeing “the ‘comparative advantage’ of cheapness of 
labour and ensure the continued reproduction of labour-power in the reserves” (Legassick, 
1974: 19).   
Despite rapid and sustained economic growth, poverty and inequality increased during the 
second half of the 20th century due to discriminatory practices, laws and policies which 
systematically created a flow of resources and capital away from the black population and 
towards the white population.  This facilitated the process which made it possible for 19% of 
the minority white population to receive 74% of the national income (Legassick, 1975).  The 
white population was able to “enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the world” 
(Legassick, 1975: 229). “The disparities in actual income [were] matched in the provision of 
social services”, Legassick notes, where “in terms of education, health facilities, housing, 
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pensions, and recreation whites are served as well as any advanced industrial country and 
non-whites in grossly inadequate terms” (Legassick, 1975: 229-230).  The poverty resultant 
from this unequal flow of resources is stark and manifested itself in a variety of systemic 
social problems:  low quality education and the colour bar created low economic mobility; 
the infant mortality rate was amongst the worst globally for countries of comparable 
resources - up to half the children born in rural areas died before the age of five (United 
Nations, Unit on Apartheid, 1970).  The South African economy was based upon cheap black 
labour and the outcome of the unequal system of labour was distributed along explicitly racial 
lines. 
The policy of granting autonomy to reserves was also part of the larger aim to transfer 
welfare costs and obligations to the Bantustan authorities conceived of in the scheme of 
“Grand Apartheid”.   The National Party government started placing greater emphasis on 
increased African wages and with it increasing the responsibility of the employer – as a 
means to make “Grand Apartheid” affordable and viable. An overview of the taxability of the 
African population9 was one of the reasons the government came to this conclusion – since 
employers did not pay Africans enough for them to get taxed – and therefore ‘pay’ for their 
social services – the state transferred some of the obligations of social provision to 
employers.  Also, it was argued that state subsidisation of cheap African labour through the 
provision of houses, transport and cheap food had led employers to view the State as a source 
of profit maximisation, which in turn encouraged employers to employ more African 
labourers at lower cost.   
4.2.3. Summary 
There is a similarity between the emergence of structural poverty in South Africa and other 
industrialising countries.  Rapidly changing economic and social patterns left many without 
the means to live and in this context social measures emerged to ameliorate or compensate 
for the ‘diswelfare’ caused by industrialisation and rapid social change.  The policies which 
were formulated following the Carnegie investigations into the Poor White Problem reflect a 
concern for the effects that modernisation had on impoverished whites.  However, these 
policies were used towards the ends, not of equality, but of racial differentiation and 
domination.  These policies were used to “divide, discriminate and compete”, as Titmuss 
                                                                
9 See the debates on the 1958 Native Taxation and Development Act.  It showed that “African wages were too 
low to permit an increase in taxation.” (Legassick, 1974:  20) 
62 
 
warned (1964b: 34) in a different context.  The impoverished black communities were 
segregated from white communities and received different measures of welfare.  The 
differential reaction to the different races was done in order to further the interests of the 
dominant classes and the ideology of racism and severe repression mediated and made their 
implementation possible. 
Both segregation policy and policies aimed at the ‘upliftment’ of poor whites were used in 
this project of racial differentiation.  The policy of segregation was used, not only to 
differentiate people by “race” by providing different services, but also to promote and 
entrench social alienation between social groups.  Economic growth during Apartheid was 
structured to benefit a white minority.  The provision of better services and welfare for a 
small amount of people and low-quality or non-existent provision for the majority fuelled 
inequality along racial lines and ideas of racial hierarchy reproducing the status quo.  These 
stereotypes and normative conceptions about race and culture played an important role in the 
emergence and length of Apartheid rule. 
4.3. Powerful interests and ideas of poverty and ill health 
Policy is directly and indirectly influenced by several external factors.  Policy reacts to the 
way current social ills are perceived and these perceptions are often shaped by dominant 
interests.  This section focuses particularly on the effects of prevailing attitudes towards 
disease, social problems and poverty. As has been pointed out, “irresponsible” policy 
decisions are most often fuelled by a misdiagnosis of the “underlying causal processes and 
political dynamics that underpin structural poverty and entrench inequality” (Du Toit, 2011a: 
128).  As a British colony, ideas of the ‘deserving and undeserving poor’ travelled to South 
Africa from Britain and influenced the way institutions viewed and treated the poor in South 
Africa.  State-initiated sick pauper centres “were deliberately created to punish and stigmatise 
indigents in accordance with English notions of poor relief prevailing in the nineteenth-
century Cape Colony” (Sagner, 2000: 525; see also Iliffe, 1987: 101).  In South Africa the 
processes of urbanisation, industrialisation and increasing landlessness increased poverty 
among both the white and black population.  Yet these racial groups were treated differently 
when it came to poverty alleviation. 
Attempts to systematically eradicate poverty among whites were made to the detriment of the 
black poor.  The presence of white poverty did not fit into the ideology of white superiority 
and fears of the dangers of racial and cultural miscegenation proliferated.  Policies were used 
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to divide the population of South Africa and it manifested itself most obviously in the policy 
of segregation.   From early on segregation was justified by interested parties through the use 
of medical theories.  According to Iliffe, serious calls for the segregation of races started in 
the 1880s due to, among other things, several epidemics10 which were blamed on the influx 
of Africans into urban centres (Iliffe, 1987: 115). 
The progressive view of scientific inquiry in the medical sciences and social inquiry into 
poverty argued that, as knowledge grows and facts about disease and poverty causation were 
revealed through experimental inquiry, the application of medicine and poverty alleviation is 
extended in society. This notion of progressive enlightenment that influences perceptions of 
illness and poverty fits into a linear model that explains the changes in policy over time 
(Bernier and Clavier, 2011: 110).  The linear model leads us to believe that, as our 
understanding about causal factors expand; we will make policy judgments based upon 
empirical knowledge which would, in turn, lead to positive outcomes. 
A linear model assumes the existence of a continuum from research to policy 
change: authors assume that good data are provided and that good policy 
decisions should follow accordingly (Bernier and Clavier, 2011: 110) 
However, this does not explain how policies have changed dramatically over time, and have 
taken, as their point of departure, less enlightened views on causal factors; very often despite 
existing knowledge.  For instance, the clear focus on poverty and resultant reforms in the 
United States in the 1960s and 1970s, however flawed, were nonetheless progressive in the 
way they were influenced by more enlightened views of the structural causes of poverty.  
They were, however, followed by a conservative reaction which moved away from structural 
and systemic contexts as their point of departure and the poor were once again victimised. 
As Himmelfarb points out in relation to the UK experience, “the tendency to read the 
[British] past as a progressive movement towards a more enlightened future” is a “fallacy”; a 
reading of the past more accurately “resembles a pendulum oscillating between extremes of 
regression and progression, of punitive, repressive policies and generous, melioratory ones” 
(Himmelfarb, 1984: 6).  Thus despite scientific medical progress, regression in the formation 
of policy is possible.  South African intellectuals and policy makers had access to progressive 
                                                                
10 Smallpox in 1882; Bubonic plague in 1901 
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international theories, yet many opted for the application of racist notions and chose to ignore 
the fundamental causal factors of poverty and ill-health. 
4.3.1. Early medical racism, segregation and mining capital 
This view of the progressivity of medical knowledge has been questioned by several authors 
who show, in different contexts, how the social and intellectual environment at a given time 
affects society’s views on disease (Rosenberg, 1962; Kuhn, 1970; Starr, 1982; Rosenkrantz, 
1972).  Rosenberg points out that views on cholera in American society had changed between 
outbreaks, not due to medical advances (because there were none) but due to developments in 
American society itself which had shaped the popular outlook on disease; what was at first “a 
drama of moral choice and spiritual salvation”, had become merely “a consequence of man’s 
interaction with his environment” (Rosenberg, 1962: 228).   
Packard (1987) makes a similar argument with regards to the way tuberculosis was viewed in 
South Africa at the turn of the century and how these views affected (or facilitated) the 
process of policy formation – policies were made which were, to a large extent, in the interest 
of a white minority social group.  Objective evidence about tuberculosis susceptibility played 
an ambivalent role in policy formation.  Wider social, economic and cultural currents within 
South African society played a more prominent role in determining medical attitudes.  
Attitudes towards the disease as it affected Africans “reflected changes in the nature of South 
African society and, more specifically, phases in the development of racial capitalism” 
(Packard, 1987: 190). 
Deacon makes a similar point when she argues that ‘scientific racism’ was slow to take root 
in South Africa as doctors in the Cape Colony drew from more universalist and metropolitan 
medical theories, but ‘racist science’ abounded with the incorporation of popular racist 
norms, practices and stereotypes into what was essentially universalist-orientated theories 
(Deacon, 2000: 194).  Early medicine practiced in the North drew from racist scientific 
theories which were widespread at the turn of the 20th century.  However, popular racism at 
the time, drawing from “well-worn stereotypes” shaped the early medical profession (Rich, 
1990: 667).  Furthermore, colonial sanitation policies had a massive influence on the way 
Blacks were treated medically. These policies also fuelled popular racist conceptions which 
were then written into policy.   
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Extreme racist stereotypes of Africans as disease-bearing and unhygienic were widespread 
and justified segregation as a matter of health: 
When bubonic plague struck Cape Town in 1901 the authorities blamed it on 
‘these uncontrolled Kafir hordes’ and implemented a plan to create a segregated 
African location at Ndabeni near the sewage farm on the Cape Flats 6 kilometres 
from the city centre.  Some 6000-7000 Africans were immediately moved there, 
many at bayonet-point. (Iliffe, 1987: 115) 
Swanson argues that at this time medical officers and public officials were “imbued with the 
imagery of infectious disease as a societal metaphor”, what he calls “the sanitation 
syndrome” which contributed greatly to the emergent calls, justification and acceptance of 
segregationist policy (Swanson, 1977: 387).  The emergence of segregationist policy in the 
late 1800s has been argued to be caused by the increasing need for cheap labour and the 
strong influences of mining capital in early South Africa; segregationist policy provided the 
mines with cheap labour whilst exporting the miners’ health risks and obligations to the 
reserves (Legassick, 1975, Wolpe, 1972).   
As Packard explains, medical assumptions about tuberculosis susceptibility among the black 
population reflected the change of needs in the mining industry (Packard, 1987: 191-209).  In 
each and every instance the responsibility of the mining industry towards the health of the 
African population was negated by the way in which medical officials formulated their 
theories about tuberculosis susceptibility.  This was done by blaming the victim for their own 
poor health by either downplaying the environmental factors (such as overcrowded living 
arrangements provided by the mines), by deflecting attention away from these factors through 
an inordinate focus on pathology, or by claiming that the improvement of environmental 
factors would have no effect on the mortality rate at all.  Interesting to note, this did not stop 
in the 1990s as some writers’ show (Trapido et al, 1998; Williams et al, 1998). 
At first the high rate of tuberculosis among Africans were blamed on their ‘intemperate’ 
living, drawing from early assumptions that blamed European tuberculosis patients along 
similar lines.  As the mortality rate increased Africans were once again blamed for being 
inexperienced in the ‘civilised way of life’ and therefore allowing themselves to be more 
susceptible to the TB virus.  The problem of containing TB therefore became an issue of 
sanitation and housing, but to absolve the mining industry of these responsibilities they opted 
for sanitary segregation; protecting white mine workers rather than improving living 
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conditions for all.  Furthermore, much was done in the way of teaching Africans to be 
‘civilised’ and the policy of ‘acclimatisation’ was employed to increase African resistance to 
the disease.  The medical idea that Africans were inexperienced in the ways of the civilised 
came at a time when there was a labour crisis and the policy of hiring more experienced mine 
workers was very much in line with the needs of the mines.  Segregation on the mines was 
also a means of controlling Africans in the urban areas.  Also, as Packard points out, 
segregation justified by ‘medical’ reasons had the effect of creating a group stereotype; 
previously TB was viewed on individual terms.  The consequence was that disease, 
particularly tuberculosis 
…contributed to a more generalised association of unsanitary behaviour with 
race.  Physical segregation heightened racial consciousness and moved 
conceptions of the causes of black susceptibility to disease toward a more 
explicitly racial conceptualisation of the problem. (Packard, 1987: 196) 
Shaped by ‘well-worn’ racist stereotypes, the emerging health and welfare systems became 
interwoven with segregationist thinking and medical and social misconceptions about race 
and culture was used to drive policies through. 
4.3.2. Early views of the poor 
As a British Colony, South Africa inherited many British ideas and norms about poverty and 
poverty alleviation.  Early notions of the poor were caught up in religious rhetoric on holiness 
and the amelioration thereof, firmly in the hands of the church, implied the dual role of 
upliftment and spiritual salvation (Himmelfarb, 1984). A large network of charitable societies 
and church organisations existed in South Africa by the end of the 19th century which was 
administered by the Provincial Authorities (Pienaar Commission, 1927: 9).  They provided a 
patchwork of poor relief for both the black and white poor.  But with the importation of 
British institutions, so also came with it ideas of poverty that shaped the consciousness of the 
population and the attitudes towards the poor. 
Debates around poor relief at the time symbolised a clash of fears.  On the one hand charity 
and obligation towards the poor was a religious benchmark of morality – a test few were 
willing to fail.  Then there was the fear that poverty alleviation will have as a consequence 
“the encouragement of idleness” as Benjamin Franklin warned on his visit to England in 1766 
(Himmelfarb, 1984: 5).  Both these ideas were compatible with religious doctrine as idleness 
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was considered a product of unrighteousness and hard work a virtue.  The solution to this 
dilemma was often found in identifying between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ poor.  
As poverty alleviation became secularised these debates changed little. State intervention in 
poverty alleviation became a “test of civilisation” (Himmelfarb, 1984: 4) and particularly in 
South Africa to differentiate between civilisation and barbarity.  The increasing amount of 
poor whites challenged the notion of white supremacy by providing ‘uncomfortable 
similarities’ between white and black people.  State intervention, which emerged in South 
Africa in the early 1900s, was a reaction to the inability of the religious and benevolent 
institutions to deal with the extent of poverty among the poor whites in South Africa.  The 
Pienaar Commission on Old Age Pensions and National Insurance argued that, instead of 
providing adequate security the patchwork of small provisions from various sources was 
“turning the deserving poor into callous and hardened professional beggars” (Pienaar 
Commission, 1927: 7).  Not soon after, the Carnegie Commission (1932) was instructed to 
report on the causes and suggest solutions to the increasing amount of poor whites in South 
Africa. 
4.3.3. Poor whitism 
Teppo (2004) argues that segregation and the provision of white suburbs for poor whites was 
done with the aim of creating “good whites” – social provision in the form of grants and 
housing was instituted and formulated to guide and rehabilitate these ‘inferior’ whites 
towards becoming ‘civilised – thus the solution to the poor white problem was a ‘civilising 
process’ (Teppo, 2004: 15-17).  
Drawing from the Carnegie Commission’s research into the ‘poor white problem’ it is easy to 
see the particular attitudes that governed the inquiry.  Not only was the notion of poverty 
situated in dichotomous terms of civilised/white and uncivilised/black, but the investigation 
into poverty among the poor whites led to the conflation of poverty with degeneration, mental 
deficiency and inferiority. 
4.3.4. The 1930s and 1940s 
The 1930s and 1940s presented an era of competing interests and ideas which culminated in 
an opening up of possibilities.  The deteriorating state of the African family made it onto the 
agenda for two reasons.  Firstly, all over the world developed countries were drawing 
increasingly from social-welfarist thinking which presented a new confidence in the 
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interventionist state; secondly there was the need for stable African families which would 
increase their productivity and provide a healthy workforce as well as reduce crime in urban 
areas (Posel, 2005: 64-65).  Tackling African poverty, it was argued, would promote healthy 
family life and decrease ‘urban juvenile Native delinquency’.  A particularly conservative 
form of eugenicist thinking played an important role in shaping the way the state was to 
tackle the problem of poverty and was perhaps most clearly explicated in the solutions to the 
poor white problem.  The same happened among the African poor as the state attempted to 
subject the social and economic life of Africans through  
…systemic and comprehensive state intervention... spearheaded by various 
groupings of liberals, missionaries, academics, urban African leaders, and urban 
administrators, who found a receptive audience within some state institutions – 
notably in the Department of Native Affairs through the office of Douglas Smit 
as Secretary of Native Affairs. (Posel, 2005: 65) 
The social reforms of the 1930s and 1940s did not include extending the franchise to 
Africans, nor political reforms in any manner.  Apart from a few progressive thinkers within 
and outside Parliament representing sections of the liberal white community, who were more 
open during the war to extending social, political and economic rights to the black 
population, suggested and enacted social reforms were treated as no more than rhetoric to the 
population. In the case of black political movements, most notably the African National 
Congress, who called for the extension of political, civil and social rights in the context of the 
war against Nazism, there was a disillusion with constitutional methods of change.  The 
Gluckman Commission (Report of Commission on National Health Services, 1944) called for 
the nationalisation of the health services open to all South Africans regardless of race.  
However, the “proposals ran aground on vested institutional interests” (Van Niekerk, 2007: 
91).  The Smit Commission (Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, 
Health and Economic Conditions of Urban Natives, 1942) suggested the abolition of the pass 
laws and the right to residency in urban areas for all South Africans.   Thus although there 
were moves towards social inclusivity and calls for political inclusivity, most of these were 
still-born.  As Van Niekerk (2007: 74) puts it 
…social policies which attempted to redress the social inequalities experienced by 
urban Africans had to confront the policy of segregation and the denial of civil, 
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political and social rights of citizenship to Africans, the major cause of such 
inequalities. 
1948 marks the end of any possibility for progressive reform with the coming to power of the 
National Party. 
4.3.5. Apartheid 
Posel (2005) argues that there was indeed a break with the welfare option in 1948 when the 
National Party came to power, but draws a significant parallel between the political-economic 
ideologies of the time:  the welfarist logic of regulation that is embedded within social 
democracy was transferred into the National Party doctrine yet used towards “different 
political and ideological ends” (Posel, 2005: 64).  The roots of this thinking were found in the 
1930s where parallels were directly drawn between the deterioration of white family life and 
the continuing poverty which culminated in a call for racially exclusive welfarist policies and 
a more interventionist state.  Posel argues that the perhaps benevolent notion of welfare 
developing in Europe and North America at the time, and for a few years in South Africa, set 
the theoretical stage for making “the Apartheid project thinkable” (Posel, 2005: 66). 
What made the logic of welfare so easy to shape according to dominant interests was its 
premise on both the material as well as the normative. In stark contrast to the ideology of 
liberalism, which puts the ‘private’ lives of people off limits to the state, communitarian 
notions calling for the regulation of the economic sphere often justifies the regulation of the 
social.  In this framework taxation itself is an infringement on the private individual’s liberal 
rights and it is all too easy to ‘demand’ certain forms of behaviour in return for welfare 
benefits.  The material and the normative are, as have been argued in this thesis, closely 
interlinked.  Racism, to the extent that it denies citizenship or even humanity to a particular 
race can be written into welfare policies as much as it could be written into economic 
policies.  It is perhaps therefore not hard to see how the Nationalist Party could justify a 
racialised welfare state.  As Titmuss (1964b: 34) warned, “welfare can divide, discriminate 
and compete”. 
4.4. Conclusion 
Policy can be directed by dominant interests in order to ensure the cheapness of labour and 
the reproduction of cheap labour power.  During the last century both economic and social 
policies were constructed to systematically create a flow of resources and capital away from 
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the black population and towards the white population.  This use of social policies for 
perpetuating racial exclusion and political domination leads to the oppression and 
exploitation of excluded individuals and groups.  As argued above, capitalism played a 
leading role in the unequal outcomes of South African society: racist norms were used to 
shape social policy in the favour of capital.  Race was used to justify differential treatment.  It 
is important to recognise the normative facilitating factor in reproducing racial inequality. 
South Africa under apartheid demonstrates that shaping social policy towards ends other than 
equity and equality can lead to entrenched racial and class divisions.  The justifications of 
these policies are based significantly upon conceptions of poverty and disease which are 
ideological.  The argument that early notions of poverty and disease causation which 
influenced policy were misinformed due to lack of knowledge provides very little insight 
compared with the explanation that such notions were shaped by dominant interests and racist 
ideologies of the time.  Early colonial racism had a profound effect on the exclusionary shape 
of institutions and the inequity in state provision.  The ingrained culture of racism and 
apartness in these institutions continued to fuel an ideology that justified continued 
inequality.  It is only when these institutions are radically changed, despite contemporary 
resistance, will they then create the foundation for an inclusive and solidaristic society.  As 
these notions become the norm they will reproduce themselves just as racism and apartness 
reproduced itself in Apartheid institutions. 
The main aim of this chapter was to demonstrate the complex relationship between dominant 
political and economic interests, the production of policy and the ideological framework 
which justifies, maintains and manages reactions to it.  The ideas about race upon which 
apartheid policies were built provided the ideological framework which shaped popular ideas 
of race and, particularly among the white voting community, was powerful enough to sustain 
apartheid for almost half a century.  And whilst ideas about human nature fuelled by racist 
considerations have fallen into disrepute (despite the fact that it still enjoys some popularity), 
similar stereotypes still remain among classes.  Just as a particular conception of the 
hierarchy of races legitimated racist policies so are particular ideas around poverty 
legitimating the continuation of regressive policies. And as the privilege of one group (in this 
case the poor white community) was built upon the exclusion of another, so too today, as is 
seen through the application of the Social Division of Welfare, one class benefits from 
policies which are meant, on principle, to benefit the worst off.  The anti-egalitarian 
principles which brought the policies into being are also perpetuated within these institutions 
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and allow these institutions to be sustained ideologically.  The complex relationship between 
dominant political and economic interests, the production of policy and the ideological 
framework which justifies, maintains and manages reactions to it in post-apartheid South 
Africa should be subjected to scrutiny, just as those of the apartheid era have been. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE SOCIAL DIVISION OF WELFARE AND 
STATE EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5. L 
5.1. Introduction 
Richard Titmuss’ most influential theoretical framework, the ‘Social Division of Welfare’, 
was a critique of many of the assumptions and stereotypes of the ‘Welfare State’ that 
prevailed during the 1950s and 1960s in the West.  Titmuss formulated a theory which, in 
dividing up all the benefits received by all citizens demonstrated how the non-poor 
disproportionately benefit from welfare provision due to their privileged position in the 
labour market.  First presented at the sixth Eleanor Rathbone Memorial Lecture in 1955, ‘The 
Social Division of Welfare:  Some Reflections on the Search for Equity’ was subsequently 
published along with a number of other essays that dealt with the role of the social services in 
a changing society, in his volume Essays on ‘The Welfare State’ (1958).   
The Social Division of Welfare is based around the ideas of the theory of the division of 
labour.  The division of labour was developed by Adam Smith who described the increasing 
specialisation and division in labour in industrial society.  General jobs are broken up into 
specialised tasks and each of these tasks is performed continuously by one individual.  This 
simplification of tasks creates efficiency.  
In 1893, when Emile Durkheim wrote The Division of Labour in Society the business sector 
was  
ingeniously following and reflecting in all its shadings the infinite diversity of 
industrial enterprises; and, while this evolution is realising itself with 
unpremeditated spontaneity, the economists, examining its causes and 
appreciating its results, far from condemning or opposing it, uphold it as 
necessary.  They see in it the supreme law of human societies and the condition of 
their progress”. (Durkheim, 1893, English transl., 1965: 39) 
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This form of division that we now live with in modern society is interdependent and 
specialised, as almost no single form of labour can exist or operate on its own. Thus 
Durkheim argued that the more specialised we become; the more socially dependent we also 
become (Durkheim, 1893, English transl., 1965).  Titmuss sees Durkheim’s notion of 
interdependence and solidarity as a way of explaining the emergence of systems of welfare: 
man becomes more aware of what has caused his dependency, and thus more 
exposed to uncertainty and conflict about the purposes and roles he himself is 
expected to fulfil.  More self-knowledge of the ‘man-made’ causes of dependency 
has been reflected in social policies through the greater recognition accorded to 
individual dependencies and their social origins and effects.  It has also influenced 
the growth of our other categories of welfare. (Titmuss, 1958: 44) 
As is explained by the notion of ‘diswelfare’, the dependencies and insecurities that arise out 
of modern society are compensated by different forms of welfare.  Titmuss hoped that what is 
generally perceived as welfare would be regarded, not merely as a safety net for the worst-
off, but as a universal system of compensation for the disutilities of a chosen economic 
system.  However, what is, according to the Social Division of Welfare, defined as Social 
Welfare most often takes the form of a safety net for those who cannot procure these forms of 
security for themselves in a market driven society.  Thus there is a free public service for 
those who cannot afford private health care or health insurance.  It is an environment such as 
this that allows for the emergence of other forms of welfare such as occupational and fiscal 
welfare. 
Titmuss divides welfare into three divisions (1958: 42-44): 
social welfare (directly administered services and transfer payments, including the 
health services, social security payments, housing and education);  
fiscal welfare (taxation allowances and deductions from the state); and  
occupational welfare (derived from employment and including pensions and 
occupational health and welfare).   
They all have the same functions and they are formulated in recognition of a dependency or 
need. However, ‘fiscal’ and ‘occupational’ welfare tend to benefit the well-off and are not 
perceived as welfare as understood generally.  They are therefore not subjected to the same 
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criticisms and scrutiny that ‘social’ welfare is.  In Titmuss’ view, these divisions were all 
redistributive; whether progressive, regressive, horizontal or vertical distributions over time, 
and involved a transfer of resources, in cash or kind, between social groups. 
All forms of distribution or ‘collective interventions’ are essentially the same in the way that 
they function or what their ‘declared aims’ are.  Their ‘declared aims’ are usually attempts at 
equity.  Where fiscal and occupational welfare do differ from social welfare is in 
“organisational division of method, which, in the main, is related to the division of labour in 
complex, individuated societies” (Titmuss, 1958: 42).  They are, partly due to the fact that 
they are not considered a form of welfare, most often used as a reward or an incentive.  The 
Social Division of Welfare makes it possible to: 
interpret the development of these three systems of social service as separate and 
distinctive attempts to counter and to compensate for the growth of dependency in 
modern society.  Yet, as at present organised, they are simultaneously enlarging 
and consolidating the area of social inequality.  That is the paradox:  the new 
division of equity which is arising from these separate responses to social change. 
(Titmuss, 1958: 55) 
The South African system of health provision is uniquely suited to the application of 
Titmuss’ framework.  The private health system in South Africa is considered an independent 
system operating outside the rubric or involvement of the state and runs as a market in health 
care for those who can afford it.  The public health system operates as a ‘safety net’ for those 
who cannot afford the high costs of private health care.  Due to the fact that the private 
system is viewed as independent of the state, the connection between the failing state system 
and the private system is not interrogated.  Thus, the failings of the public system are either 
argued to simply be internal issues over efficiency or external policy weaknesses.  The Social 
Division of Welfare can reveal the differentiated relationship between the private and public 
health systems and provide conceptual insights previously left unexamined or unexplored.   
5.2. The Social Division of Welfare in theory 
Titmuss argued that redistribution does not necessarily mean a flow of money from rich to 
poor and that ill-advised policy could have the opposite effect of its initial intentions.  
Moreover, he demonstrated exactly how this process occurred.  Distribution used as an 
incentive ends up becoming regressive and allows those in an already favourable position to 
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benefit over the poor or the unemployed.  In what he termed ‘occupational welfare’, benefits 
are often used as an incentive and reward for good business conduct and success.  This 
slowly turns into a cycle of privilege that “divides loyalties”, “nourishes privilege”, and 
“narrows the social conscience” (Titmuss, 1958: 52).   
The Social Division of Welfare identifies three categories of welfare expenditure which is 
different only in its methods of administration and its general conception in society.  The first 
is Social Welfare.  Social Welfare would include the grant system and all directly 
administered services in the area which is generally conceived in South Africa as the social 
security system and administered by the Department of Social Development.  The focus of 
this thesis, the South African health system, situates Social Welfare as direct state 
expenditure on public health care.   
Fiscal Welfare represents deductions and allowances on taxable income.  In the area of health 
care Fiscal Welfare is represented by medical deductions and more recently, tax credits, 
provided under the Tax Act No 24 of 2012.  What Titmuss describes as “ordinary social 
expenditure” such as the State Old Age Pension (SOAP) and the public health system flows 
directly from the central government account.  Subsidies and tax relief on income tax, such as 
the Tax Expenditure Subsidy (TES) that operate in South Africa for those who purchase 
private health and retirement insurance express a similar purpose – it is the recognition of a 
dependent need – the adverse effects incurred on an individual’s cash flow due to medical or 
retirement insurance expenditure.   
Fiscal welfare also disproportionately benefits the affluent and more successful since it is 
almost always offered on a sliding scale to tax payers only and the better paid are more likely 
to be able to afford such amenities.  It is perhaps interesting to note that the notion of fiscal 
welfare was a critically new concept when Titmuss formulated the Social Division of Welfare 
in 1955.  “Economists took the idea over and called it ‘tax expenditure’ and it is now a 
fundamental and accepted part of public economics.  Governments measure it and have 
changed their budget and economic statistics to include it” (Alcock et al., 2001: 4).  In South 
Africa the TES is not treated as health expenditure, and it is “not part of the formal annual 
budget in parliament” (McLeod, 2009: 4). Nonetheless, both public social provision and tax 
subsidies for private social provision accrue to being, for the individual, a transfer payment. 
Government is often fearful of creating a new major spending program such as a universal 
state pension scheme due to the controversy and stigma attached to such social schemes.  In 
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order to increase the insured population, either in health or retirement, they opt for less 
controversial ways such as providing tax cuts.  In other words, tax subsidies are politically 
attractive.  There are two ways in which tax subsidisation works, the one is through 
deductions of tax on health or retirement insurance and costs and the other is through tax 
credits.   
Occupational Welfare represents any form of fringe benefit derived from one’s position in the 
labour market.  In order to interrogate the flow of public funds to the private sector, this 
thesis focuses on public resources only. Occupational Welfare therefore includes all health 
benefits or contributions provided by the state as an employer such as in the case of the 
Government Employee Medical Scheme (GEMS), as well as any tax subsidies or deductions 
that arise from employer-sponsored health provision.  The government provides a tax subsidy 
to employers who contribute towards their employees’ medical aid payments.  In tax terms 
these contribution qualify as ‘fringe benefits’, which have a special tax status.   
All of these forms of ‘welfare’ provisions have some purpose and is often used as an 
incentive for certain behaviour, especially in the case of fiscal and occupational welfare.   
Bonuses and fringe benefits are given as incentives either to draw specialised employees or 
improve productivity.  Just as tax incentives for foreign investors are provided in the hope for 
increasing foreign direct investment, so too is the Tax Expenditure Subsidy (TES) used as an 
incentive for those in the formal economy to purchase a private retirement plan.  These forms 
of welfare provision, as is demonstrated further on, invert the process of redistribution and 
allow for the well off and secure to benefit from a process which originated to help the 
insecure.   
The reasoning behind tax incentives is most often that the more people who are able to 
purchase insurance, fewer will need to utilise state facilities and services (Van den Heever, 
2007).  Van den Heever (2007: 30-31) makes it clear that subsidies “provided through the tax 
system (TES) is opaque and its true value is therefore hidden from adequate public scrutiny”.  
The multiple character and complexity of the welfare process is obscuring the fact that those 
whose needs are greatest are being less and less favoured by redistributive functions.  
Furthermore, the continuous scrutiny which public social provision is subjected to should 
therefore be extended to the benefits that flow to the middle and upper classes.   
It is important to view fiscal and occupational benefits as part of the social security system 
since public social provision, tax subsidies for private social provision and occupational 
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benefits accrue to being, for the individual, a transfer payment from the state to support their 
well-being.  This chapter quantifies the different forms of state welfare provision for 
comparison.  It focuses on trends suggested by the data due to the paucity of information and 
statistics on these resource flows.  Despite this drawback, examination and discussion of data 
trends reveals who benefits from state expenditure and allow for an analysis of the 
beneficiaries of public health expenditure. 
5.3. The Social Division of Welfare in the South African health system 
This section applies Titmuss’ Social Division of Welfare to the contemporary South African 
context.  It is restricted to state expenditure for health provision (either directly or indirectly).  
It quantifies, as far as possible, spending in the different categories for comparison.  These 
figures are analysed and compared extensively in the next chapter by integrating them into 
the larger context of the two-tier health system in South Africa. 
5.3.1. Social Welfare 
Social Welfare includes all state funds that are spent in the public health sector.  This figure 
can be quantified by looking at the state budget for health care.  Public health expenditure for 
2011 was around R122 billion, or 4.2 per cent of GDP (Minister of Health, 2011).  Total 
expenditure on health for South Africa in the 2011/12 financial year was 8.6 per cent of GDP.  
This amounts to about R258.4 billion (National Treasury Budget Review, 2012).  According 
to National Treasury there has been a 4.9% annual real increase in public health spending 
(National Treasury Budget Review, 2012). The World Health Organization recommends that 
at least 5 per cent of GDP is spent on health care which means South African expenditure is 
particularly high, especially for a middle-income country.  However, despite this high 
expenditure South African health outcomes are very poor.   
The focus of the thesis is on state resources on health care.  There is of course, in both the 
private and public systems a great amount of spending by individuals.   For comparison, 
2009/2010 figures are utilised since the latest fiscal figures are only available for these years.  
This means that the changeover to tax credits cannot be taken into account.  Total health 
expenditure in the public sector for 2009/2010 amounts to R99 billion, including local 
government revenue from tariffs and rates.  R88 billion of that flowed through the provincial 
departments through block and conditional grants.  These funds are used for projects, 
infrastructure, salaries, equipment and the subsidisation of public health provision.  More or 
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less half of all health spending in South Africa therefore provides benefits for more than 80 
per cent of the population.   
5.3.2. Fiscal Welfare 
The tax expenditure subsidy for health deductions is an inherited feature of the apartheid era 
and “despite 15 years of commissions and reports all arguing for the abolition of the tax break 
for medical scheme membership, this incentive to join the private sector has been left in place 
each year” (McLeod, 2009: 6).  Due to the fact that it is not part of the formal budget and it is 
not generally seen as social expenditure, tax legislation such as this “can persist for many 
years after their purpose has been fulfilled” (McLeod, 2009: 4).  As Van den Heever points 
out with regards to the subsidy for retirement contributions, the subsidy favours those who 
already have insurance and “effectively provid(es) a financial transfer to beneficiaries” (Van 
Den Heever, 2007: 18).   
5.3.2.1. What is Tax Expenditure? 
The notion of ‘Tax Expenditure’ was coined by Stanley S. Surrey (Wolfman, 1985: 491) long 
after Titmuss’ conception of it as fiscal welfare.  Surrey made sense of the concept by 
explaining it as a formula of government spending on particular groups, but through different 
mechanisms than direct transfers (Surrey, 1970).  Thus, tax expenditure is a transfer of 
money to individuals or companies through the ‘lowering’ of their taxes.  It has the same 
goals of direct state spending on social programs, but these goals are accomplished through 
the tax code.  The South African government provides individuals and companies special tax 
statuses in the form of credits or deductions when they purchase retirement plans for 
themselves or their employees.  The same applies to medical aid.  It also provides a tax 
subsidy for small businesses to grow; for companies to provide learnership programs and to 
undertake research.   The state also subsidises certain basic food items through reductions in 
Value Added Tax (VAT).  Chart 1 indicates the main tax deductions on income tax for 2009 
in percentage of total deductions and the actual amount in forgone tax revenue. 
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Figure 1: Assessed individual taxpayers' deductions, 2009 (National Treasury and SARS, 
2001: Figure 2.8) 
 
Tax expenditure is defined as “tax provisions that reduce the amount of tax revenue that 
could otherwise have been collected” (National Treasury, 2011: 179).  It does so through 
allowances, deductions, deferrals, credits, exemptions or through accelerated depreciation.  
Since tax expenditure does not go through the normal budgeting process it is often not 
quantified which has implications for accountability and transparency.  In 1994 the Katz 
Commission (Report of Inquiry into Taxation, 1994) found it impossible to quantify tax 
expenditure due to lack of data (Stewart, 2012: 8).  Since then there has been an increased 
output of relevant data to quantify and compare the different tax expenditure subsidies in 
South Africa (Budget Review 2003, 2006, 2011; Tax Statistics, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011).  If 
tax expenditures are not quantified and published alongside direct government spending 
programs, government expenditure can never truly be transparent (Swift, 2006). 
As a means of measurement, tax expenditures are considered against a benchmark framework 
which is usually put forward as a position of neutrality and equity, although, depending on 
the ideology employed, these frameworks differ.  The form taxation takes (progressive or 
regressive) as well as what constitute taxable units, among other things, are what is 
considered the benchmark income tax structure of the country and “any special departures 
from those decisions constitute tax expenditures” (Swift, 2006: 4).  Tax expenditures are then 
measured in terms of “estimated loss to the fiscus” (National Treasury, 2011: 180) and done 
in either one of three ways.  The first is through the ‘revenue foregone’ method which 
“estimates the tax expenditure by calculating the amount of tax revenue that would have been 
collected in the absence of the tax expenditure, and assumes that the behavioural response of 
taxpayers remains unchanged” (National Treasury, 2011: 180).   
All other deductions 
-R7.4 billion 
Current pension 
fund contributions - 
R19.5 billion 
Current retirement 
annuity fund - R10 
billion 
Medical expenses - 
R22 billion 
Medical expenses - 
disabled - R1 billion 
Travel expenses - 
actual business cost 
- R1 billion 
Travel expenses - 
fixed cost - R21 
billion 
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The ‘revenue gain’ method calculates “tax revenue that would have been collected in the 
absence of the tax expenditure, taking into account behavioural responses associated with the 
removal of a tax expenditure provision” (National Treasury, 2011: 180).  The third method is 
called ‘outlay equivalence’ where “tax expenditures are measured by estimating the amount 
of direct government expenditures that would be required to provide the same benefit to 
taxpayers” (National Treasury, 2011: 180).  The first method is the most commonly used 
since calculating taxpayer behaviour is complex.  This chapter utilises the first method to 
calculate the tax expenditure subsidy for medical spending deductions to tax payers and 
provide a comparative element by estimating total direct government expenditure on the 
public health system.  This reveals trends on the regressive character of the subsidy.  
5.3.2.2. International literature on Tax Expenditure 
Tax expenditures provide important economic benefits to those who can claim them.  They 
tend to be a popular measure towards attaining certain goals due to their relative invisibility 
and because they do not draw as much attention and criticism as public programs.  Swift 
(2006: 2) points out that, especially in low-income countries, tax expenditures are popular 
among policy makers despite the fact that “the poor do not benefit from tax incentives 
because their income is usually below the tax thresholds”.  This he sees as ironic because tax 
expenditures decrease the revenue governments have to alleviate poverty. 
Tax expenditures are regressive when it is applied to a progressive tax rate structure.  In their 
basic formulation they benefit those with high tax brackets more than those with low tax 
brackets.  The other form of state expenditure – direct transfers – can be controlled to favour 
those it intends to.  Wolfman (1985: 493) explains this simply: 
… if a preacher in the 40% bracket is allowed to exclude $10 000 from income, 
the tax expenditure he receives is $4 000; if a preacher in the 30% bracket 
excludes the same amount, his subsidy is only $3 000.  If instead each receives a 
direct payment of $10 000 and the receipt is taxable, the lower bracket taxpayer 
come out ahead, with $7 000 available to him after tax, while the taxpayer in the 
higher bracket is left with just $6 000.  Only when the direct payment is non-
taxable would each have the same addition to his consumable resources. 
Tax expenditures therefore make progressive taxation less progressive.  Particularly in the 
United States tax expenditures have become a common means of public spending.  As Surrey 
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and McDaniel (1985: 81) argue, “a tax expenditure is a spending program and must therefore 
be analysed in spending terms”.  As a normative tax provision, tax expenditures should be 
analysed with the same scrutiny as direct public spending. 
5.3.2.3. Tax expenditures as incentives 
Tax expenditures are sometimes called tax incentives since they are often legislated to change 
the behaviour of the population in line with social or economic goals.  For instance, the 
government may want to incentivise the purchase of medical aid through the provision of a 
tax subsidy on medical aid contributions in order to increase coverage of medical aid among 
the population.  The South African government’s policy intentions are to alleviate the burden 
upon the overcrowded public health system by subsidising the purchase of medical aid (Van 
den Heever, 2007).  Unburdening the public health system, it can then be argued, will mean 
better quality health care for those who are left in the public system.  In this sense the Tax 
Expenditure Subsidy (TES) on medical aid contributions is a tax incentive.    However, TES 
have been criticised from both the left and the right.  It is often argued that they do not 
change behaviour, especially among the low paid (Littlewood, 1998 in Mann, 2008).  
Particularly from the right it is argued that tax incentives distort market behaviour. 
In offering the carrot of tax relief/fiscal welfare the government simultaneously 
appeared to endorse private pensions, subsidised the products and helped to create 
a ‘sellers market’. (Mann, 2008) 
The rationale of incentives was put forward to motivate the introduction of a tax cut on 
retirement insurance spending in the USA around 2000 to counter the continuous rise in the 
uninsured population.  Gruber and Levitt (2000) used a micro simulation model to measure 
the impact of tax subsidies on levels of health insurance and came to the conclusion that the 
subsidy’s ability to do so “remains uncertain and unproven” and that “even very generous tax 
policies could not cover more than a sizable minority of the uninsured population” (Gruber 
and Levitt, 2000: 72).   
The question is what the consequences of the provision of a TES are for attaining the goal of 
better quality health care in the public system.  Unless Tax Expenditure Subsidies are 
reconceptualised as a form of government spending (as Surrey (1970) argued) its aims and 
functions will never be interrogated.  Apart from the fact that they are hidden transfers, they 
are, in the main, erroneously assumed to be costless.  This assumption can be linked with 
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ideas of deservedness and class stereotypes:  a state transfer to an upper class citizen does not 
make this person ‘dependent’ on the state – however, a state transfer to a lower class citizen 
could very much have that effect. 
5.3.2.4. Tax Expenditures – a safety net for the wealthy? 
The TES however also subsidises general medical expenses, which means it is not just an 
incentive but is used to reduce financial hardship due to high medical expenses.  In this way it 
is also a health care safety net for tax payers.  Furthermore, the recognition, by the 
government, of the adverse effects of high medical costs, points to an important, yet often 
overlooked fundamental problem within the health system – that of cost escalation in the 
private health system.  The subsidy is playing a fundamental role in alleviating the negative 
effects for individuals of increasing cost escalation which has, since its inception, been a 
feature of the private health system.   
Not only does the government subsidise the purchase of medical aid, it also has to subsidise 
the failure of the medical aid industry to provide comprehensive cover for those who utilise 
it.  This need for a subsidy for the richest quintile of the population draws attention to 
fundamental problems which beset the current private health system.  Without medical aid 
the private health system could not exist.  If the justification for a subsidy such as this is to 
alleviate the burden on the already overcrowded public health system and this intervention 
comprises an amount up to a fifth of the total health budget it is very important that it should 
produce the intended results.  Furthermore, in order to justify the spending of this amount 
towards the goal of alleviating the burden on the public health system, all other possible 
solutions for the deterioration of the public health system and the cost-escalation in the 
private system need to have been exhausted. 
In order to answer this question of whether the TES is the most efficient and effective way of 
improving public health sector provision, not only does the TES need to be quantified, 
compared and scrutinised (as is done in this chapter), but the structure of the public health 
system and the reasons for its low performance need to be analysed within the larger 
framework of the two-tiered health system (which is done in the next chapter).  Also, reasons 
for the increasing cost-escalation should be analysed and its role in the decreasing health of 
the overall system should be interrogated.  When this is done, the necessity, effectiveness and 
justification of the TES can be re-evaluated.  
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5.3.2.5. The Tax Expenditure Subsidy on medical expenses 
The TES for medical expenses works on two levels.  The first level allows you to claim tax 
back spent on payments to medical insurance.  This is subject to a capped amount that 
increases with the number of dependents.  The second level allows you to add to your claim 
any further medical expenses which were out-of-pocket and which you could not claim back 
from your medical aid.  You can only claim an amount exceeding 7.5% of your taxable 
income after the first level claims have been deducted.  The income tax level is set at 
different levels for different incomes. 
The TES stood at just over R20 billion in 2009.  The amount of people who claimed this 
subsidy equals just over 1.8 million taxpayers.  It is of course important to note that these 
recipients may have dependents; indeed the more dependents the higher the subsidy.  The 
most important thing to note is that 74% of the people who claimed subsidies in 2009 were 
above the bracket of R100 000 taxable incomes per year.  This 1.3 million people together 
received a medical subsidy of 13.5 billion.  The total subsidy divided by its recipients show 
that public spending in the form of a tax subsidy in medical deductions amounts to just over 
R10 000 per recipient per year (National Treasury and SARS, 2010: 48,49).   
Figure 2: Average TES by income group – current beneficiaries (National Treasury and 
SARS, 2010: 81-82) 
 
In Chart 2 the subsidy is calculated to show the average amount currently deducted from the 
taxable income of each income group.  Column A refers to taxpayers who had taxable 
incomes less than R50 000 a year, B to the income tax bracket R50 000 – R100 000; C to 
R100 000 – R300 000; D to R300 000 to R500 000; E to R500 000 to R750 000 and F to 
taxpayers earning more than R750 000.  Column A includes all registered taxpayers who, in 
that year, had negative taxable incomes after allowances and deductions.  Particularly due to 
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the fact that all taxpayers with negative incomes for the year fall into group A, regardless of 
their general class status the tax subsidy seems to benefit the poorest taxpayers and then 
shows a general regressivity upward.  Chart 3 shows just how regressive the subsidy is, 
mainly due to the fact that it is not offered to those who do not pay tax.  
Figure 3:  Average TES by income group – total adult population (National Treasury and 
SARS, 2010; Bureau of Market Research, 2010) 
 
This subsidy is regressive in the way that the benefit is greater the larger your medical 
scheme payments are.  Indeed, “those with the highest incomes benefit the most from tax 
deductions” (McLeod, 2009: 5).  Furthermore, those who do not qualify to pay tax cannot 
access this subsidy no matter what percentage of their income goes to medical expenses.  The 
capped amount is set quite high to cover most medical scheme fees outright and thus makes 
most medical scheme payments tax free.  Chart 4 shows the total amount of the subsidy since 
1995.  The dramatic increase in the subsidy pay-out by the government can be explained by 
rising costs of medical schemes along with an increase in out-of-pocket and co-payments 
which was facilitated by a gradual increase in the capped amount allowed.  
Figure 4: Health TES since 1995 (billions)(National Treasury and SARS, 2008: 58; 2010: 81) 
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Figure 5:  Number of claimants (in millions) of the Health TES (National Treasury and 
SARS, 2008: 58; 2010: 81) 
 
Chart 5 shows a rapid increase in the number of claimants benefiting from tax deductions for 
medical expenditures between 2006 and 2007.  Around 550 000 more beneficiaries claimed 
the deductions in the 2007 tax year than in the year before. However, after this increase the 
number of beneficiaries actually decreased yet there is a continuous upward movement in 
total deductions. This means that the amount of the subsidy increases not just due to an 
increase of individuals who qualify for it, but also increases with rising medical expenses.  It 
cannot be determined from these statistics whether these expenses were incurred in the 
private or in the public health sectors. If medical scheme holders utilise the private health 
system most extensively – and especially if the better off do so disproportionately – it can be 
deduced that most of the R20.17 billion of tax revenues foregone in 2009 will have 
subsidised the private health sector.  
Until 1 March 2012 the South African tax regime provided medical deductions.  This was 
replaced by medical tax credits.  National Treasury recognises the inequitable outcomes of 
medical deductions: 
While the current deductions regime serves both to provide relief for those 
taxpayers contributing to medical schemes and protects families against 
catastrophic health expenditure, it is inequitable in that it affords a greater benefit 
to higher income taxpayers for necessary services like health, through the effect 
of the progressive marginal rate structure. (National Treasury, 2011) 
Although it is argued that the tax credit will have a more equitable outcome due to the fact 
that it reduces a taxpayer’s liability and not their taxable income and even though it might be 
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more equitable among taxpaying beneficiaries, it still excludes those who either cannot afford 
the high medical aid contributions or are non-tax payers.  Nonetheless, it is claimed that “the 
underlying principle behind the proposed change is fairness, and the new system is proposed 
as a step towards an equitable fiscal contribution” (National Treasury, 2011).  As Chart 1 
shows, deductions on medical expenses comprised 26.5% of all tax deductions.  A similar 
comparison is worth making in the area of retirement provision, where the tax expenditure 
subsidy far exceeds the resources spent on the State Old Age Pension11.   
5.3.3. Occupational Welfare 
In an analysis of health expenditure inequality in 2003 Wadee et al. pointed out this important 
fact: 
Over the period of review, government spent twelve times as much per year on 
subsidising a civil servant to purchase medical aid as it did on funding public 
provision of care per person dependent on the public sector (Wadee et al., 2003: 13) 
Wadee et al. (2003) go on to say that “general tax revenue filters into medical schemes via 
employer (government) contributions to medical schemes on behalf of civil servants (which 
amounted to nearly R1.8 billion, or about 16% of the government health budget, in 1992/93).  
Civil servants and their dependants account for 25% of all medical scheme members.” 
(Wadee et al., 2003: 10)  In 2010, R13.1 billion was paid to the scheme in contributions and 
around R12.5 billion was paid out in claims (GEMS Annual Report, 2010).  Members of 
GEMS can access up to a 75% subsidy paid by the state (GEMS Website).  Once again, the 
form the scheme takes is regressive, with higher paid employees able to access more 
comprehensive benefits.  The Government Employees Medical Scheme (GEMS) has, as its 
beneficiaries, 3% of the South African population (GEMS, 2010).  This represents just under 
1.5 million beneficiaries (520 477 principal members).     
Figures as to the exact amount of claims paid out to the two health sectors are not available, 
and utilisation pattern data is not available either, but available information does suggest that 
very few medical aid holders utilise the public system unless their medical scheme does not 
cover certain procedures.  The cross-tabulation of utilisation and access to medical aid “show 
                                                                
11 SOAP expenditure in 2009 was around R30 billion (Woolard et al., 2010), whereas the subsidy for retirement annuity and 
pension fund contributions was around R26 billion (National Treasury and SARS, 2010).  This means R30 billion went to 
the poorest 1.7 million retirees in the country (SASSA, 2009) and R26 billion to just over a million middle to upper class 
taxpayers. 
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that those with medical aid were more likely to use private facilities than those without access 
to medical aid” with 86.4% of medical aid holders opting for private care (Wadee et al., 
2003: 21-22).  It is therefore safe to assume that most of the R12.5 billion in claims filtered 
into the private sector.   
Another source of state funds flowing to the private health sector which straddles fiscal and 
occupation welfare provision is that of subsidies for private companies contributing to their 
employees’ medical aid payments.  These contributions are fully tax deductible (Wadee et al., 
2003: 10) and qualifies as a fringe benefit.  In 1994 this subsidy equalled “between R1.5 and 
R2.6 billion” (Price et al., 1994 in Wadee et al., 2003) being “equivalent to between 10% and 
17% of the 1994/95 health budget” (McIntyre, 1997 in Wadee et al., 2003).  In 2009 
“Medical scheme contributions paid on behalf of employees remains the largest fringe benefit 
claimed amounting to R6.9 billion” (National Treasury and SARS, 2011: 32).  With 
taxpaying claimants numbering around 990 000, this subsidy works out to be around R7 000 
annually per claimant.  This is once again state resources flowing towards the private sector. 
Occupation welfare provision is also used as an incentive and particularly as an “employee 
retention and recruitment tool” (Mann, 2008).  It plays an important role in providing 
security; the state plays an important role in either facilitating or subsidising it, yet it is rarely 
cited in literature dealing with welfare dependency (Mann, 2008).  Moreover, there are many 
fringe benefits provided (on a sliding scale) to employees which also qualify as occupational 
welfare if judged by their provisional criteria.  There is considerable amount of overlap 
between fiscal and occupational welfare when these fringe benefits are taken into account.   
5.4. Analysis and conclusion 
The aim of the Social Division of Welfare is to point out that financial resources do not 
necessarily flow from the rich to the poor and that the middle and upper classes derive a 
considerable benefit from ‘welfare’ provision.  The analysis of trends in the data shows that 
indeed, within the health system of South Africa, a considerable amount of state resources 
flow towards the non-poor.   
The Ministerial Task Team on Social Health Insurance (2002) estimated that the Tax 
Expenditure Subsidy, which amounted to R10.1 billion in 1995, allowed the state to spend 
R120 per beneficiary per month on medical scheme members whilst only spending R96 per 
beneficiary per month on those who utilise the public sector.  This estimation has increased 
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exponentially.  Currently the figures stands on R11 000 annually per taxpaying claimant, 
whereas public health spending is estimated at R2 500 per public health sector patient.  Over 
and above that the state spends an aggregated R7 000 per year per civil servant in subsidising 
their government medical aid bills and even more indirectly, R8 000 per year by providing a 
subsidy to employers contributing to their employees’ medical aid bills. 
Although these are rudimentary equations, some of which are fleshed out in the next chapter, 
the amount that flows to the private sector compared to the amount that flows towards the 
public sector is significant enough to validate the argument that the non-poor benefits 
considerably from ‘welfare’ arrangements.  The forms of redistribution that qualifies under 
fiscal and occupational welfare are not generally considered to be welfare and because they 
are considered incentives for certain behaviour in private social markets they have the 
opposite effect of policies aimed at decreasing inequality.  Furthermore, due to the fact that 
they are not considered social spending and therefore not subject to the criticisms launched 
against social spending, fiscal and occupational welfare expenditure does not get reviewed 
and their impact evaluated.  Thus, even if they do not have a notable effect and do not 
contribute towards the aims for which they were initially implemented, they nonetheless 
remain a part of the annual expenditure framework.   
In South Africa only 15% of the population are covered by medical insurance (StatsSA, 
2011).  The dynamics involved in the creation of this form of inequality is caught up in the 
ideological and structural framework of South Africa.  It involves not only the current 
private/public mix and the tax structure in South Africa, but also depends largely upon the 
prevailing ideologies that provide a frame of reference for health and tax policy formation.  
Recently there has been research undertaken on the inequitable outcome of the current South 
African tax regime.  Government proposals are on the table to change the structure through 
the introduction of tax credits.  But there is a very clear recognition that tax legislation reform 
is only a step towards greater cross-subsidisation.  The current tax legislation works to the 
benefit of the rich since tax relief is based upon percentage of medical expenses.  Especially 
medical benefits provided by employers regressively affect those with a lower income and 
disproportionately benefit those with a higher income.  The same goes for pension benefits.   
The main concern it seems of the low rate of medical scheme coverage is that the burden falls 
upon the already struggling public health sector to service those who cannot afford private 
medical insurance.  The answer to the problem is then sought in tax legislation reform.  As 
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Titmuss points out, occupational and fiscal welfare benefits could have the unintended 
consequence of increasing inequality since it is based on incentive and reward. In other 
words, the private health system artificially creates the need for subsidisation of health 
insurance provision due to the high and escalating costs of private health care provision.  
Currently the fiscal and occupational welfare provisions are indirectly reproducing inequality, 
and no matter how reformist they are, they will only alleviate the symptoms of an inequitable 
system, not transform it. 
Through this analysis it has come to light, as in Titmuss words, that stereotypes surrounding 
welfare provision in South Africa is “either irrelevant or unbalanced” (Titmuss, 1958: 38).  In 
light of this we need to deconstruct the meaning of social policy in South Africa in order to 
illuminate again what we mean by ‘social policies’.  The fundamental question then becomes:  
What are the aims of social policy in South Africa?  And what is the role of the social 
services in South Africa?   Misconceptions and stereotypes of policy by the middle classes 
and well-off has resulted in the emergence of an ideological framework which justifies 
prevailing inequality and forces attention away from the structural causes of poverty towards 
the symptoms of poverty.  The result is that the public services in South Africa are geared 
towards alleviating the symptoms of an unequal system and reproducing the status quo.   
Considering the high unemployment rate in South Africa, the current system of health 
provision which is strongly commodified in Esping-Andersen’s terms12, signify potential 
barriers to the provision of security in these areas to the South African citizenry.  If access to 
quality health care and security in old age remains highly dependent on stable employment in 
the formal market then a considerable section of South Africa’s population will never have 
access to the fundamental provisions of the Freedom Charter and the Constitution of a system 
of equitable social security.  As this thesis shows, this is not due to a lack of resources, but a 
structural element of South African security provision system based upon a particular 
ideological system.  This thesis interrogates the assumption that Titmuss makes that welfare 
as described in the categories of occupational and fiscal welfare promotes inequality in South 
Africa.  In the next chapter this argument is explored more thoroughly. 
 
                                                                
12 Esping-Andersen divided states into different regime types.  Within each regime type there is a distinctive relationship 
between the notions of solidarity and distributive justice.  The distinctions manifest themselves concretely in differing levels 
of what Esping-Andersen calls the ‘commodification’ or ‘de-commodification’ of human needs and labour power (Esping-
Andersen 1990:35).  The process of ‘decommodification’ brings about a situation in which citizens have access to claims of 
economic and social benefits which does not depend on their labour power.  
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5.5. Values and the Social Division of Welfare 
What is particularly problematic for Titmuss about occupational and fiscal welfare provision 
is the value system which underpins such redistribution.  Indeed, he believed, the actual 
emergence of such forms of redistribution is built upon a value system that not only 
misunderstands the systemic roots of poverty but emerges from it.  His argument is that such 
forms of intervention will inevitably lead to exacerbating poverty as opposed to alleviating it.  
The importance of understanding the real causes of poverty therefore plays a very particular 
and fundamental role in the process of policy making and that different understandings of 
poverty are underpinned and distinguishable by different value systems.  The privatisation of 
the social services justifies the application of an ideological framework that works against 
equality.  In this sense, therefore, we need to, as South African citizens and policy makers, be 
clear on what we believe the aims of social policies should be and what kind of society we 
want to live in.  It will be helpful then to deconstruct the meaning of social policy in South 
Africa in order to illuminate again what we mean by ‘social policies’.   
The Social Division of Welfare was formulated in order to disprove stereotypes which were 
having a detrimental effect, not only on the support of egalitarian policies, but were also 
creating resentment between classes.  The Social Division of Welfare pointed out that indeed 
the middle and upper classes were benefitting from the social services due to the way these 
services were appropriated by specific interests and how distribution was skewed over time 
due to the social services’ lack of adequate and equitable adaptation to change.  The different 
systems of welfare, as have been outlined, have each, in their own capacity adapted to 
particular needs and dependencies in society and are rooted in the differentiated employment 
status which derives from an unequal labour market.  And the fact that it did not do so as a 
whole has meant that welfare benefits have become skewed in favour of those within the 
formal market.  This has resulted in powerful interests within (especially privatised) social 
services artificially creating needs, and permitting resources to flow towards ever increasing 
salaries resulting, in the treating “at a higher standard the symptoms of need rather than in 
curing or preventing the cause of need” (Titmuss, 1958: 24).   
Not only has powerful private interests been allowed to dictate priority, but welfare has been 
allowed to be shaped by the moral and ethical assumptions of the time.  If welfare grants are 
made to be associated with laziness, lack of intelligence, or inferiority, then, Titmuss argued, 
the poor could use this to build “an image of their selves” (Titmuss, 1958: 37).  Furthermore, 
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this notion, attached to the fear “that calamity will follow the relaxation of discipline and the 
mitigation of hardship” (Titmuss, 1958: 37) which welfare represents, invokes a demand for 
punishment, reprisal and the need to show ‘deservingness’.   
Particularly in South Africa it is commonly held that welfare creates a dependency on the 
state.  This is a contradictory statement (since the state is there to serve the needs of the 
populace).  Nonetheless, it resonates with the dominant middle-class ideology, which tends to 
invoke the fear that people will refuse to work once they realise they could sustain a 
livelihood from social grants.  This notion is attached to the common accusation that poor 
South African teenage women are getting pregnant in order to access the Child Support 
Grant.  These underlying frames of judgments do not just innocently employ the rational 
logic of a causal chain – they are attached to images and stereotypes of ‘the other’, or ‘the 
poor’.  For R280 a month your teenage daughter would not get pregnant, but it is easy to 
imagine a poor, township-dwelling teenager to do so, since, in the popular middle and upper 
class imagination, “the other” doesn’t tend to reason as they should. 
The next chapter looks more closely at the public/private health system of South Africa and 
comes to the conclusion that the mere presence of market based principles employed in the 
private health sector is having a detrimental effect on the attempts at equity and equality in 
the public health sector.  There are, in a sense, two ideologies at play in the provision of 
health care in South Africa and, taking into account the findings of this and the next chapter, 
the winner, so far, has been the one based upon market principles.  This has created a crisis of 
public health care provision and the majority of the South African population is being very 
hard hit by the consequences. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
RESOURCE FLOWS IN THE CONTEMPORARY  
SOUTH AFRICAN HEALTH SYSTEM 
 
6. l 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to analyse the South African public/private health system and the 
distribution of finances between the government and the two health systems.  It shows how 
the structure of the current health system undermines the goals of equity, efficiency, 
accessibility and affordability.  It does so by tracing the resource flows in and between 
government and the two-tier health system.  The South African health system has been under 
constant restructuring since 1994 with the aim of securing equity, efficiency, accessibility and 
affordability (Nadesan-Reddy, 2010: 31).  The current public/private system is analysed 
according to these aims with a particular focus on financial flows.  A critical analysis of the 
flow of resources within the health system is vital to expose existing issues working against 
these goals.  It draws from existing data and sources such as the National Health Accounts, 
the Health Expenditure Reviews, Household Survey data, National Treasury and South 
African Revenue Service data as well as from secondary analyses of this data.   
A short history of the development of the modern health system and financing intermediaries 
is provided in order to provide context to the contemporary situation.  Since the 1970s South 
Africa followed a very similar path to many countries affected by the oil crisis of the early 
1970s and the ascendency of neo-liberal ideology by privatising the health system and 
leaving the public health system for those who cannot afford profit-oriented, high cost private 
health care.  The argument of this thesis is that many of the current systemic issues plaguing 
the South African health system today stems from and is embodied by the move towards the 
commodification of health care.  In this chapter the particularities of the commodification of 
health care is considered and the connection between the distortion in our own health system 
and the theoretical arguments against health care as a commodity sheds light on the actual 
roots of contemporary health inequity.   
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According to Wadee et al. (2003: 9-10) there are three ways in which government money 
flows towards the private health sector.  Two have already been discussed; the subsidisation 
of medical scheme contributions (fiscal welfare), the provision of government medical aid 
that is used in the private sector and the provision of deductions on employer contributed 
medical aid payments (occupational welfare).  Another way in which the government 
indirectly subsidises the private health sector is through the subsidisation of health 
professionals training.  Every South African-trained health professional that subsequently 
chooses to find employment in the private sector represents a flow of state expenditure to the 
private health sector.  
A narrow focus on state expenditure in the public health system fails to engage the 
institutional structure of the South African health system i.e. the relationship between public 
and private health care, and its role in perpetuating inequality.  In Chapter 5 the key 
beneficiaries of government spending in the area of health provision were uncovered with the 
help of the Social Division of Welfare.  A deeper look at the total annual spending patterns 
within public and private health systems as well as direct government contributions to private 
health care sheds light on whom the key beneficiaries of government spending really is and 
how it perpetuates the unequal status quo.   
The Social Division of Welfare points to inequitable spending trends in the health system of 
South Africa.  Spending trends alone do not however explain the reasons for the continuing 
negative outcomes in health or for the dire state of the public health system.  Resource flows 
follow the particular market mechanisms embodied by the system and if encouraged, can be 
distorted to enforce inequity.  Thus the trajectory of resource flows in South Africa is a 
derivative of a commodified health system.  There are many challenges facing the public and 
private health systems today and this chapter uncovers how the resource flows in the public 
and private health systems contributes to the current crisis in health care.  An analysis and 
investigation of these trends, along with the historical context of its emergence sheds light on 
the structural challenges that face health reformers today.   
Among the many issues that originate from the privatisation of health care is an inevitable 
favouring of profitable, high-cost curative health provision.  Despite the dire need for primary 
health care, it is crowded out by private, curative-oriented health provision which not only 
serve only a small percentage of the population, but is also, due to its profit-making 
orientation, concentrated in urban centres far away from those most in need.  This is an 
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unintended consequence of the privatisation of health care.  This thesis aims to show how the 
privatisation of health care creates a series of institutional problems, most of which can be 
identified as plaguing the South African health care landscape today.   
By dividing state expenditure between Titmuss’ social divisions of welfare, the relatively vast 
inequity and regressive health expenditure, the role of government and the unequal labour 
market in the process, is revealed.  Situating this form of expenditure within the broader 
framework of the health system of South Africa reveals that the nature of the entire system 
contributes to and perpetuates continuing inequality in quality health care provision. 
6.2. How is a health system funded? 
“Total health expenditure” is defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as “the sum 
of general government expenditure on health and private expenditure on health in a given 
year” (WHO, 2003).  Within a health system there is a complex flow of funds.  The main 
source of health expenditure data is provided by National Health Accounts (NHA) which 
consists of health finance outcome indicators and Health Expenditure Reviews (HER).  The 
collection of health expenditure data dates back to the 1960s when a colleague of Richard 
Titmuss, Brian Abel-Smith (1963) produced several comparative studies of health 
expenditure between several countries.  The NHA situates health expenditure within a 
framework of a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and describes both the sources 
of funding as well as its uses.   
Since then more and more countries began producing NHAs and demanding reliable 
expenditure information from both public and private health systems.  The methodology was 
recently standardised for international comparison and currently bases its framework on 
recommendations from the WHO (2003).  For the sake of comparison it is therefore 
important that methodology and definitions are similar.  Thus ‘health expenditure’ is most 
commonly defined as: 
“all expenditures for prevention, promotion, rehabilitation, and care; population 
activities; nutrition; and emergency programs for the specific objective of 
improving or maintaining health.”  (Hjortsberg, 2001: 7) 
The first HER in South Africa reviewed the years 1992-1993 (McIntyre, 1993).  An NHA 
study for years 1996/7, 1997/98 and 1998/99 for both the private and public health sectors 
followed (Thomas et al., 2000; Cornell et al., 2001; Doherty et al., 2002).  Nadesan-Reddy 
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(2010) produced a private sector HER for the years 2003-2006.  All other years have not been 
covered. 
The quality of NHAs and HERs depends on the reliability and availability of data from 
Medical Schemes, Income and Expenditure Reviews and General Household Surveys.  Often 
surveys are undertaken to fill the gaps or compensate for inaccuracies in already existing 
data.  Despite this, surveys are generally considered to be inaccurate for obvious reasons.  
Out-of-pocket expenditure is particularly inaccessible and often grossly underestimated.  
Furthermore, private health care financing and expenditure data is particularly difficult to 
obtain (Cornell et al., 2001: 2).  Despite these limitations, the NHA, HER and all additional 
data is valuable since it enables a critical analysis of the systemic flows of finance within the 
health system and the impact of certain policies on resource flows.  The following section 
clearly sets out the available data produced in order to show the general resource flow trends 
in the health sector.   
Almost all health expenditure reports come to the conclusion that current resource flows in 
the health system are inequitable.  Summarising the 1995 Private Sector Expenditure Review, 
McIntyre writes that roughly  
… 23% of the South African population benefited from approximately 54% of 
total health care expenditure in 1992/3. (McIntyre et al., 1995: 133) 
In the revision of Public Health Expenditure from 1996-99, Thomas et al (2000: 2) writes that  
It is apparent that corrective action is needed if the public sector is not to slide 
into inequity and miss its policy objectives.  The government needs to find ways 
of boosting public sector financial resources, focusing on priorities and 
encouraging redistribution of resources. 
The key findings of the Private Sector NHA were that the private sector is consuming not 
only most of the essential human resources, but is, due to simple supply-side economics, 
geographically skewed to favour the rich.  And despite the fact that the private sector is 
growing at a remarkable pace 
… population coverage by institutional financing intermediaries has been 
declining in the late 1990s.  This suggests declining ‘value for money’ within the 
South African private health sector and dependency on public health services, 
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particularly in relation to hospital care, for a growing section of the population. 
(Cornell et al., 2001: vii) 
Even the most recent Health Expenditure Review (2003-2006) concluded that 
… both the cost and inequity existing between the public and private sectors 
increased in the three financial years that were reviewed. (Nadesan-Reddy, 2010: 
46) 
And 
… there remains a major inequity in the financial distribution of resources 
between the public and private health care systems. 
Thus, despite major reforms, the South African health system remains inequitable 18 years 
into democracy. 
The NHA and HERs take their figures from government income and expenditure surveys, 
Medical Aid Council annual reports and Household Reviews.  With this data it comes to the 
conclusion that the overall cost drivers include almost every section of the private sector 
health care provision.  For 2003-2006, these were the private hospitals, medical specialists, 
medicines dispensed from hospitals and administration and broker fees (Nadesan-Reddy, 
2010: ii).   
The National Health Accounts Project shows that overall health spending in South Africa is 
very high compared to other middle income countries.  Between 1990 and 1997 South 
African health expenditure as percentage of GDP was averaged at 7.9% (Thomas et al., 2000: 
3).  In 2002 it had risen to around 8.3% (Nadesan-Reddy, 2010: 29).  National Treasury 
(2011) indicates that in 2011 8.3% of GDP was spent on health care of which 4.1% and 4.2% 
was spent in the private and public sectors respectively.  This is significantly high as the 
average middle-income country spends about 4.4% of GDP on health care.  South Africa’s 
health expenditure to GDP ratio is closer to that of high-income countries.   
Spending of government funds on health is averaged at 3.2% of GDP in 2008 and represents 
“38.6% of total expenditure on health” (Nadesan-Reddy, 2010: 28).  The 2007/08 budget 
allocated R59.2 billion to health in the public sector which constituted 3.1% of GDP and 
11.1% of total government expenses (Nadesan-Reddy, 2010: 28).  The rest amounts to 
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expenditure by private individuals either to medical schemes or directly to private or public 
facilities and practitioners.   
The question therefore remains why South Africa has such dire health outcomes.  South 
Africans’ life expectancy at birth for 2003 was 48 years.  The connection here can be made to 
the high levels of HIV/AIDS infections in the country.  Countries with similar prevalence 
rates, such as Botswana and Swaziland also spend an above average percentage of their GDP 
on health and have similar infant mortality and life expectancy rates (WHO, 2012).  
However, as this chapter shows, only a small percentage of general government expenditure 
is on HIV/Aids prevention, even less in the private sector, and although it is not an 
insignificant amount it is not the cost-driver within the health care sector. 
6.3. General overview of health care in South Africa 
The current challenges in the health system have its origins in the apartheid era.  Especially 
towards the end of apartheid, the National Party (NP) minority white government “began a 
process of deregulating and privatising health care with little insight into consequences for 
equity, efficiency and access and the policies of a future democratic government” (Van den 
Heever, 1998: 281).  The NP government implemented discriminatory policies in order to 
bolster their white electoral base and to enforce ideology.   
Corporate capital, particularly the mining houses also had a significant impact on the shape of 
the South African political economy as well as its social service systems, more so than in 
other post-colonial countries.  The growth of the private health sector was driven “by 
corporate capital, particularly the mining houses” (Coovadia et al., 2009:  826).  Due mainly 
to government policy of privatisation, for-profit general hospitals expanded greatly between 
1988 and 1993 (Coovadia et al., 2009:  826).   
The shift towards privatisation in the 1980s mirrored a similar shift within the thinking of 
advanced capitalist countries during the time (Price, 1989: 122).  During the 1940s in South 
Africa there emerged an increasing interest in the state control of health care exemplified by 
the Gluckman Commission of 1944 which called for a comprehensive non-racial national 
health service.  Although the recommendations of the commission were accepted in principle 
they were not implemented and by 1948 with the advent of the NP government the non-racial 
element of the proposals were discarded.  The NP government did however, in line with 
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international trends, increase its control over the health sector, but, as Price suggests, “in 
ways not prescribed by the 1944 Commission” (Price, 1989: 122).   
Mission hospitals, which serviced the Bantustans, were gradually taken over by the 
government and handed over to Bantustan administration (Price, 1989: 123).  In urban areas 
the state provided blacks with health care mainly due to concerns over the spread of disease 
and the maintenance of the health of the massive, yet increasingly expensive workforce 
(Price, 1989: 123).  The broad electoral base consisting of poor whites and farmers played a 
role in the maintenance of public health provision for whites (Price, 1989: 123).  Thus by the 
1970s the state still considered itself the custodian of health provision whilst suspicious of 
private health care, which were at that time, under strict state regulation.   
By the late 1970s the Nationalist Government’s attitude towards private health care changed 
dramatically.  The Department of Health made it clear that public health care should take 
second place to private provision by implementing the recommendations of the Commission 
of Inquiry into Health Services (Browne Commission, 1986).  Several policies were 
implemented to encourage the growth and utilisation of private health care providers.  Public 
sector fees were increased dramatically to encourage the utilisation of private providers and 
the building of private hospitals was encouraged.  By the mid-1980s Medi-Clinic started 
building a chain of private hospitals (Sunday Express, December 30, 1984, as quoted in Price, 
1989: 124).  In 1986 the managing director of Medi-Clinic proclaimed that: 
Private hospitals have a great future as the government hands over the medical 
care of everyone but the indigent to the private sector.” (Sunday Times, June 29, 
1986 as quoted in Price 1989: 124) 
Private health care was, from the outset, exclusionary.  Without sufficient numbers of people 
with medical aid the sector could not survive.  Entrepreneurs will only build hospitals where 
there is a sufficient supply of medical aid holders and will only acquire equipment, employ 
specialists and do procedures which are covered by medical aid.  The private health system 
could not grow unless there was an increase in the numbers of medical aid holders and at the 
time the market for whites covered by medical aid was already saturated.  This meant the 
necessary entry into the medical aid market by the middle-class black population.  Thus from 
1977 there was a push for the gradual increase in the numbers of Africans, Coloureds and 
Indians covered by medical aid (Price, 1989: 126).  This meant that private hospitals were no 
longer racially segregated.  Instead they admitted according to ability to pay. 
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Price argues that the shift towards privatisation was driven by a desire to decrease state 
expenditure in the health sector.  Though, he argues that the way in which privatisation of the 
health sector was taking place would eventually increase the costs to the public sector. 
It would in fact aggravate not only the problem of a lack of public finance for 
health services, but also the problems of rational resource allocation, equality of 
access to health care, fragmentation and co-ordination of health services, and the 
appropriate balance between preventive and curative care. (Price, 1989: 128) 
The privatisation of the health sector since the late 1970s had particularly significant 
implications for the advent of democracy.  The ANC government, when it came to power in 
1994, was confronted with the dilemma of how to overcome the inequalities of the past whilst 
maintaining the political support of the reformist NP government.  The inherited health 
system consisted of an inequitable centralised and undemocratic framework in which control 
and implementation was fragmented between the national, provincial, local and the former 
homelands (Wadee et al., 2003: 5).   
Not only was curative (tertiary) and preventative (primary) care provided and administered 
separately, primary care was marginalised whilst curative care was generously funded.  
Resources were biased towards former ‘white areas’ as townships, ‘homelands’ and informal 
settlements were “systematically underfunded” (Wadee et al., 2003: 5).  By 1991 the private 
health sector employed half of all South Africa’s doctors, almost all dentists, and consumed 
more than half of all health resources.  This was despite the fact that it only served 16% of the 
entire population (Price, 1994: 50).   
Furthermore, medical schemes were facing financial problems and as a result rising costs 
meant that many beneficiaries were unable to afford the payments (Muller, 1997).  In 1993 
several amendments to the Medical Schemes Act reinforced the deregulations adopted in the 
1980s.  This was despite the fact that such policies were criticised widely, “even by the 
avowedly capitalist agencies of the World Bank” (Muller, 1997: 26). 
The reduction in medical scheme holders affected private hospitals which are too expensive 
for those without medical aid.  This opened up an avenue for the emergence of the medical 
insurance industry which could provide ‘top-ups’ for those private consumers whose medical 
aid run out.  However, the insurance industry was careful to exclude high-risk patients in 
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order to insure profits and policies of deregulation allowed them to do so.  The result was the 
‘dumping’ of patients on the already overcrowded, underfunded public health sector.   
By 1997 the public sector with a budget of R20 billion served 33 million people (82% of the 
population) (Van den Heever, 1998: 281).  The overcrowded public health system, which had 
been providing free primary care since 1994, still suffered from inequitable access 
concentrated in urban areas, poor health information systems and bad management (Van den 
Heever, 1998: 282).  Immediately after 1994 there was real increase in health spending but 
the introduction of GEAR meant that spending could not maintain its parallel with population 
growth.  Since 2002/03 there again has been an increase in the health budget.  However, due 
to the HIV pandemic the real per capita value of this increase has been insignificant 
(Nadesan-Reddy, 2010: 35).  By 2007/08 the health budget stood at R62.7 billion. 
6.4. The Public Health Sector 
The public health system caters for more than 80% of the population.  Public sector hospital 
care is not free except for those with indigent status and payments are based upon levels of 
income.  Nonetheless, the public service is considerably cheaper since procedures are free of 
VAT and is subsidised through the health budget.  Although the percentage of GDP spent by 
South Africans on health care is very high compared to other middle income countries, the 
percentage of General Government Expenditure (GGE) on health is lower than other 
countries on similar socio-economic levels.  Nonetheless, South Africa’s GGE on health is 
still higher than the international average.   
Although expenditure on health is high overall and average in the public sector, South 
Africa’s health outcomes are very poor and worsening (Development Bank of South Africa, 
2008: 15).  The public sector, catering for the majority of the population particularly those 
whose health status is contributing to the worsening of our health outcomes, it seems, is 
“underperforming with its given level of expenditure” (DBSA, 2008: 15).  A narrow look at 
public sector spending levels does not explain the low health outcomes of the country.  
Instead, it is important to look at how the entire health system works together to create low 
health outcomes in the public health sector. 
6.4.1. Spending trends in the public health sector 
The public sector is heavily dependent on taxation.  The introduction of an NHI could boost 
resources which means it would be less vulnerable to international financial market volatility 
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and macro-economic policy (Thomas et al., 2000: 3).   Currently however this dependence 
means the public health sector is frequently plagued by budget cuts such as the falling per 
capita health spending, the “reversal of redistribution across provinces and limited growth in 
primary health care expenditure” (Thomas et al., 2000: 2) that occurred between 1997 and 
2003. 
Between 1992 and 1998 there was a substantial increase in spending in the public health 
system with particular focus on primary health care.  The distribution of funds between the 
new nine provinces was a lot more equitable.  With the introduction of GEAR and the advent 
of fiscal federalism government expenditure on health as percentage of total health 
expenditure declined rapidly from 55.9% in 1998 to 33.1% in 2002.   
There is some interaction between the two health sectors which could lead to cases where 
money flows from the private sector to the public sector.  This is particularly evident where 
“private financing funds access to government-owned services for private patients” (Wadee 
et al 2003: 9), though, this only becomes a useful cross-subsidy if the revenue it generates for 
the public sector is retained in the public sector.  However, “the potential revenue generating 
capacity of these arrangements for the public sector is limited by the fact that the charges 
levied for medical scheme members who use public sector hospitals are generally below cost-
recovery levels” (Gilson and McIntyre, 2000; 2002, in Wadee et al., 2003: 9-10).  This, 
according to Wadee et al (2003: 10), leads to the subsidisation of the private system by the 
public system. 
The lack of cross-subsidisation between the two systems means that the public health sector 
is almost completely dependent on public health sector funding.  Market trends in health 
provision leave the public sector vulnerable, and, along with the migration of doctors, nurses 
and highly trained health personnel to the private sector, the public health sector is in a 
downward spiral of deterioration that even increased spending has no guarantee of reversing .  
Due to the fact that the public sector has to adhere to principles of equity and a right to health 
care it is unable to compete in the health care market.   
As the public sector deteriorates so do public perceptions of it which means that more and 
more people choose to use private health care, even if it presents problems of affordability.  
This contributes to the already high expenditure as percentage of GDP whilst contributing 
very little to health outcomes.  Most people who opt for private health care are in the middle 
and upper class income brackets, which mean valuable private income into the public sector 
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is diminishing.  In 1990, around 20% of medical scheme benefits paid to hospitals went to the 
public sector.  In 2004 it stood around 3% (Matsebula and Willie, 2007: 168). 
Since 2002 there has been an increase in health spending with current spending patterns at 
around R100 billion in 2010/2011 (National Treasury, 2012).  Despite this, per capita 
spending in the public health sector has not increased.  Most of the increased spending was 
confined to HIV and AIDS programmes.  Since 2005 the District Health Service have 
benefited from budget increases although public hospitals have not gained much from the 
increase (DBSA, 2008: 17).  Overall unit cost increases shows that since 1998 “the public 
hospital system has faced a real decline in budget” (DBSA, 2008: 17).  The budget increase 
for the District Health System could soon start showing improvements in health outcomes, 
but it is still too early to tell. 
Despite increases in the budget “as a proportion of total health expenditure, South Africa has 
one of the lowest levels of government expenditure” (Blecher et al., 2011: 32).  This speaks 
to the inequality in resource allocation in the South African health system and goes some way 
to explain the low health outcomes in the country.   
6.4.2. Financing intermediaries 
Public health funds flow through the three tiers of government: national, provincial and local.  
National Treasury allocates funds according to national priorities in the form of ring-fenced 
conditional grants (equitable share) and block grants.  Conditional grants must be spent on 
the allocated function (i.e. health, education, social development).  Block grants to provincial 
treasuries and local administration can be used according to their own criteria.  Health, 
education and social development compete for block grant finances.  The provincial 
departments of health then allocate funds to district hospitals, health programmes or clinics.  
Provincial departments also sometimes contract out services to local departments or subsidise 
local health projects.  Local municipalities often depend on local tariffs and rates for health 
funds. 
The decentralisation of the public health system has been progressing since 1994.  This 
enormous process along with a lack of clarity on roles and responsibility has made 
implementation of health goals difficult (Local Government and Health Consortium, 2004).  
Generally, decentralisation is associated with a lack of cross-subsidisation and therefore 
inequity.  In South Africa the particular fragmented and decentralised funding mechanisms in 
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the health sector is having an effect on equity as have been shown, in 2004, “budgetary 
allocations between municipalities are inequitable, in that those with least funding have 
greatest needs... and those with most funding have the least needs” (Local Government and 
Health Consortium, 2004: 64).  Personnel allocations reflect funding and therefore the better-
off districts can attract better personnel.  Primary health care seems to be generally neglected 
due to the freedom given to provincial and local departments to allocate funds. 
In the financial year 2010/11 the funds allocated to provincial departments amounted to R98 
billion (National Treasury, 2012) making the provincial departments of health the largest 
intermediary.  Apart from local revenue collection from tariffs and rates, the public health 
sector is dependent on tax revenue.  As have been mentioned before, this dependence makes 
the public health sector vulnerable to fluctuating market trends.   
6.5. The Private Health Sector 
6.5.1. Private Hospitals 
Private hospitals play an important role in the South African health system since it has more 
than 22% of all hospital beds.  Despite the fact that it is running around 60-65% capacity 
(Hospital Association of South Africa, 2010: 7), they alleviate some of the burden on the 
public sector.  The concern is, however, that private hospitals consume the largest component 
of health spending by medical schemes.  Of the R57.6 billion in total medical scheme 
contributions (Nadesan-Reddy, 2010: 78), R18 billion went to private hospitals (Nadesan-
Reddy, 2010: 101, 103).  This figure has shown a steep increase in recent years.  Available 
data until 2006 suggests that since 2003 there has been a 30% real increase in benefits paid 
out to private hospitals.   Despite a moratorium placed on the building of private hospitals, 
there was a 34% increase in the number of for-profit private hospitals (Matsebula and Willie, 
2007: 162).  This was due to the fact that hospital companies were sidestepping regulations 
by building wards without other services which would classify them as hospitals (Cornell et 
al., 2001, in Matsebula and Willie, 2007: 160).   
The dominant perception is that public health care is of low quality.  Due to this, medical aid 
holders have increasingly shifted towards using private instead of public hospitals since 1990 
(Matsebula and Willie, 2007: 162).  More financial resources are flowing towards the private 
sector than the public sector which in turn contributes to the deterioration of the public sector.  
There is a dual mechanism contributing towards the increasingly low health outcomes.  The 
public sector is deteriorating due to, among other reasons, the lack of financial and staff 
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resources, which is increasingly flowing towards the private sector and the inability for the 
market-driven private sector to contain the rising costliness of private health provision.  Both 
of these reasons are analysed further down. 
6.5.2. Financing intermediaries:  Medical Schemes 
Health insurance “monetises health”; providing the private health sector “a source 
of ‘effective demand’” (Minister of Health in Daily Dispatch, 30 June 2011, as 
quoted in Ruiters, 2011: 1).   
Medical aid guarantees profit. (Ruiters, 2011: 2)  
Medical insurance emerged as a form of risk-sharing which is distinct from accessing 
universal and free public health.  A free public health system, such as the UK National Health 
Service formed in 1948, uses the tax base as a form of risk-sharing.  Resources are provided 
according to need and indirectly paid for according to means through taxes.  In the absence of 
such an arrangement the middle-class and affluent contract into a medical aid scheme sharing 
risk among themselves and in order for this medical aid company to stay afloat it risk-rates 
high risk customers out of the scheme.  The uninsured part of the population still needs health 
care and it falls upon the state to provide for them.   
A two-tier system effectively divides the mechanism of risk-sharing in two; to afford an 
exclusive system the affluent share only among themselves.  The uninsured pay out-of-pocket 
in a public system subsidised by taxes.  The section on the public health sector illustrates  
how finances flow through the public system.   
The section which follows discusses funding through medical aid.  The first private medical 
scheme emerged in 1889 and its membership, restricted to the white population, catered 
mainly for white miners – before that private health care was paid for out-of-pocket.  Private 
hospitals consisted mainly of missionary and mining hospitals, but this changed as for-profit 
hospitals, driven by government policy influenced by international trends of privatisation, 
allowed the for-profit health sector to greatly expand from the 1980s (Coovadia et al., 2009: 
826).  Increasing specialisation and high salaries pulled doctors to the private health sector at 
the detriment to primary health provision, which was mainly public.   
In 1981 77% of the white population was covered by medical aid.  The use of the public 
health system by medical aid customers was high.  Only just over a million of the total black 
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population of over 25 million were covered.   Since public hospitals were segregated most of 
the black insured population utilised private facilities, where they had access, including 
occupational facilities.  With the drive towards privatisation the number of medical aid users 
increased by just over 1.4 million members between 1981 and 1991.  The number of black 
medical aid holders doubled, but the number of white beneficiaries declined.  Together with 
population growth the number of beneficiaries as a percentage of total population was no 
more than 1%.  By 1995 a total of 17.6% of the South African population had medical aid. 
Although numbers differ, the October and General Household Surveys indicate that the 
number of medical aid beneficiaries remained stagnant between 1995 and 2007 (StatsSA, 
1995-2007).  Between 1994 and 2006 the number of medical aid members grew by 20%, but 
the number of beneficiaries grew at less than half the pace.  This trend is “not attributed to 
real changes in family size but a response to affordability problems in medical schemes” 
(McLeod and Ramjee, 2007: 50).  The sharp increase in medical aid members from 2007 
figures onwards is partly due to the introduction of GEMS in 2006.  Yet in relation to 
percentage of population medical scheme coverage has shown a significant decline between 
1995 (17.6%) and 2006 (13.7%).  The introduction of GEMS brought this figure up to 16% in 
2011. 
6.6. Hidden resource flows: Subsidies/Tax deductions 
The state currently spends 13.6% of general government expenditure funding the public 
health system.  This is through several departments, funds and spheres with the provincial 
department of health spending the greatest amount.  In the financial year 2010/11 this 
amounted to R109 769 billion (National Treasury, 2012).  Although the intermediary through 
which the largest amount of funds for health flows is the provincial department of health 
(only since 2008), overall the private system still absorbs more resources than the public 
system.  The public health system caters for just over 82% of the population (42 million 
people) and the private system is utilised by just over 16% of the population (8 million 
people). 
General health expenditure surveys usually investigate the flow of resources through the two 
health systems by utilising the data such as provided above.  This does not however paint the 
whole picture.  There are other ways in which state funds flow directly to the private sector.  
This takes the form of subsidies for the purchase of medical aid or of medical expenditure in 
general as well as providing medical aid to civil servants to access private health care in the 
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form of occupational health insurance.  This was calculated using Richard Titmuss’ Social 
Division of Welfare in the previous chapter.   
6.6.1. The subsidisation of health professional training 
The South African public health system has a crisis of human resources with regards both 
staff shortage and retention.  The crisis features prominently in media coverage.  In these 
media reports hospital employees are either painted as victims of overwork and staff 
shortages or as violators of standard good conduct evidenced in the rude manner in which 
they behave towards patients or refusing patients’ treatment. The official opposition party, the 
Democratic Alliance has focussed on the failure of the ANC government in the delivery of 
services, with public health provision as a useful example to exploit. They however present a 
challenge for health reformers who want to promote the NHI since most of these stories lay 
the blame at the feet of incompetent state machinery.   
Due to the failure of public hospitals, public perception and confidence in the state as a 
vehicle for the provision of services are eroding.  The staff shortage crisis, however, has 
deeper systemic roots going back, once again, to the presence of a private health system that 
can, at the outset, offer staff better salaries and working conditions.  In 1995 McIntyre et al 
wrote  
Another way in which the state supports the private health sector is by subsidising 
health worker training. A recent study estimated that the average cost of training a 
university medical graduate was 66,500 rands in 1992 and that the net 
government subsidy was 40,200 rands (Bunting, 1994). This refers only to the 
Department of Education's subsidy to universities, and does not include the 
substantial indirect medical training costs which are borne by the academic 
hospitals. The training of all other health personnel is similarly subsidised. There 
has been a great deal of debate about how to recoup some of the training subsidy 
of professionals who work in the private sector. Recommendations include 
providing people with a choice between a period of compulsory public sector 
service prior to registration for private practice or the full repayment of training 
costs, possibly through licensing fees. (McIntyre, Bloom, Doherty and Brijlal, 
1995: 37) 
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Without adequately trained and experienced staff, no hospital or clinic can run efficiently.  
The problem however is that you cannot force an individual to work in the public sector after 
they have finished their compulsory public sector service work.  Another problem is 
immigration.  The state has often had to rely on to foreign trained doctors for service in 
underserved areas.   
Richard Titmuss (Alcock et al. (eds.) 2001: 114) pointed out a very similar trend in the UK in 
the mid-1900s where the USA actively recruited British doctors trained at the public’s 
expense: 
Since 1949 the United States has absorbed (and to some extent deliberately 
recruited) the import of a 100 000 doctors, scientists and engineers from 
developed and developing countries.  In about eighteen years the US will have 
saved some $4,000 million by not having to educate and train, or train fully, this 
vast quantity of human capital.  It has spent more on consumption goods, less on 
public services.  It has taxed itself more lightly while imposing heavier taxation 
on poorer countries.  Estimates have been made that foreign aid to America is as 
great as or greater than the total of American aid to countries abroad since 1949.  
Moreover, such estimates leave out of account the social and economic effects in 
Britain (and much more significantly in the poor countries of the world) of having 
to train more doctors, scientists and engineers, and of having to pay heavily 
inflated rewards to prevent American recruitment with all their harmful 
repercussions on incomes, prices and levels of taxation. 
6.7. Conclusion 
In each of these cases state funds flows to the private sector.  In other words, the state spends 
a considerable amount of resources in order to bail out the deteriorating public system as well 
as alleviate the rising costs in the private system.  Although the state spends R110 billion on 
the public sector (including salaries, infrastructure, research and training) to provide health 
care to 42 million people, it also spends around R40 billion (excluding the subsidies on health 
professionals) on the private sector to subsidise 8 million people.  The per capita state 
expenditure per South African is therefore just more than R2 600 per person in the public 
sector and R5 000 per person in the private sector.  This is apart from the R115 billion 
already spent in the private sector. 
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The reason why these hidden resources arise is due to the structure of the public/private mix 
and the inability of the state to see the nature in which the commercialisation of health care 
distorts resource flows.  The deterioration of the public health system is an indirect result of 
the presence of a for-profit health system and the remedial actions of government is merely 
drawing more resources away from the public health system.   
Tax subsidies for the purchase of medical aid as well as other medical costs are an attempt by 
the state to make private health care more affordable to South Africans.  However, the costs 
to the state of this subsidy will continue to increase with the increase in costs of hospital, 
specialist and therefore medical scheme benefits.  As Chapter 5 has shown, the tax 
expenditure subsidy for medical benefits has increased dramatically from R5 billion in 1995 
to just more than R20 billion in 2009.   
The subsidy is in effect support to middle to high income earners to enable them to afford 
medical aid and resultant non-reimbursed medical spending.  Furthermore, due to the fact that 
it is not part of the formal budget it is not viewed as social expenditure and is not 
incorporated into general health expenditure surveys.  As it is only available to taxpaying 
individuals, these R20 billion in subsidies benefit an incredibly small minority currently 
amounting to less than 2 million individuals and their dependents (National Treasury and 
SARS, 2010). 
Tax subsidies can therefore be viewed, not as an attempt to remedy a system contributing to 
an ever-increasing escalation of health costs, but merely to reduce the ultimate negative effect 
it has on the population.  This cannot ever be an answer to the problem of health costs nor can 
it ever be equitable.  It is an incentive for the acquisition of medical aid, yet, like most 
incentives, it has a very minimal positive impact to society compared to its cost.   
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CHAPTER 7 
THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE MIX OF HEALTH CARE PROVISION AND THE 
REPRODUCTION OF INEQUALITY 
 
7. j 
This chapter outlines and summarizes the argument that the private health system is creating 
many of the inequalities in health provision in South Africa. 
7.1. Marginalisation of primary health care 
The inordinate focus on curative-oriented health provision has a long history in South Africa.  
According to the Gluckman Report, by 1944 only 1% of the total of all health spending (state, 
employer and individual) was on preventive services13 (Gluckman Commission, 1944: 2).  
The commission argued that indeed the South African health services were “NOT in 
conformity with the modern conception of ‘Health’ – for they are mainly directed not to the 
promotion and safeguarding of health, but to the cure of ill health.” (Gluckman Commission, 
1944: 2)  
The hospital-centred trajectory in the public service can be attributed to state resource flows:  
only 11% of state spending went to non-hospital primary health care services by 1994 
whereas hospitals consumed 80% of the health care budget.  Of the 80%, half went to tertiary 
level and academic hospitals (Coovadia et al., 2009: 828).  Within a public service, state 
resource flows can be directed by policy.  In 1994 the trajectory was changed towards 
primary health care with the reallocation of resources to primary health care. 
In 2008 the World Health Organisation dedicated their annual World Health Report to the 
promotion of primary health care.  The report argues that health sectors all over the world 
have been slow to channel resources to primary health care and transforming health 
institutions to accommodate primary health care values.  This, the report argues has been due 
to the “powerful trends” related to commercialised health care.  These forces include  
                                                                
13 This total excluded subsidised housing and subsidised nutrition which accounted for about £3 million state spending. 
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a disproportionate focus on specialist hospital care; fragmentation of health 
systems; and the proliferation of unregulated commercial care. (WHO, 2008: 2) 
Primary health care is a more holistic approach to health provision with a greater focus on 
either promotive, preventive, curative or rehabilitative services, depending on community 
needs.  The goal of primary health care is for people to attain “a level of health that will 
permit them to lead a socially and economically productive life… at a cost that the 
community and country can afford to maintain at every stage of their development.” (Alma 
Ata, 1978: Declaration VI).  Thus primary health care is focused on community-oriented and 
non-hospital services, including GPs, pharmacists, dentists etc. 
Primary health care is considered to be the major contributor to overall population health.  In 
general, strong primary health care systems reduce the overall need in a country for 
hospitalisation.  Good quality primary health care has also shown to significantly reduce the 
mortality rate and countries with strong primary health care systems usually have better 
health outcomes (WHO, 2008: 2-3, 7, and 54).  With its particular disease demographics 
South Africa would benefit considerably from high quality primary health care facilities, 
particularly ones focused on holistic disease prevention and health promotion. 
Primary health care was, and still is, mainly provided by public health institutions.  With the 
deregulation of health care during the 1980’s recession, the privatisation of health care 
immediately led to the rapid expansion of hospital-based curative services.  More and more 
doctors moved away from rural areas to better-paid jobs in the more specialised urban 
facilities.  Preventative service provision declined and the more expensive curative care 
proved to be a barrier for low-income groups in accessing health care.   
Despite the focus on primary health care ushered in by the ANC’s election victory in 1994 
and its subsequent redistributive changes, the implementation of a people-oriented primary 
health system is still facing a serious set of obstacles, much of which are connected to the 
institutional and economic strength of the private, curative-oriented, sector.  By 1994 only 11 
per cent of health spending was oriented towards primary health care (McIntyre, Bloom, 
Doherty and Brijlal, 1995: 47).  The ANC agenda, set out in the 1994 Health Plan was to 
substantially change these inherited spending patterns.  A centrally administered needs-based 
resource allocation mechanism was introduced quite speedily as well as the removal of 
certain public sector fees such as those for children under six and nursing and pregnant 
women (Gilson et al., 2003: 34).  In 1996 all primary care user fees were abolished.    
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Due to the speed with which these reforms were implemented, public sector capacity was 
overlooked and this led to many unintended consequences.    With the advent of the era of 
fiscal federalism, the resource allocation mechanism was replaced by provincial block grants 
distributed by the Department of Finance.  This had a negative effect on equitable budgeting; 
“the initial equity gains achieved through implementation of health resource allocation 
formulae were reversed by the implementation of provisional block grants after 1996” 
(Gilson et al., 2003: 36).    
Although the geographical re-allocation of resources was a move towards addressing the 
inequity between primary and tertiary public spending, no action was taken on the 
improvement of cross-subsidisation between the private and public sectors.  This was a goal 
in the original Health Plan, but the NHI has only recently brought this back onto the policy 
agenda.   
Within for-profit health care there are forces which pull health provision in the direction of 
specialist hospital care.  Curative care is more expensive than primary health care and 
therefore hospitals will focus on attracting specialists who will bring more income to the 
facility.  One practical example is that the private hospital industry invests in surgical beds 
over medical beds.  Ward fees are the same for all beds.  Yet, “the overall cost of a surgical 
admission is higher due to the use of theatre and surgical items such as the prosthesis” 
(Matsebula and Willie, 2007: 160).   
According to Nadesan-Reddy (2010: 162), the most prevalent condition among medical aid 
holders is that of hypertension followed by hyperlipidaemia, asthma, diabetes mellitus type 2 
and HIV.  “Hypertension, hyperlipidaemia and diabetes mellitus type 2 are all strong risk 
factors for the development of coronary artery disease which is a chronic disease of poor 
lifestyle management (Nadesan-Reddy, 2010: 162).  Although the private sector can provide 
high quality treatment for these conditions, especially since it has become part of the 
Minimum Prescribed Benefits (MPBs), (state regulations introduced in 2000) these 
conditions can be combated, more efficiently through a system of primary health care which 
focuses on the prevention of such diseases.  However, with its current focus on treatment of 
disease and subsequent marginalisation of primary health care in the private sector, these 
medical aid holders are done a disservice. 
The profit-making incentive in an open health market would therefore direct investment to 
curative care provision.  The WHO argues that health care institutions need to be mobilised 
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around primary health care values and that the failure to “either counter or substantially 
modify forces that pull the health sector in other directions, namely: a disproportionate focus 
on specialist hospital care; fragmentation of health systems; and the proliferation of 
unregulated commercial care” (WHO, 2008: 4) is the reason for the general failure of 
countries to meet the MDGs in health care. 
7.2. Hidden resource flows to the private health system 
As have been pointed out, a considerable amount of state resources flow to the private health 
system via the tax code.  The need for subsidies and incentives to increase the number of 
medical aid holders are due to escalating cost in the private health industry.  The amount of 
resources which flows through these fiscal and occupational welfare mechanisms are 
increasing at a relatively rapid pace and will continue to do so if left unexamined.  The 
amount, rudimentarily valued at over R30 billion in the previous chapter represents too large 
an amount to be allowed to flow to the private health sector without scrutiny.  Due to the 
hidden nature of these subsidies it is important to bring their existence under the spotlight.  
The existence of these subsidies demonstrates also, as Titmuss attempted to do when he 
formulated his theory the Social Division of Welfare, that the middle and upper classes 
benefit disproportionately from welfare spending which is ironic as they are often the most 
vociferous critics of state expenditure on the poor. 
7.3. Quality of Care 
It is a common-sense, popular belief that the private health sector provides high quality care 
in South Africa.  This is almost always taken as a given.  However, often the inordinate focus 
on curative-oriented health provision and the general trend to focus on high cost procedures 
have very negative effects on quality of care.  Most problematic however is the lack of data in 
the area of health outcomes and quality indicators from medical schemes (Council of Medical 
Schemes, 2001). Despite the fact that they are mandated to do so by the Medical Schemes 
Act “medical schemes are currently not collecting data that would allow for an accurate 
evaluation of access to health, cost and quality of healthcare” (Council of Medical Schemes, 
2001).  Nor do medical aid schemes seem concerned about whether patients are re-admitted 
for the same problems, for post-operative complications or whether operations themselves are 
without complications.   
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Indeed it is acknowledged by the Council that on the contrary data collection by medical 
schemes is motivated by “cost data than quality and outcomes data” which is evident in the 
fact that there is a strong emphasis on the collection of data on the administration of high cost 
items such as MRI and CT scans yet very few bother to collect mortality data (Council of 
Medical Schemes, 2001). 
It is therefore hard to judge whether the private sector is providing adequate quality care 
which is in line with their high costs.  Despite the popular conception that the private health 
industry provides high quality care this is not always the case in every area of its care 
provision.  A recent study has found that private sector GPs have little knowledge of recent 
STI developments and more than half of these GPs did not provide up to date information on 
how to prevent future infections (Stevens et al., 2007: 206).  This is one way in which the 
focus on the curative is having negative outcomes on the general health status of the country.  
The same study also found that the quality of care received by a patient was highly influenced 
by their insurance status when patients sought STI treatment:   
STI clients with a medical scheme were 2.64 times more likely to receive 
effective treatment than cash clients. (Stevens et al., 2007: 206) 
People who utilise the private sector are therefore treated differentially merely on the basis of 
whether they have medical aid or not.  The researchers come to the conclusion that the 
control of STIs among the population “does not appear to be a priority” and as a result it is 
“undermining national efforts to control STI’s especially among the poor” (Stevens et al., 
2007: 206).   
Private health practitioners and providers are less likely to provide health care services that 
are in the public interest if it is not in their financial interest.  Profit-maximisation is not in the 
public interest especially where poor people are the main section in need; when it comes to 
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis intervention even the private curative services lack sufficient 
financial incentives to “motivate uniformly high standards in provision” (Stevens et al., 2007: 
210).  A discussion on the provision of HIV treatment is dealt with further down.  Generally 
however, researchers agree that the private system is not contributing enough to South 
Africa’s most pressing diseases and epidemics. 
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7.4. Cost-escalation in the private health industry 
As have been pointed out in Chapter 2, in 1963 the economist Kenneth Arrow wrote a 
powerful theorem on ‘uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care’ which argued 
that the particular characteristics of the medical care industry renders it different from the 
norm which allows systems to operate effectively and efficiently in a competitive model.  
The first characteristic of the medical care industry that Arrow points out is the nature of 
demand.  The demand for medical care is irregular and unpredictable and “not steady in 
origin” such as for instance food and clothing (Arrow, 1963: 948).  The demand for medical 
care is usually also accompanied by the “loss or reduction of earning ability” (Arrow, 1963: 
949).   
Another deviation from the norm is the “expected behaviour of the physician” which is unlike 
that of a business arrangement since “the product and the activity of production are 
identical”.  In other words the consumer cannot ‘test’ the product and the relationship is 
highly dependent on trust.   
His (the physician’s) behaviour is supposed to be governed by a concern for the 
customer’s welfare which would not be expected of a salesman.  In Talcott 
Parsons’ terms, there is a “collectivity-orientation,” which distinguishes medicine 
and other professions from business, where self-interest on the part of participants 
is the accepted norm. (Arrow, 1963: 949) 
Arrow argues further that physicians’ behaviour should not be dictated by financial 
considerations as it would distort the principles which guide the provision of health care.   
Particularly pressing is the presence of an ‘uncertainty principle’ since illness and recovery of 
human beings are not as certain as the breakdown and servicing of say, a vehicle or a 
television set.  This uncertainty extends to the complicated nature of medical knowledge and 
the “informational inequality” (Arrow, 1963: 965) between the physician and patient.  If the 
medical industry were to operate according to the norm the patient would know exactly 
which illness they have and what is needed as a cure.  Only then would the patient be able to 
make a decision in line with competitive market practice. 
The medical care industry also deviates from the norms of competitive theory in terms of the 
governing of supply by net return due to the high cost of training, the subsidisation of training 
by the state, the restrictions to entry into medical schools, the high earnings of the doctor as 
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an incentive for entry into the field coupled with the public need and, in effect, interest to 
training doctors.  These disparate departures from the norm make the medical care industry 
particularly different from the general marketplace.   
Arrow also points to problematic trends in pricing practices which results in the deviation 
from the norm of competitive theory.  Discrimination by income could have the unintended 
consequence of cherry-picking when not regulated.  The absence of an ideal competitive 
environment in health care therefore distorts the outcomes generally expected in a market 
place.  This goes far to explain the problematic issues created by the private health sector of 
which the most important is cost-escalation and exclusion and attempts to balance the two. 
Interest groups within the private sector include the private hospital industry, pharmaceutical 
companies, doctors and specialists, the medical insurance and the medical scheme industry.  
Each of these interests puts forward a different scenario as to what is driving cost-escalation 
and why.  In each of these scenarios the protagonist is innocent.  What they do have in 
common is their desire to maintain the private health sector.  In most cases the argument is 
put forward that the imposition, by the state, of regulations, are what is driving costs in the 
private sector.  By imposing regulations to manage risk-rating, they argue, the market 
mechanisms that would allow medical schemes to keep costs low are thwarted.   
The state imposes such regulations in order to insure that more people can access medical aid 
and therefore private health care.  The state also subsidises medical aid users by providing 
medical tax deductions.  Risk-rating is not in the interest of the South African population, or 
even the medical aid user since many would be excluded.  Most of this is due to the fact that 
health care is not an ordinary commodity that can be withheld from those who cannot afford 
it.  Due to the economic strength of the private hospital and medical aid industry the 
consumer has very little power to drive costs down.  
The question of ethics in health care does not fit into the argument made by proponents of 
market driven health provision.  The choice is therefore between unregulated, highly 
exclusive private services for a very small part of the population at manageable prices, or 
regulated, expensive private services for a slightly greater proportion of the population.  This 
is when assuming that state regulation drives cost escalation. 
Another argument is that the growing monopoly in private hospital ownership is having an 
adverse effect on costs in the private sector.  Netcare, Medi-Clinic and Life Healthcare own 
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around 80% of all private hospitals in South Africa.  This means that their bargaining power 
outweighs those of medical schemes.  The correlation is made between the trend in hospital 
consolidation and rapidly increasing costs in hospital care (Matsebula and Willie, 2007: 169).  
The hospital industry disagrees, citing inflation and regulation as the drivers of hospital costs.   
The Council of Medical Schemes (2001) argues that the monopoly practices in the private 
hospital industry have handed over market power to hospitals thus allowing hospitals to 
increase their prices without suffering the damage necessarily associated with price increases 
in a competitive environment due to guaranteed funding from medical schemes.  The price 
increases are shouldered by medical schemes which are then passed on to consumers through   
levies.  Unfortunately the cost is borne by the consumer who can no longer afford medical 
aid.  These patients either start utilising public services or join the swelling numbers of 
consumers paying out-of-pocket in the private health system. 
Apart from quality control (National Health Act 61 of 2003), private hospitals are not 
regulated.  The three monopoly hospital groups were all listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange until 2005 when Life Healthcare delisted.  Although it is hard to make definite 
estimates and comparisons: 
Available figures suggest that the private hospital sector is consistently profitable 
with significantly high rations of operating earnings before interest, taxation, 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA).  A seven-year review of the financial 
performance of both Netcare and Medi-Clinic reveals a consistent trend of growth 
in earnings.  The Competition Tribunal characterises the private hospital industry 
as having “opaque vertical relationships and a guaranteed source of funding from 
medical schemes”14. (Matsebula and Willie, 2007: 170)  
Since hospital admission is out of reach of most South African citizens and would even set an 
average middle class family back significantly there has been some focus on enhancing bed 
occupation in private facilities by lower income citizens, although, it seems this has been 
hampered by the lack of specialists (Matsebula and Willie, 2007: 172).  There has not 
however been an attempt to force private hospitals to lower their prices.   
                                                                
14 Competition Tribunal, Phodiclinics (pty) Ltd & DJH Defty (Pty) Ltd and Protector Group Medical services (Pty) Ltd & 5 
Others.  Case no: 122/LM/Dec05, Pretoria 2007. In SAHR 2007: 170. 
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Another argument is that “the fee-for-service reimbursement mechanism implemented by 
medical schemes encourage over-servicing” (Matsebula and Willie, 2007: 159).  Fee-for-
service reimbursement is argued to create the incentive to over-supply (Doherty and McLeod, 
2002: 50; see also Arrow, 1963: 953).  As was explained earlier, patient ignorance, or what 
economists refer to as ‘uncertainty’, allows for health as a ‘market good’ to be distorted, thus 
not providing the criteria for optimum competition.   
7.5. Migration of doctors and nurses 
The low numbers of staff in the public sector presents a major challenge to quality public 
health provision.  There has been significant staff reductions since 1997/98, and possibly 
prior to this date, although data is not reliable (DBSA, 2008: 19-20).   
In 1997 a staff headcount reveals around 251,000 staff members. By 2002 this had declined 
by around 36,000, and thereafter increased again to 251,000 by 2007/08. Thus from 1997/98 
to 2007/8, a period of 11 years, no increases in staff levels had occurred despite a significant 
increase in the population making use of the public sector and an increased burden of disease 
resulting from HIV and AIDS.  
The DBSA report (2008) argues that staff levels fluctuate with budgetary allocations, with 
fiscal austerity clearly following by staff reductions.  One of the reasons why the public 
sector is short staffed is due to the ability of the private sector to draw trained professional 
services with larger salaries and better working environments.  As have been mentioned, 
doctor and nurses training is subsidised by the state, and every state subsidised professional 
who chooses to work in the private sector represents an indirect flow of state resources to the 
private sector.  Furthermore, these invaluable health professionals are not accessible to those 
who need them most. 
7.6. Geographic inequality 
For-profit hospital growth is driven by market indicators.  They are therefore more likely to 
concentrate in high-wealth urban areas.  Despite the fact that private for-profit hospitals claim 
that they are not “as dependent on the medical scheme population as is being argued” 
(Matsebula and Willie, 2007: 162), data shows that private hospitals distribution shows the 
same patterns as medical aid distribution (See table 1).  
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Table 1 shows that the distribution of private hospitals does not concur with demand based 
upon population levels, but rather based upon medical scheme beneficiary levels.  Medical 
scheme beneficiary levels concur with the share of high earners in each province.  Therefore, 
Gauteng and Kwazulu-Natal have equal sized populations; however Gauteng has more than 
twice the amount of high-income earners and therefore more than twice the amount of 
medical scheme holders.  This explains why there are 95 private hospitals with over 12 000 
beds in Gauteng and only 27 private hospitals with a mere 3 400 beds in Kwazulu-Natal 
(2006 data in Matsebula and Willie, 2007: 161-163). 
Table 1: Provincial distribution of private hospitals (Matsebula and Willie, 2007) 
 
 
EC FS GP KZN LP MP NW NC WC
Percentage of private hospitals:
2006 data 6.0 7.0 43.0 12.5 2.3 4.0 4.6 1.3 18.0
Share of private hospital beds by
province: 2006 data 5.1 9.1 47.9 12.6 2.4 3.4 1.1 2.5 15.8
Percentage of medical scheme
beneficiaries: 2006 data 8.8 4.8 37.1 15.2 3.8 6.8 4.9 2.1 16.4
Share of highest income groups
by province:  2010 data 7.4 4.6 40.5 13.8 5.4 6.1 5.6 1.8 14.7
Percentage provincial population:
2006 data 14.0 5.7 21.8 21.3 11.0 7.3 6.5 2.2 10.5
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7.7. HIV treatment 
National AIDS Spending Assessment (NASA) reports are compiled by countries, however 
there is no such report for South Africa.  The South African Health Review reports that 
spending on HIV and AIDS is around 0.7% of GDP (2011) and will likely hit the 1% mark 
soon (Blecher et al., 2011: 32).  In 2001 South Africa signed the Abuja Declaration on 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other related infectious diseases.  This declaration signified the 
commitment of signatories to commit 15% of their national resources to health care.  The 
HSRC states that in 2003 15% of the total South African government expenditure was 
dedicated to health care amounting to 3% of GDP.  The NHA report of 2003-2006 puts this at 
11.1% of total government spending.  The Human Science Research Council (HSRC) does 
recognise that such high spending can be of little use when it is distributed so inequitably and 
inefficiently.   
Consequently, this apparently adequate level of health spending is not translated 
very efficiently into health outputs, such as immunisations and antenatal visits, 
and health outcomes, such as infant and maternal mortality rates. (HSRC Media 
Brief, 2003, HIV/AIDS spending in Southern Africa below requirements for 
prevention, care and treatment) 
It is further stated that two thirds of government spending is awarded to provincial 
departments in the form of block grants, which is the HIV/AIDS component of equitable 
share.  However, what increases South African health care spending is the 4.1% of GDP 
spent in the private sector for little more than 16% of the population.  The pandemic itself is 
not the cause for high spending in the private for-profit sector.    
Although “the prevalence of HIV appears lower than the national average... among members 
of medical schemes”, another reason for the low numbers can be that “schemes had restricted 
access to antiretroviral therapy to dual- and in some cases mono-therapy” (Nadesan-Reddy, 
2010: 163).  Anti-retroviral therapy has, since 2005, been included in the PMB package 
which, Nadesan-Reddy argues, would probably lead to an increase in the numbers of medical 
aid holders reporting HIV treatment.  Furthermore, the medical scheme HIV management 
framework (such as the Disease Management Programme) are not holistically orientated due 
to its curative focus and therefore these medical aid beneficiaries do not benefit from an 
integrated framework for the treatment and prevention of HIV-related infections such as TB 
and STIs (Nadesan-Reddy, 2010: 163). 
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Even though the Medical Schemes Act (131 of 1998) prescribes a list of PMBs in relation to 
HIV infection, Stevens et al. (2007) comes to the conclusion that, along with the private 
sector’s curative approach, the problem lies with the lack of “financial incentives among 
private sector providers to motivate uniformly high standards in provision of care for these 
priority health conditions” (Stevens et al., 2007: 210).  The for-profit private sector, despite 
the fact that it consumes such a great amount of resources, is not playing a helpful role in 
controlling infectious disease. This is mainly due to the limited amount of people able to 
afford private health care and the fact that infectious diseases is most prevalent in low socio-
economic circumstances.   
7.8. Conclusion 
This chapter examines seven areas pertaining to the health sector which is, in some way or 
another, having a detrimental effect on the health outcomes of South Africa.  In each of these 
areas the presence of a profit motive in the private health sector plays an important role in the 
creation or continuation of these negative effects.  The presence of a profit motive means that 
services which do not necessarily create high profits are systematically marginalised.  These 
include the provision of primary health care and comprehensive HIV treatment.  Private 
hospitals are built in areas where there are higher concentrations of medical aid holders, i.e. 
areas where middle and upper class people are concentrated.  This bias means rural and 
poorer areas have little to no access to private health care.  Again, this is due to the presence 
of a profit motive.   
 The South African Health Review 2007 asks the pertinent question whether “some of the 
challenges faced by the public health sector can be laid at the door of an under-regulated 
private sector?” (Editorial: page viii).  The Hospital Association of South Africa disagrees 
(HASA, 2008: 4) and counters the attack by the SAHR contributors by arguing that the 
disproportionate spending in the private health sector is inflated by “value-added tax at 14%, 
the cost of capital, the cost of infrastructure, property rental and the substantial private sector 
cross-subsidy of pharmaceuticals”.  However, apart from value-added tax with regards to 
hospital treatment, the public health budget also caters for the other resources mentioned.  
The SAHR (2007: x) argues that lack of funding plays an important role in the inadequate 
levels of quality and access which the public sector provides. Low levels of quality health 
care draw medical aid holders away from the public sector and thus a cycle of deterioration is 
set in motion.  As Wadee et al. (2003: 13) points out: 
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…the cost-recovery rate in public facilities is low and decreasing, falling from 
around 9.2% of public hospital recurrent expenditure in 1992/93 to 2.1% in 
1998/99. This is most likely due to a combination of falling use by paying patients 
and poor management of billing systems. 
The intricate flow of resources in and between the state and the two health sectors has been 
analysed in this thesis.  Without a critical interrogation the links between the deterioration of 
the public sector and the presence of an ‘under-regulated private sector’ is not apparent, and 
can easily be argued away, as HASA (2008) attempted to do.  The division of the health 
sector of South Africa into two, one which caters for the well-off and one which caters for the 
less well-off, quite simply means the division of the risk pool.  Cost-recovery in the public 
sector is thus decreasing due to a lack of paying patients, exacerbated by the fact that medical 
aid holders are generally charged below cost-recovery rates (Gilson and McIntyre 2000; 
2000).   
There are mechanisms which can represent resource flows from the private to the public 
sector.  Medical scheme reimbursements for private patients which were treated in the public 
sector or the leasing of public hospital beds to private providers include some of the more 
significant ways in which the public sector can obtain private funding (Doherty et al., 2002: 
12). But since medical scheme members are charged below cost-recovery levels as Gilson 
and McIntyre (2000; 2002) pointed out, “these arrangements generate subsidy from the 
public to the private sector” (Wadee et al., 2003: 9). 
The public system therefore remains dependent on general taxation and, as a result, all the 
vulnerabilities which accompany macro-economic policy, financial market volatility, budget 
cuts and the like.  In the process, the private health system is not contributing in any 
significant manner to addressing the most pertinent health issues facing the country.  This is 
due to the fact that primary health care is marginalised along with adequate HIV, STI and TB 
treatments.  Apart from this the private sector also excludes those who live in rural areas due 
to the geographical distribution of private facilities.  And where patients without medical aid 
choose to go to private facilities and pay out-of-pocket, they either incur debilitating financial 
costs or are unable to receive treatment due to the lack of financial resources.   
Each of these ‘problems’ created in and by the private health sector is due to the presence of 
the profit motive.   And as this chapter has pointed out, the uncertainties which abound in the 
medical care industry and the deviation from the norms upon which the market operates 
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creates a variety of distortions which can account for cost-escalation, increasing exclusion, 
and the diminishing of the ‘care’ principle (Arrow, 1963). 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Inequality and its consequences are pervasive and prominent features of everyday life in 
South Africa.  What is significant is the reproduction of inequality through social institutions 
on the basis of access to the formal labour market.  This thesis argues that in order to 
understand and more effectively address the persistence of inequality, policy makers should 
focus on the mechanisms which reproduce poverty.  The work of Richard Titmuss is used as 
a conceptual framework to explain how social changes are differentially responded to by 
policy makers who are, in turn, reacting to the interests of powerful stakeholders, hegemonic 
ideas and persisting stereotypes.  Chapter 4 demonstrates how policy decisions were 
influenced historically by racist ideology and the interests of mining capital.  The result was 
that in the area of health, and particularly mining-related illnesses, views and ideas about 
causes and cures were continually being rewritten, not only to the benefit of the accumulation 
of capital in the mining industry but also the wider project of segregation and apartheid.   
Notions of the ‘deserving and undeserving poor’ in South Africa were influenced by debates 
in the United Kingdom and manifested itself in the differentiated form of social policy aimed 
at the poor (Sagner, 2000).  As capitalism in the mining and agricultural sectors developed 
and South Africa was industrialised, the social changes which accompanied these processes 
had profoundly negative effects on a large part of the South African population, in particular 
the black majority.  Policies such as the 1910 Constitution, the 1914 Natives Land Act and 
the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923 were intended to segregate the races and to dispossess 
the African population and were in large part fuelled by the racialised form capitalist 
development took in South Africa.  The accumulation of capital and a racist ideology thus 
worked in tandem.  In South Africa the processes of urbanisation, industrialisation and 
increasing landlessness led to increased poverty amongst both the white and black 
population.  In this context the differential treatment in the application of social policy among 
races emerged.   
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Policy interventions for the segregation of the different races, Iliffe (1987) states, emerged 
around the 1880s although differential treatment preceded along similar lines due to colonial 
notions of hierarchy as well as slavery and the preoccupation with the supply of labour.  The 
impetus for segregation was rationalised on the basis of several epidemics among the poorer 
citizens of the Cape Colony.  The diagnosis was influenced by these early ideas and blame 
was laid on the victims themselves, particularly African victims of smallpox and bubonic 
plague.  From very early on ideas about the causes of disease played an important role in 
shaping policy as well as popular opinion about race.  In the analysis of early policy it 
becomes apparent that these ideas about race and disease were used as justification for certain 
policy actions (see for instance the Lagden Commission (1903) and the Native Urban Areas 
Act of 1923 as well as the reactions of the mining industry towards tuberculosis among both 
black and white miners).   
Justified by ideas of racial hierarchy the social policies which emerged as a reaction to 
increasing poverty resulted in the differential treatment of races and worked in favour of the 
minority white population as well as capitalist interests.  The appropriation of land from the 
locals as well as the commercialisation of agriculture, along with other social changes 
associated with rapid industrialisation, led to large numbers of both black and white people 
moving to urban areas.  Slums were segregated to prevent social mixing across social groups 
and to protect the ideology of white imperialism.  The result was that poor whites were 
materially advantaged through preferential labour policies and differential but redistributive 
social policies to the detriment of the black population, who were treated either as non-
citizens or received racially differentiated benefits.  Thus although poor whites were not 
viewed as “victims of their vices” (Iliffe, 1987: 116), stereotypes of disease ridden and 
barbarous ‘natives’ still remained intact.   
The solutions to the ‘Poor White Problem’ therefore played the role of stigmatising poverty 
as something that should not be associated with being civilised and uplifting poor white 
people, but in ways which negatively affected the social wellbeing of black people (Teppo, 
2004).  Although the “war years” of the 1940s under the United Party represented an era of 
liberal ideas on social policy albeit co-existing with continued labour repression and political 
disenfranchisement, most of the recommended social policies aimed at ameliorating the 
social effects of segregation and industrialisation were not implemented. When the National 
Party was voted into government in 1948 the policy of apartheid rapidly supplanted the 
liberal impetus which existed in sections of the white intelligentsia.  In the health sector the 
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National Party government continued to manage institutions of health on a racial basis, but 
gradually ceded control of health institutions for Africans to local Bantustan authorities 
(including mission hospitals) (Price, 1989).  The underdeveloped Bantustans were unable to 
maintain a fully functioning health system and outside of the Bantustans black South 
Africans were treated differentially based upon the exclusionary principles and values of 
apartheid.  Access to quality health care was therefore dependent on race and the ability to 
pay for private health care. 
From the 1970s the government followed international trends by pursuing the policy of 
privatisation (Price, 1989).  For-profit general hospitals expanded greatly between 1988 and 
1993.  Coovadia et al. (2009) argues that established corporate capitalist interests, 
“particularly the mining houses” drove the policy of privatisation (2009: 826).  The drive 
towards the privatisation of health care was argued to be due to the desire of the state to 
decrease social spending.  Price (1989) argued that it would have the opposite effect.  Due to 
high costs private hospitals were dependent on medical aid beneficiaries and thus could not 
expand if the pool of medical aid beneficiaries did not as well.  This opened up an avenue for 
the inclusion of the black middle class in the provision of private health care (Price, 1989).  
The change from public to private health care leading up to the democratic era therefore 
represents a change from exclusion based upon race to exclusion based upon ability to pay. 
The process in which health care came to be a commodity also had several other 
consequences.  This is discussed in a historical setting in Chapter 6 and summarised in 
Chapter 7.  The negative consequences of the privatisation of the health sector includes the 
marginalisation of primary health care; severe cost escalation; inferior quality care provision 
in certain areas such as epidemics; the exclusion of a very large part of the population due to 
high costs and the lack of cross-subsidisation; the unequal geographic distribution of private 
hospitals; and the distortion of not only human resources but also public health funds.  
Chapter 5 focuses particularly on the distortion of public health funds through the application 
of Richard Titmuss’ theory of a Social Division of Welfare.   
High quality private health care is accessible only to those who can afford it.  While those 
who access public institutions such as public health care are assumed to be ‘dependent’ on 
the state, those who access private health facilities are assumed to be ‘independent’ of the 
state.  However, these connections are not that clear cut.  Access to the formal labour market, 
and subsequently the paying of taxes, authorises one to access subsidies not available to those 
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who do not.  Furthermore, there is a variety of factors which impact upon your access to this 
subsidy, and these factors all work in a regressive manner.  Thus, in essence, the benefits of 
the subsidy increases the wealthier you are.   
Due to cost escalation in the private health sector, medical aid payments have become 
increasingly costly.  Medical aid membership has risen in the last few years only due to the 
introduction of the Government Employee Medical Scheme (GEMS).  GEMS had around 
400 000 members and around 1.2 million beneficiaries in 2009 (GEMS, 2010).  Overall 
medical scheme beneficiaries in South Africa has been fluctuating between 6 and 7 million 
since 1991 (see appendix 1), with new growth showing only in 2005.  However, the relation 
between beneficiary coverage and the growing total population shows that coverage 
“declined from 17.0% in 1994 to 14.9% in 2005” (StatsSA, 1998b, in McLeod and Ramjee 
2007).  In 2009 there were just over 5.5 million tax payers and 3.5 million principal members 
of medical schemes (CMS, 2011).  Of these members, 1.8 million accessed the subsidy 
(National Treasury and SARS, 2010); and as Chapter 5 has shown, access is regressive.   
The Gross Contribution Income (GCI) is R84.9 billion for all medical schemes (CMS, 2011: 
43) (which exclude out-of-pocket payments). With subsidies which amount to R20 billion 
(fiscal welfare) and 6.9 billion (occupational welfare), including another R12.5 billion which 
flows from the government to the private sector through GEMS, as well as the subsidisation 
of health professionals who migrate to the private sector. The private health sector is thus 
dependent on subsidies derived through the state through mechanisms such as GEMS.   The 
subsidy which private sector patients receive from the state is, in aggregate, two to three 
times more than what the average public sector patient receives through the public health 
budget.  This has a number of significant consequences for the reproduction of inequality. 
The first consequence is the perpetuation of myths and stereotypes of the “deserving and 
undeserving poor” which prevail in a highly stratified society such as South Africa.  Titmuss’ 
intention with the formulation of the Social Division of Welfare was to demonstrate how the  
middle and upper classes in the UK were benefitting considerably from the welfare state by 
dividing all ‘welfare’ benefits according to administrative method (directly provided public 
services for the poor, differential fiscal benefits through the system of taxation and 
occupational benefits through differential positions in the labour market).  The social division 
of welfare demonstrated how the non-poor (middle-class and upper-class) disproportionately 
benefit from welfare provision due to their privileged position in the labour market.  The 
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application of the Social Division of Welfare to the South African health system reveals a 
system of class and race-based differentiation in social policy.  Rather than being an 
independent entity operating on market logic, the private health industry in South Africa is 
demonstrated to be highly dependent on government tax funds through the subsidisation of 
medical aid to individuals in the form of a Tax Expenditure Subsidy and fringe benefits to 
employers, the provision of heavily subsidised medical aid to civil servants, and the 
subsidisation of health professional training.  The government indirectly spends more, per 
person, on the subsidisation of the private health sector than it does on beneficiaries of the 
public health system.  If dependency on the state is measured according to benefits received, 
or benefits required, private sector patients are very much dependent on the state.   
Kirk Mann summarises the significance of the understanding and application of the Social 
Division of Welfare: 
By telling public welfare recipients that they must do more to avoid dependency, 
whilst ignoring the dependency of those who can access generous fiscal and 
occupational welfare provisions, academics, politicians and journalists may 
reinforce the misleading stereotypes and social divisions. (Mann, 2009) 
Because the figures which represent resources flowing to the private system are indirect, not 
part of the budget and relatively out of sight and they are not the subject of scrutiny.  
Consequently policies are very often shaped by stereotypes and anecdotes of a feckless 
“undeserving” poor but which is nonetheless not extended to include discussion of an 
“undeserving” middle-class.  The rhetoric of dependency encourages not only the idea that 
the poor are lazy but promotes a hegemonic public discourse that welfare provision, in 
Benjamin Franklin’s words, supports “the encouragement of idleness” (Himmelfarb, 1984: 
5).  These anecdotal but nonetheless neo-liberal ideological views are exacerbated by a 
concern “that calamity will follow the relaxation of discipline and the mitigation of hardship” 
(Titmuss, 1958: 37).  Ideas such as these have real social consequences however, tending to 
“[impoverish] political imagination” and “[constrain] the possibilities for social thought and 
public action” (Katz, 1989: 3).  Furthermore, it does what the era of theorists to whom 
Titmuss belonged feared: it re-enforces class division.  Differences in action caused by 
economic and structural disparities are given prejudicial emotional content by furnishing 
them with ideological meanings; effectively turning an entire class (or an entire race) into 
‘the other’. 
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As Tawney lucidly explained, “One of the regrettable… effects of extreme inequality” is that 
the middle and upper classes “take for granted” their own “advantages, as though there were 
nothing in them which could possibly need explanation”, yet become quite “critical of claims 
to similar advantages advanced by… those who do not yet possess them.” (Tawney 1931: 31-
32).  This thesis demonstrates that the ‘advantages’ of the middle and upper classes need 
explanation.  Built upon a particular value system which privileges profit over care, the 
commoditisation of the health system has allowed certain class stereotypes to flourish.  The 
idea that quality health care should be bought, like one does a motor vehicle or a television 
set, has allowed for the notion of “deservedness” to flourish in the South African health 
system.  Thus, it is assumed in everyday life that those who cannot afford private health care 
should be content with the diminished quality of health care found in an overburdened public 
health system.  It is these stereotypes which undermine the ability of achieving cross-class 
solidarity.   
In the same way in which the apartheid state could perpetuate a grossly unequal system based 
upon the hierarchy of races, so too does the logic of capitalism prevail within a highly 
unequal health system - perpetuated by a hierarchy of classes based on differential access to 
the labour market.  This logic of ‘Economic Man’ allows for the perpetuation of the status 
quo, continuous unequal resource allocation and undermines prospects for cross-class 
solidarity.  Cross-class solidarity is what social theorists and academic activists such as 
Richard Tawney, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Peter Townsend and Richard Titmuss, amongst 
others, believed would usher in an era of redistribution and equality.  The dispelling of myths 
and stereotypes of classes and the poor, as well as empirically refuting ideological, common-
sense views about who the principal beneficiaries of state resources were, would reveal the 
structural causes of poverty.    
As Du Toit (2011a: 129) argues, images of the poor and subsequent reactions to poverty 
operate within a field of meaning.  If poverty is merely seen as a ‘problem’ that can be solved 
through ‘development’ and economic growth, policy makers are likely to ignore the true 
causes of poverty in South Africa.  Moreover, it is likely to depoliticise poverty discourse 
through the use of technicist and value-free language, as has been witnessed across other 
countries.  The now popular idea that ‘service-delivery’ is the answer to solving the 
‘problem’ of poverty is too simplistic and only reproduces the notion that poverty is an issue 
removed from wider societal dynamics; that providing services is adequate and there is no 
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need to remove the structural mechanisms which reproduce inequality between groups of 
people.   
If the concept of poverty is a contested and contradictory one, shaped by “underlying 
ideological stories about the nature of society, the relationship between suffering, humanity 
and material lack, and the obligations of citizenship, community membership and solidarity” 
(Du Toit, 2011a: 129), then South African policy makers should develop a greater awareness 
of the complexities which beset the process of policy making.  Images of the poor, 
reproduced by political parties and movements and the media, should be constantly 
interrogated, for they are mere representations, and within middle-class discourses often 
prejudicial, of those living in poverty.   
Policy makers should be aware that poverty is merely a symptom of inequality and that 
poverty itself cannot be addressed without a focus on its opposite – the accumulation of 
wealth.  Capitalist industrialisation has “pushed humanity along the road of modernisation, 
but at an enormous cost in terms of individual and collective suffering” (Gerth and Mills, 
1948).  The modernisation of the South African state alongside racialised policy has 
historically benefitted a white minority and created a state of ‘diswelfare’ for the black 
majority.  Furthermore, the form that the accumulation of capital has taken post-1994 has had 
the same result due to particular policy choices as well as the failure to reform regressive 
social policies such as tax subsidies largely enjoyed by the middle and upper classes which 
enables them to access private health care.  Thus, poverty, as a corollary effect to the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, has allowed South Africa to become one of the 
most unequal countries in the world.    
This thesis has illustrated the ways in which public resource flows in health care are directed 
towards those who are not categorised as poor or needy.  These flows are not recorded in a 
transparent manner in government records because they are not viewed as a contribution to 
social policy and therefore not subject to scrutiny in the manner that public expenditure on 
directly provided government services is.  Even if a comprehensive non-means tested grant 
system is established, continuing resource flows from the public to private sector such as 
those in health will thwart the goal of creating a more egalitarian society based on social 
solidarity.  The South African health system is merely one example in which detailed analysis 
and scrutiny reveals a regressivity that is contributing to the trend of inequality in the country. 
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Secondly, the question which needs to be asked is whether the Tax Expenditure Subsidy is 
attaining its intended goal.  The South African government’s policy intentions are to alleviate 
the burden upon the overcrowded public health system by subsidising the purchase of 
medical aid (Van den Heever, 2007).  Chapter 5 interrogates whether or not the TES is the 
most effective means to this end.  The logic of spending up to a quarter of the public health 
budget on ‘unburdening’ the public health sector needs to be revised.  This is especially since 
this amount of resources is allocated regressively and excludes the majority of South Africans 
from accessing it.  Even considered on its own terms if the private health sector operates 
according to a market logic in which competitive behaviour is essential to keeping costs 
down, not only does medical aid thwart such behaviour, but the provision of a subsidy will 
create a ‘sellers market’ (Mann, 2008). 
Thirdly, is the commodified form which private health care takes the kind of health care 
South Africa needs?    Chapter 7 summarises some of the problems created when a market 
mechanism operates within a health system.   South Africa, in particular, needs primary 
health care provision.  The World Health Organisation argues that health systems left to their 
own devices “do not gravitate naturally towards the goals of health for all” (WHO, 2008: 7) 
and that a renewed focus on primary health care is urgently needed, particularly in Third 
World countries.  Indeed as they point out, commercialised systems tend to fragment, and 
become hospital and specialist-centred (WHO, 2008: 11).  Furthermore, primary health care 
goals are discarded in systems based upon profit since they tend not to be financially 
profitable, despite being very beneficial to a country’s overall health outcomes.  Countries 
which have invested in re-orienting their health systems towards primary health care have 
witnessed significant health gains.   Oman’s under-five mortality rate dropped by 94% since 
they implemented reforms in the late 1970s (WHO, 2008: 2).  With the particular disease 
demographics of South Africa, this country would benefit considerably from high quality 
primary health care facilities, particularly ones focused on holistic disease prevention and 
health promotion.  However, as the World Health Report points out, without incredible 
incentives, private health care facilities are unlikely to reorient themselves toward the values 
which govern primary health care.  It falls therefore squarely on the public sector to provide 
the necessary primary health care for the entire country. 
Data also demonstrates that private hospitals follow concentrations of medical aid 
membership.  This means that large portions of the country, those not marked by relative to 
high levels of wealth-holders, are left wanting in the distribution of private hospitals.  Those 
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who want to access private care have to incur travel costs in order to access these institutions, 
over and above the costs of care.  But perhaps most importantly is the treatment of South 
Africa’s most prolific disease.  As is shown in Chapter 7, medical schemes often restrict 
antiretroviral, dual and mono-therapy in their packages.  And those who do have access to 
these therapies through medical aid do not benefit from an integrated framework for the 
treatment and prevention of HIV-related infections such as TB and STIs because the medical 
scheme HIV management framework (such as the Disease Management Programme) are not 
holistically orientated due to its curative focus (Nadesan-Reddy, 2010: 163).  Stevens et al. 
(2007:210) lays the blame at the lack of financial incentive for for-profit health institutions to 
help in controlling infectious diseases such as HIV.  The for-profit private sector, despite the 
fact that it consumes such a great amount of resources, is therefore not making a meaningful 
contribution to controlling infectious disease in South Africa. 
The fourth question that needs to be asked is what role the private health system is playing in 
the deterioration of the public health system.  The exclusive nature of private health 
provision, due to high costs is having a detrimental effect on the health outcomes of South 
Africa.  As Chapter 7 has pointed out, utilising Kenneth Arrow’s theory on the medical care 
industry and the competitive model (1963), medical care cannot be reduced to an ordinary 
commodity without significant negative social consequences.  An attempt at running it on a 
profit motive will show various deviations from the norms on which markets operate 
efficiently.  South Africa’s total health expenditure is estimated at 8.5% of GDP which is 
comparatively high for a middle income country (Erasmus and Fitchen, 2010).  3.9% of this 
is represented by the public health budget leaving the remaining 4.3% to household 
expenditure on health.  As Chapter 6 showed, the Health Expenditure Reviews do not take 
into account the subsidies which are offered by the state to medical aid holders.  Nonetheless, 
these figures show that the private health sector consumes a large amount of financial 
resources, considering that it caters for less than a fifth of the population.  If the subsidies by 
the state to compensate for these high costs are removed, the burden of health expenses for 
those on medical aid could increase beyond their ability to pay.   
Due to the fact that the majority of those who are able to pay for health care utilise the private 
sector, vital resources remain in the private sector without ever flowing through the public 
system.  The public system therefore remains dependent on general taxation and is thus 
constantly vulnerable to international financial market volatility and macro-economic policy 
(Thomas et al., 2000: 3).  Due to the fact that the South African health system is bi-furcated 
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by class and race there is very little cross-subsidisation between the public and private 
system.  The continuing decline of spending in the public health sector by the middle-class 
sector of society plays a significant role in the deterioration of the public sector. This, 
combined with the lack of cross-subsidisation, the public sector’s dependence on general 
taxation, hidden resource flows from the state to the private sector, and the migration of 
doctors, nurses and administrative staff to private facilities, who can offer better salaries, all 
contribute to the continuing deterioration of the public health sector.  
If the South African health system, as a whole, is to contribute to the creation of a more equal 
and overall healthy society and not, as this thesis have shown, to the exacerbation of an 
already unequal order, health policy makers should review every aspect of the public/private 
system.  If policy makers do not formulate their policies to tackle the structural causes of 
inequality and poverty, these policies are likely to end up as they have – benefitting the 
middle and upper classes disproportionately. 
The capitalist system has recently found itself in a state of crisis all over the world.  In the 
process it has depended upon state resources to bail it out.  Systems working on market logic 
have needed considerable state regulation, and, as the recent banking crisis in the United 
States of America has shown, welcomes state intervention.  This has become the logic upon 
which the capitalist system has kept itself afloat.  In a very similar way the private health 
sector in South Africa treasures its ‘independence’ and boasts about its efficiency and quality, 
whilst consuming a large amount of state resources.   
Not only does the private sector save millions by not training or subsidising the training of 
their own doctors it depends largely on the state to do so.  Without subsidies medical schools 
are unlikely to attract many students due to the costliness of training doctors.  In a sense 
therefore the private sector is living off the welfare expenditure of the South African state and 
all who utilise it are highly dependent on the state for these forms of subsidisation.  If the 
subsidies which keep the private sector and all who utilise it afloat exceeds state investment 
in state sectors, as have been show in this thesis, then perhaps the argument so often made 
about the poor being dependent on the state should be revised and applied to the middle and 
upper classes. The challenge for overcoming inequality in South Africa is thus to identify the 
mechanisms by which poverty is reproduced: which points forcefully to a problem not of the 
benefits and choices of the poor in society but that of the rich.   
 
133 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abel-Smith, B. (1963), Paying for health services:  A study of costs and sources of finance in 
six countries, Geneva: WHO. 
African National Congress, (2007), 52nd ANC National Conference Resolutions, December  
2007, Polokwane, http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2536. 
Alcock, P., Glennerster, H., Oakley, A., and Sinfield, A. (eds.) (2001), Welfare and 
Wellbeing: Richard Titmuss's contribution to social policy, Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Allsopp, J. (2005), ‘Review of Private Complaints and Public Health:  Richard Titmuss and  
the National Health Service’, in the Journal of Social Policy, Vol.34, Issue 02, April 
2005, pp.326-327, Cambridge University Press. 
Alma Ata, (1978), Primary health care: report of the International Conference on Primary  
Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR, 6-12 September 1978. 
Arrow, K. J. (1963), ‘Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, in American  
Economic Review, Vol.53, Issue 05, pp.941-973, American Economic Association. 
Arrow, K. J. (1972), ‘Gifts and Exchanges’, in M. Cohen, T. Nagel, & T. Scanlon, Medicine 
and Moral Philosophy, pp.139-158, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Atkinson, A.B. (1975), ‘Income Distribution and Social Change Revisited’, in Journal of  
Social Policy, Volume 4, Issue 01, January 1975, pp.57-68, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Badat, S. (forthcoming), ‘Redressing apartheid’s legacy of social exclusion: social equity,  
redress and admission to higher education in South Africa’, in One World, Many 
Knowledges: Dilemmas of Change, forthcoming book publication. 
Baines, G. (2003). ‘Revisiting Urban African Policy and the Reforms of the Smuts 
Government, 1939-1948’. Workshop on South Africa in the 1940s, South African 
Research Centre, September 2003. Kingston.  
Baldwin, P. (1990), The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare 
State 1875 - 1975. Great Britain: Cambridge University Press. 
Barnes, H. and Wright, G. (2012) ‘Defining child poverty in South Africa using the socially  
perceived necessities approach’, in A. Minujin and S. Nandy (eds.), Global Child 
Poverty and Well-Being: Measurement, Concepts, Policy and Action, Studies in 
Poverty, Inequality and Social Exclusion Series, pp.135-154, Bristol: Policy Press. 
Bernier, N.F. and Clavier, C. (2011), ‘Public health policy research: making the case for a  
political science approach’, in Health Promotion International, Vol. 26, No. 1, 
Oxford University Press. 
134 
 
Blecher, M., Kollipara, A., De Jager, P. and Zulu, N. (2011), ‘Chapter 3:  Health Financing’,  
in South African Health Review 2011, pp. 29-48, Durban:  Health Systems Trust. 
British Medical Association, (1905), ‘Report on Contract Practice’, in British Medical  
Journal, Supp. July 22, 1905, p.28, BMJ Publishing Group Ltd. 
Browne Commission, (1986), Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Health  
Services, (RP 67/1986), Pretoria: Government Printer. 
Bulmer, M. (1991), ‘National contexts for the development of social-policy research: British  
and American research on poverty and social welfare compared’, in P. Wagner, C. 
Hirschon Weiss, B. Wittrock and H. Wollmann (eds.), Social Sciences and Modern 
States: National Experiences and Theoretical Crossroads, pp.148-67, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bunting, B.P. (1964), The Rise of the South African Reich, London: Penguin. 
Bunting, I. (1994), ‘Public expenditure on the education and training of medical personnel’.  
National Health Expenditure Review, Technical Paper No. 7, Durban: Health Systems 
Trust. 
Bureau of Market Research, (2010), Press statement to Personal income Estimates for South  
Africa, 2010, Research Report No.396, Bureau of Market Research. 
Carnegie Commission, (1932), The Poor White Problem in South Africa: Report of the  
Carnegie Commission: Joint Findings and Recommendations, Stellenbosch: Ecclesia. 
Clark, C. (1954), Welfare and Taxation, Catholic Social Guild. 
Collard, D. (1978), Altruism and Economy:  A Study in Non-Selfish Economics, London:  
Martin Robertson. 
Coovadia, H., Jewkes, R., Barron, P., Sanders, D. and McIntyre, D. (2009) ‘The health and  
health system of South Africa: historical roots of current public health challenges’, in 
The Lancet, Vol.375, September 5, 2009.  Elsevier Ltd. 
Cornell, J., Goudge, J., McIntyre, D, and Mbatsha, S. (2001), National Health Accounts – 
The Private Sector Report, March 2001, Pretoria: Department of Health. 
Council of Medical Schemes, (2001), Final Report on Statutory Information Survey:   
Research and Monitoring, July 2001. 
Davenport, T.R.H. (1987), South Africa: A Modern History, 3rd edition, Basingstoke:  
Macmillan. 
Deacon, A. (1993), ‘Richard Titmuss: 20 Years On’, in Journal of Social Policy, Vol.22,  
Issue 02, April 1993, pp.235-242, Cambridge University Press. 
 
135 
 
Deacon, H. (2000), ‘Racism and Medical Science in South Africa’s Cape Colony in the  
Mid- to Late Nineteenth Century’, in Osiris, 2nd Series, Vol. 15, pp.190-206, 
University of Chicago Press. 
Development Bank of South Africa, (2008), A Roadmap for the Reform of the South African  
Health System, 10 November 2008. 
Doherty, J. and McLeod, H. (2002), ‘Chapter 3: Medical Schemes’. In P. Ijumba, A. Ntuli, 
and P. Barron, South African Health Review 2002, pp.41-66, Durban: Health Systems 
Trust 
Doherty, J., Thomas, S. and Muirhead, D. (2002), Health Financing and Expenditure in Post- 
Apartheid South Africa 1996/97 – 1998/99.  The National Health Accounts Project 
Consolidated Report. Health Economics Unit, UCT, Cape Town: Department of 
Health. 
Donnison, D. (1979), ‘Social Policy after Titmuss’, in Journal of Social Policy, Vol.8, Issue  
02, April 1979, pp.145-156, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Du Toit, A. (2003), ‘Hunger in the Valley of Fruitfulness:  globalisation, “social exclusion”  
and chronic poverty in Ceres, South Africa’, Draft paper presented at the conference 
‘Staying Poor: Chronic Poverty and Development Policy’, University of Manchester, 
7 to 9 April 2003. 
Du Toit, A. (2004), ‘’Social Exclusion’ Discourse and Chronic Poverty:  A South African  
Case Study’, in Development and Change, Vol.35, Issue 05, pp.987-1010, Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Du Toit, A. (2008), ‘Living on the margins: the social dynamics of economic  
marginalisation’, in Development Southern Africa, Vol.25, No.2, June, pp.135-150,  
London: Routledge. 
Du Toit, A. (2011a), ‘The Proper Subject of Research is Inequality’, in B. Maharaj, A. Desai, 
& P. Bond (eds), Zuma's own goal: losing South Africa's "war on poverty", pp.125-
149, Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press. 
Du Toit, A. (2011b), Nasruddin's Key: Poverty Measurement and the Government of 
Marginal Populations, Working Paper 20, Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian 
Studies, University of the Western Cape, Bellville: UWC. 
Du Toit, A. (2012), ‘The Trouble with Poverty:  Reflections on South Africa’s Post-
Apartheid Anti-Poverty Consensus’, Working Paper 22, Institute for Poverty, Land 
and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape, Bellville: UWC. 
Durkheim, E. (1893), The Division of Labor in Society, English Edition (1965), G. Simpson, 
English Translation, New York: Free Press Macmillan. 
136 
 
Durkheim, E. (1957), Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, English Edition, Great Britain:   
Burleigh Press. 
Erasmus, M. and Fitchen, E. (2010), Econex Occasional Note, November 2010. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity  
Press. 
Fontaine, P. (2002), ‘Blood, Politics and Social Science: Richard Titmuss and the Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 1957-1973’, in Isis, Vol. 39, Issue 03, pp.401-434, University of 
Chicago Press. 
Gamble, A. (1988), Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
George, V. and Wilding, P. (1985), Ideology and Social Welfare, London:  Routledge. 
Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W. (eds.), (1948), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Great  
 Britain: TJ International Ltd. 
Giddens, A. (1977), Studies in Social and Political Theory, London: Hutchinson. 
Gilson, L. and McIntyre, D. (2000), ‘Redressing dis-advantage: Promoting vertical equity  
 within South Africa’, in Health Care Analysis, Vol.8, pp.235-258, Springer. 
Gilson, L. and McIntyre, D. (2002), ‘Experiences from South Africa: dealing with a poor  
health legacy of apartheid’, in Whitehead M, Evans T, Diderichsen F and Bhuiya A 
(eds). Challenging inequities in health: From ethics to action, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gilson, L., Doherty, J., Lake, S., McIntyre, D., Mwikisa, C. and Thomas, C. (2003), ‘The  
SAZA study: implementing health financing reform in South Africa and Zambia’, in 
Health Policy and Planning, Vol.18, Issue 01, pp.31-46, Oxford University Press. 
Glazer, N. (1971), ‘Blood’, in The Public Interest, Number 24, Summer 1971, pp.86-94,  
 National Affairs. 
Gluckman Commission, (1944), Report on the Provision of an Organised National Health  
Service for all Sections of the Union of South Africa, Union of South Africa, 
(U.G.30), Pretoria: Government Printer. 
Goffman, E. (1963), Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, England:  
 Penguin Books. 
Gough, I. (1979), The Political Economy of the Welfare State, London: Macmillan. 
Gouldner, A.W. (1971), ‘Review of The Gift Relationship’, in New York Times Book Review,  
21 Mar 1971, 76:2-3, 20, The New York Times Company. 
 
137 
 
Government Employees Medical Scheme, (2010), Annual Report. http://www.gems.gov.za/  
default.aspx?mESVdUJkb8l9G04DJ+aoz16soHtrplOu/zGvqGe06yg= 
Government Employees Medical Scheme Website:   
http://www.gems.gov.za/default.aspx?oMeLCYJThx+ydtQfDMXkfQ 
Grebenik, E. (1943), ‘Review of Birth, Poverty and Wealth’, in Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Vol. 106, No. 2, pp.171-172.  Royal Statistical Society. 
Grebenik, E. (1963), ‘Review of Income Distribution and Social Change’, Journal of the 
 Royal Statistical Society, Series A (General), Vol. 126, No. 1, p.142. Royal Statistical  
Society. 
Gruber, J., and Levitt, L. (2000), ‘Tax Subsidies for Health Insurance: Costs and Benefits’, in 
Health Affairs, 2000, Vol.19, 1 Feb., pp.72-85, Project HOPE. 
Hagenbuch, W. (1958), Social Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Henman, P., and Marston, G. (2008), ‘The Social Division of Welfare Surveillance’ in 
Journal of Social Policy, Vol.37, Issue 02, pp.187-205, Cambridge University Press. 
Hickey, S. and Du Toit, A. (2007), Adverse incorporation, social exclusion and chronic  
poverty, CPRC Working Paper 81, Chronic Poverty Research Centre. 
Himmelfarb, G. (1984), The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age, London: 
Faber and Faber Ltd. 
Hood, C. (2000), ‘Paradoxes of public-sector managerialism, old public management and 
public service bargains’. International Public Management Journal, Volume 3, pp.1-
22. London: Routledge. 
Hjortsberg, C. (2001), Issue Paper on National Health Accounts – Where are we today?  
Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, (Sida):  
Department for Democracy and Social Development, Health Division. 
Hospital Association of South Africa, (2008), Private Hospital Review,  
http://www.hasa.co.za/documents/detail/98/ 
Human Sciences Research Council, (2003), Media Brief:  HIV/AIDS spending in Southern 
Africa below requirements for prevention, care and treatment, 
www.hsrc.ac.za/Media_Release-181.phtml 
Iliffe, J. (1987), The African Poor: A History, Cambridge University Press. 
Jefferys, K. (1987), ‘British Politics and Social Policy during the Second World War’, in The  
Historical Journal, Vol.30, Issue 01, March 1987, pp.123-144, Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
138 
 
Jewkes, J., and Jewkes, S. (1961), The Genesis of the British National Health Service,  
University of California: Blackwell. 
Katz, B. (1989), The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare,  
New York: Pantheon Books. 
Katz Commission, (1994), Third Interim Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Certain  
Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa. Pretoria: Government Printers. 
Kelly, D.L., (1957), Journal of Medical Education, Part 2, pp.195-196.  Shaheed Beheshti  
University of Medical Sciences & Health Services. 
Kuhn, T. (1970), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press. 
Lagden Commission, (1903), Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, Cape  
Times Limited, Government Printers, 1905. 
Leatt, A. (2006), ‘Child Poverty – Its Meaning and Extent’, in J. Movson, K. Hall, C. Smith  
and M. Shung-King (eds), South Africa Child Gauge 2006, Rondebosch: Children's 
Institute, University of Cape Town. 
Lees, D.S. (1961), Health through Choice, Institute of Economic Affairs Pamphlet, 1961. 
Le Grand, J. (1997), ‘Knights, knaves or pawns? Human behaviour and social policy’,  
Journal of Social Policy, Vol.26, Issue 2, pp. 146-169, Cambridge University Press. 
Legassick, M. (1974), ‘Legislation, Ideology and Economy in Post-1948 South Africa’,  
Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol.1, Issue 01, pp.5-35, London: Routledge. 
Legassick, M. (1975), 'South Africa: Forced Labour, Industrialization, and Racial  
Differentiation', in Harris, R (ed.), The Political Economy of Africa, Boston: 
Schenkman 
Lewis, R., & Maude, A. (1949), The English Middle Classes, London: Phoenix House. 
Lewis, R., & Maude, A. (1952), Professional People, London: Phoenix House. 
Lewis, J. (1997), ‘Gender and welfare regimes: further thoughts’, Social Politics, Summer,  
pp.160–177, Oxford University Press. 
Lightman, E.S. (1981), ‘Continuity in Social Policy Behaviours:  The Case of Voluntary  
Blood Donorship’, in Journal of Social Policy, Vol.10, Issue 1, January, pp.53-79, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Littlewood, M. (1998), How To Create a Competitive Market in Pensions: The International 
Lessons, Choice in Welfare Series No. 45, London: IEA. 
Macleod, I., & Powell, J. (1949). The Social Services - Needs and Means, London: 
Conservative Political Centre. 
139 
 
Mann, K. (2009), ‘Remembering and Rethinking the Social Divisions of Welfare: 50 Years  
On’, in Journal of Social Policy, Vol.38, Issue 01, January 2009, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Manuel, T. (2012), SABC News Interview, 30 October 2012. 
Marshall, T. H. (1973), ‘Richard Titmuss: an appreciation’, British Journal of Sociology,  
Vol.24, Issue 02, pp.137-139, London: LSE. 
Mbeki, T. (2005), Address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, on the occasion of  
the Heritage Day celebrations, Taung, North-West Province, 24 September. 
www.info.gov. za/speeches/2005/0509261 2 1 5 1004.html  
McIntyre, D. (1993), Health Sector Financing and Expenditure in South Africa, Health  
Economic Unit Working Paper No.4, Department of Community Health: University 
of Cape Town. 
McIntyre, D. (1997), Health care financing and expenditure in South Africa: Towards equity  
and efficiency in policy making, PhD Dissertation, Cape Town: UCT. 
McIntyre, D., Valentine, N. and Cornell, J. (1995), ‘Private sector health care expenditure in  
South Africa’, in South African Medical Journal, Vol.85, No 3, March, pp.133-135. 
Cape Town: Health and Medicine Publishing Group. 
McIntyre, D., Bloom, G., Doherty, J. And Brijlal, P. (1995), Health Expenditure and Finance  
in South Africa, Health Systems Trust and World Bank. 
McLean, I., and Poulton, J. (1986), ‘Good Blood, Bad Blood, and the Market: The Gift  
Relationship Revisited, in Journal of Public Policy, Vol.6, Issue 04, October 1986,  
pp.431- 445, Cambridge University Press. 
McLeod, H. (2009), The Future Role of Private Health Insurance, Innovative Medicines  
South Africa, IMSA. 
McLeod, H. and Ramjee, S. (2007), ‘Chapter 4:  Medical Schemes’, in South African Health  
Review 2007, pp. 47-70, Durban: Health Systems Trust. 
Makiwane, M. (2010), “The Child Support Grant and Teenage Childbearing in South Africa”,  
Development Southern Africa, Vol.27. Issue 2, pp. 193-204, Development Bank of 
Southern Africa. 
Matsebula, T. and Willie, M. (2007), ‘Private Hospitals’, in South African Health Review  
2007, pp. 159-174, Durban: Health Systems Trust. 
Meth, C. (2004), Ideology and social policy: ‘handouts’ and the spectre of ‘dependency’, in  
Transformation, No.56. UKZN Press. 
 
140 
 
Meyer, T. and Bridgen, P. (2008), ‘Class, gender and chance: the social division of welfare  
and occupational pensions in the United Kingdom’, in Ageing and Society, Vol.28, 
Issue 03, April 2008, pp.353-381, Cambridge University Press. 
Minister of Health, (2011), National Health Insurance in South Africa, Policy Paper of  
Pretoria: Government Gazette, No.34523.  
Ministerial Task Team (2004) 'Final recommendations concerning the implementation of 
Social Health Insurance in South Africa,' Report 1. Pretoria: Department of Health. 
Mishra, R. (2002), ‘Review of Reisman (2001) and Alcock et al (2001)’, in Journal of Social  
Policy, Vol.31, Issue 04, pp.747-752, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Muller, M. (1997), ‘Overview of what is happening in healthcare in South Africa’,  
Bilateralism Review, Vol.2, No.4. 
Nadesan-Reddy, N. (2010),  A Health Expenditure Review of the South African Private  
Health Care Sector from 2003 to 2006.  Thesis submitted for the degree Masters in 
Medicine in the School of Family and Public Health Medicine, UKZN. 
National Treasury, (2003), (2006), (2011), (2012), Budget Review, Pretoria: National  
Treasury. 
National Treasury and South African Revenue Service, (2008), (2009), (2010), (2011), ‘Tax  
Statistics:  A joint Publication between National Treasury and the South African 
Revenue Service’.  
Nattrass, N., and Seekings, J. (1997), ‘Citizenship and Welfare in South Africa:   
Deracialisation and inequality in a Labour-Surplus Economy’, in Canadian Journal of 
African Studies, Vol.31, No.3, pp.452-481. London: Routledge. 
Neves, D. Samson, M., van Niekerk, I.,Hlatshwayo, S. and du Toit, A. (2009), The Use and  
Effectiveness of Social Grants in South Africa, Research report to FinMark Trust. 
Noble, M.W.J, Wright, G.C., Magasela, W.K. and Ratcliffe, A. (2008), ‘Developing a  
Democratic Definition of Poverty in South Africa’, in Journal of Poverty, Vol.11, Issue 
4, pp.117-141, Routledge 
Noble, M.W.J, and Wright, G.C. (2012a), ‘Ring of fire – socially perceived necessities in  
informal urban settlements in South Africa’, in Policy & Politics forthcoming, The 
Policy Press. 
Noble, M.W.J, and Wright, G.C. (2012b), ‘Does Widespread Lack Undermine the Socially  
Perceived Necessities Approach to Defining Poverty? Evidence from South Africa’, in 
Journal of Social Policy, FirstView Article, August 2012, pp. 1-19, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Offe, C. in Keane, J. (ed), (1984), Contradictions of the Welfare State, London: Hutchinson 
141 
 
Packard, R. M. (1987), ‘Tuberculosis and the Development of Industrial Health Policies on 
the Witwatersrand, 1902-1932’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 13, No.2, 
pp.187-208.  London: Routledge. 
Pienaar Commission, (1927), Union of South Africa,  First Report of the Commission on Old 
Age Pensions and National Insurance. Cape Town: UG 21 of 1927. 
Pierson, C. (1991), Beyond the Welfare State? Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Pinker, R. (1979), The Idea of Welfare, London: Heinemann. 
Pinker, R. (2006), ‘From Gift Relationships to Quasi-markets:  An Odyssey along the Policy  
Paths of Altruism and Egoism’, in Social Policy and Administration, Vol.40, No.1,  
February 2006, pp.10-25, Blackwell Publishing. 
Posel, D. (2005). The Case for a Welfare State: Poverty & the Politics of the Urban African 
Family in the 1930's & 1940's. In A. Jeeves, & S. Dubow, South Africa's 1940's: 
Worlds of Possibilities, pp. 64-83. Juta. 
Price, M. (1989), ‘Explaining trends in the privatisation of health services in South Africa’,  
in Health Policy and Planning, Vol.4, Issue 2, pp.121-130, Oxford University Press. 
Price, M. (1994), ‘The Impact of Political Transformation in South Africa on Public/Private  
Mix Policy Debates’, Health Policy and Planning, Vol.9, Issue 01, pp.50-62, Oxford 
University Press. 
Price, M., Khunoane, B. and Van den Heever, A. (1994), Should tax concessions on medical 
aid contributions be removed? A political-economic analysis, Johannesburg: Centre 
for Health Policy, University of the Witwatersrand.  
Reisman, D. (2001), Richard Titmuss:  Welfare and Society, 2nd Edition, Palgrave Manmillan 
Reisman, D. (2004), ‘Richard Titmuss: Welfare as Good Conduct’, in European Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol.20, pp.771-794, Elsevier. 
Rich, P. (1990), ‘Race, Science and the Legitimisation of White Supremacy in South Africa,  
1902-1940’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol.23, pp.665-86, 
Boston University Press. 
Roberts, F. (1952). The Cost of Health.  London: Turnstile Press.  
Rose, H. (1981), ‘Rereading Titmuss: The Sexual Division of Welfare’, in Journal of Social  
Policy, Vol.10, Issue 04, October 1981, pp.477-501, Cambridge University Press. 
Rosenberg, C. (1962), The Cholera Years, University of Chicago Press. 
Rosenkrantz, B. (1972), Public Health and the State, Changing Views in Massachusetts,  
1842-1939, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
142 
 
Ruiters, G. (2006), ‘New faces of privatisation’, in P. Bond, H. Chitonge, & A. Hopfmann  
(eds.), The Accumulation of Capital in Southern Africa: Rosa Luxemburg's 
Contemporary Relevance, Proceedings of the Rosa Luxemburg Seminar 2006 and the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society’s Colloquium on Economy, 
Society and Nature, pp. 119-126. 
Ruiters, G. (2011), ‘Introduction’, in G. Ruiters (ed.), Challenging Commercialised Health  
Care in Southern Africa: Towards an equity perspective on National Health, Institute 
of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University. 
Sagner, A. (2000), Ageing and Social Policy in South Africa: Historical Perspectives with 
Particular Reference to the Eastern Cape, in Journal of Southern African Studies, 
Volume 26, Number 3, pp.523-553, London: Routledge. 
Samson, M., Lee, U., Ndlebe, A., MacQuene, K., Van Niekerk, I., Gandhi, V., Harigaya, T.  
and Abrahams, C. (2004), The Social and Economic Impact of South Africa’s Social 
Security System, Commissioned by the Economics and Finance Directorate, Ministry 
of Social Development, South Africa. 
Samuelson, P.A. (1971) ‘Blood’, in Newsweek, 13 Sept. 1971, pp. 160–161. 
Schlesinger, A. (1966), ‘Tawney and Titmuss on the Struggle for Equality’, in Social Work,  
Vol.11, January 1966, Oxford University Press. 
Sinfield, A. (1978), ‘Analyses in the Social Division of Welfare’, in Journal of Social Policy,  
Vol.7, Issue 02, April 1978, pp.129-156, Cambridge University Press. 
Singer, P. (1981), ‘Altruism and Commerce: A Defense of Titmuss against Arrow’, in M. 
Cohen, T. Nagel, & T. Scanlon, Medicine and Moral Philosophy, pp. 159-167, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Smit Commission, (1942), Union of South Africa, Report of the Interdepartmental  
Committee on Social, Health and Economic Conditions of Urban Natives, GP S 7272, 
Pretoria: Government Printers. 
South African Social Security Agency, (2009), Annual Report, Pretoria: SASSA. 
Starr, P. (1982), The Social Transformation of American Medicine, New Haven: Basic  
Books. 
Statistics South Africa, (1995), (1996), (1997), (1998), (1999), October Household Survey,  
Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. 
Statistics South Africa, (1998b), Mid-year Population Estimates 1991-1998. Pretoria:  
Statistics South Africa. 
 
Statistics South Africa, (2002), (2003), (2004), (2005), (2006), (2007), (2009), (2010),  
143 
 
(2012), General Household Survey, Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. 
 
Steele, M. (2006).Report on Incentive Structures of Social Assistance Grants in South Africa.   
Kesho Consulting and Business Solutions (Pty) Ltd., Geospace International. Pretoria: 
Department of Social Development, South Africa. 
Stevens, M., Sinanovic, E., Regensberg, L. and Hislop, M. (2007), ‘HIV and AIDS, STI and  
TB in the Private Sector’ in South African Health Review 2007, Durban: Health 
Systems Trust. 
Stewart, M. (2012), ‘Tax Expenditures:  Lessons from History and Country Experience’, in  
Africa Tax Spotlight, First Quarter, Volume 3.  Tax Justice Network. 
Sunday Express, December 30, 1984, ‘Now Rembrandt sets up a chain of private clinics’.   
Sunday Times, Business Times, June 29, 1986, ‘Rembrandt values clinics at R170m’.   
Surrey, S.S. (1970), ‘Federal Income Tax Reform:  The varied approaches necessary to  
replace tax expenditures with direct governmental assistance’.  Harvard Law Review, 
Vol.84, No.2, Dec 1970.  Harvard Law Review Publishing Association. 
Surrey, S.S. and McDaniel, P.R. (1985), Tax Expenditures, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Swanson, M. (1977), ‘’The Sanitation Syndrome': Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy  
in the Cape Colony, 1900-1909’, Journal of African History, Vol.18, Issue 03, 
pp.387-410, Cambridge University Press. 
Swift, Z.L. (2006), World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3927, Vanguard, May 2006. 
Tawney, R. H. (1913), Memoranda on Problems of Poverty. University of London, Ratan 
Tata Foundation. 
Tawney, R.H. (1914), The Establishment of Minimum Rates in the Chain-Making Industry  
under the Trade Boards Act of 1909. G. Bell and Sons, London. 
Tawney, R.H. (1931), Equality, London:  George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
Teppo, A.B. (2004), ‘The Making of a Good White:  A Historical Ethnography of the  
Rehabilitation of Poor Whites in a Suburb of Cape Town’, Research Series in 
Anthropology, University of Helsinki, Helsinki University Press. 
Local Government and Health Consortium, (2004), Decentralising Health Services in South  
Africa: constraints and opportunities - a crosscutting report, Durban: Health Systems 
Trust. 
Thomas, S., Muirhead, D., Doherty, J., McIntyre, D., Muheki, C. and Dawkinum, D. (2000), 
National Health Accounts Project:  The Public Sector Report, Pretoria:  Department 
of Health. 
144 
 
Titmuss, R.M. (1938), Poverty and Population: A Factual Study of Contemporary Social 
Waste, London: Macmillan. 
Titmuss, R.M. (1943), Birth, Poverty and Wealth: a study of infant mortality, London: 
Hamish Hamilton Medical Books. 
Titmuss, R.M. (1950), Problems of Social Policy, London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd. 
Titmuss, R.M. (1958), Essays on 'The Welfare State', London: George Allen and Unwin. 
Titmuss, R.M. (1961), Social Policies and Population Growth in Mauritius, London: Frank  
Cass and Co. Ltd. 
Titmuss, R.M. (1962), Income Distribution and Social Change, London: George Allen and 
Unwin Ltd. 
Titmuss, R.M. (1963), ‘Ethics and Economics of Medical Care’, in Medical Care Vol.1, 
No.1, pp.16-22, Lippincott Williams & Wilkins 
Titmuss, R.M. (1964a), The Health Services of Tanganyika, A Report to the Government.  
London: Pitman Medical. 
Titmuss, R.M. (1964b), ‘The Limits of the Welfare State’, New Left Review, Issue 27, 
Sept/Oct 1964, London: Verso. 
Titmuss, R.M. (1966), ‘Titmuss to Albertine Winner’, 14 April 1966, Series 2, File 260. 
Titmuss Papers. 
Titmuss, R.M. (1968), Commitment to Welfare, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
Titmuss, R.M. (1970), The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, London: 
George Allen & Unwin. 
Titmuss, R.M. (1987), The Philosophy of Welfare, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
Titmuss, R.M. and Abel-Smith, B. (1956), The Cost of the National Health Service in 
England and Wales. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Titmuss, R.M. and Clark, F. Le Gros, (1939), Our Food Problem, Penguin Books Ltd. 
Titmuss, R.M., and Titmuss, K. (1942), Parents Revolt, London: Secker and Warburg. 
Townsend, P. (1979), Poverty in the United Kingdom: A survey of household resources and  
standards of living, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 
Trapido, A., Mqoqi, NP., Williams, BG. (1998), ‘Prevalence of Occupational Lung Disease  
145 
 
in a Random Sample of Former Mineworkers, Libode District, Eastern Cape 
Province, South Africa’,  American Journal of Industrial Medicine, Vol.34, pp.305-
313. 
Turner, A., Drake, J. and Hills, J. (The Turner Commission) (2005), A New Pension  
Settlement for the Twenty-First Century. The Second Report of the Pensions 
Commission, London: The Stationery Office. 
UNISA, (2010), Personal Income Estimates for South Africa, The Bureau of Market 
Research (BMR) at the University of South Africa, 
www.unisa.ac.za/contents/faculties/ems/docs/Press396.pdf  
Vale, P., & Jacklin, H. (2009). Re-imagining the Social in South Africa: Critique, Theory and 
Post-apartheid Society. University of Kwazulu-Natal Press. 
Van den Heever, A.M. (1998), ‘Private Sector Health Reform in South Africa’, Health  
Economics, Vol.7, pp.281-289, Elsevier. 
Van den Heever, A.M, (2007), Pension Reform and Old Age Grants in South Africa,  
University of Pretoria. 
Van Niekerk, R. (2007). Social Policy and Citizenship in South Africa: The development of 
inclusive, de-racialised social policies in the periods 1939-1961 and 1989-1998. 
Unpublished Thesis. 
Wadee, H., Gilson, L., Thiede, M., Okorafor, O., McIntyre, D.  (2003)  ‘Health Care Inequity  
in South Africa and the Public/Private Mix’, Draft paper prepared for the 
RUIG/UNRISD project on Globalisation, Inequality and Health, September 2003. 
Walshe, A.P. (1963), ‘The Changing Content of Apartheid’, Review of Politics, pp.343-61, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Welshman, J. (2004), ‘The Unknown Titmuss’, in Journal of Social Policy, Vol.33, Issue 2, 
pp. 225-247. Cambridge University Press. 
Welshman, J. (2007). Underclass: A History of the Excluded, 1880-2000. London: 
Continuum International Publishing. 
Wolpe, H. (1972), ‘Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: from segregation to  
apartheid’, in Economy & Society, Vol.1, Issue 04, pp.425–456, London: LSE 
Academic Publishing. 
World Health Organisation, (2013), National Health Account Indicators,  
Geneva, WHO,  http://apps.who.int/nha/database/StandardReportList.aspx  
 
World Health Organisation, (2006), World Health Report 2006: Working together for health,  
Geneva: WHO. 
World Health Organisation, (2008) World Health Report 2008: Primary health care – now  
146 
 
more than ever, Geneva: WHO. 
World Health Organisation, 2012, Global Health Expenditure Database.  
http://apps.who.int/nha/database/StandardReportList.aspx  
Williams, C., Campbell, N., Mqoqi, N., Kleinschmidt, I. (1998), ‘Occupational health,  
Occupational Illness: Tuberculosis, Silicosis and HIV on the South African Mines’ in 
Daniel E. Banks and John E. Parker (eds.), Occupation Lung Disease:  An 
International Perspective, pp.95-103. London: Chapman & Hall Medical. 
Wilensky, H.L. And Lebeaux, C.N. (1958), Industrial Society and Social Welfare, New York:  
The Free Press. 
Williams, F., Popay, J. and Oakley, A. (1999), ‘Changing paradigms of welfare’, in F.  
Williams, J. Popay and A. Oakley (eds.), Welfare Research: A Critical Review, pp. 2-
16, London: UCL Press Limited. 
Wolfman, B. (1985), ‘Tax Expenditures:  From Idea to Ideology’, in The Harvard Law  
Review, Vol.99, No.2, Dec.1985, pp.491-498, Harvard Law Review Publishing 
Association. 
Woolard, I., Harttgen, K. And Klasen, S. (2010), The Evolution and Impact of Social Security  
in South Africa, Paper prepared for the Conference on “Promoting Resilience through 
Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa”, organised by the European Report of 
Development in Dakar, Senegal, 28-30 June, 2010. 
Wootton, B. (1959), Review of Essays on ‘The Welfare State’, The British Journal of  
Sociology, Vol. 10, No. 2, Jun. 1959, pp.156-158, London: LSE Academic 
Publishing. 
Wright, D. (1971), The Psychology of Moral Behaviour, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Wright, G., Noble, M. and Magasela, W. (2010) 'Towards a democratic definition of  
poverty: socially perceived necessities in South Africa', in B. Roberts, M. wa Kivilu, 
and Y.D. Davids (eds.), South African Social Attitudes 2nd Report: Reflections on the 
Age of Hope, Cape Town:  Human Sciences Research Council Press, pp.143-166. 
 
